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ABSTRACT
The confirmation of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to the Supreme Court
coincided with a dramatic shift in the Court’s approach to securities
law. This Article documents Powell’s influence in changing the
Court’s direction in securities law. Powell’s influence was the product
of his extensive experience with the securities laws as a corporate law-
yer, which gave him much greater familiarity with that body of law
than his fellow Justices had. That experience also made him skeptical
of civil liability, particularly class and derivative actions. Powell’s
skepticism led him to interpret the securities law in a consistently nar-
row fashion to reduce liability exposure and increase predictability.
Powell also rebuffed the Securities and Exchange Commission’s ef-
forts to expand its reach, most notably in insider trading and takeover
regulation. Powell’s experience and interest brought a halt to the con-
tinuing expansion of the federal securities law.
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INTRODUCTION
The 1960s witnessed a rapid expansion of the federal securities
laws, primarily through broad interpretations of Rule 10b-5 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act1 by the courts and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Rule 10b-5—ostensibly a simple antifraud provi-
sion—threatened to become an overarching “federal corporation
law.”2 In 1961, the SEC pioneered prohibitions against insider trading
in its Cady, Roberts decision.3 In 1964, the Supreme Court recognized
the existence of a private cause of action for proxy violations in J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak.4 That recognition tacitly validated private suits
under Rule 10b-5 as well, setting loose a plethora of decisions in
which lower federal courts imposed a variety of duties on corporate
officers and directors. In 1969, Louis Loss observed that “the great
Rule 10b-5 . . . seems to be taking over the universe gradually.”5 The
lower courts could feel confident that their expansive interpretations
would be upheld, given the Supreme Court’s consistently broad
reading of those laws from the time of their enactment.6 This trend
reached its apogee during the Court’s October 1971 term, with two of
the most expansive decisions.7 The federal securities laws seemed
poised to take over the law governing corporations entirely.
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002).
2. See generally Arthur Fleischer, Jr., “Federal Corporation Law”: An Assessment, 78
HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965) (arguing that “the growth of federal law in the corporate area is
sound,” but noting the criticism “that federal law has invaded areas never contemplated by the
Congress when adopting the securities acts”).
3. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912–13 (1961).
4. 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1964).
5. Louis L. Loss, The American Law Institute’s Federal Securities Code Project, 25 BUS.
LAW. 27, 34 (1969); see also David S. Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of
Corporations by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 NW. U. L. REV. 185, 185 (1964) (“Despite
Congressional unwillingness to enact a ‘federal law of corporations’, it now appears that such a
law is arising by implication through interpretation of the various securities acts.”).
6. See Alfred F. Conard, Securities Regulation in the Burger Court, 56 U. COLO. L. REV.
193, 195 (1985) (demonstrating that of nineteen Supreme Court securities law cases decided be-
tween 1933 and 1971, the Court opted for the broader approach in sixteen).
7. The two cases are Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972)
(recognizing a presumption of reliance for fraudulent omissions), and Superintendent of Insur-
ance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (expanding the “in connection” re-
quirement under section 10(b)). Neither Powell nor Justice Rehnquist participated in these two
cases. Bankers Life was Justice Douglas’s last securities law opinion for the Court and Affiliated
Ute was Justice Blackmun’s first. Search of Westlaw, SCT database (Mar. 2003). Bankers Life
was unanimous and Affiliated Ute was unanimous except for a partial dissent by Justice Doug-
las; he would have held the United States liable for the fraud as well. See Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S.
at 157 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that Justice Douglas would
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This trend dominated corporate and securities law when Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., was sworn in as an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court on January 7, 1972. Powell’s swearing in coincided with an im-
mediate sea change in the path of the federal securities laws.8 Al-
though the Burger Court has been described as “the counter-
revolution that wasn’t” in constitutional law,9 that description does
not fit securities law. By the time Powell retired from the Court on
June 26, 1987, federal securities law had been confined. The threat to
state corporate law had been beaten back, if only for a time.10
It would be an exaggeration to give Justice Powell sole credit for
this retrenchment—other Justices wrote important opinions curtailing
the growth of liability under the federal securities law.11 And the
threat of a federal incorporation was beaten back with the election of
Ronald Reagan, which augured a renewed commitment to the gov-
erning role of the states. Nonetheless, it would be difficult to identify
anyone who did more to limit the reach of the federal securities law
than Powell.
This Article chronicles Justice Powell’s influence on federal secu-
rities law. Powell participated in forty-one decisions involving the
federal securities laws, writing twelve opinions for the Court. Powell
wrote some of the foundational opinions in securities law, found in
“go further” than the Court by holding that the United States had “waived sovereign immunity
to petitioners’ claims”). Justice Blackmun characterized his opinion in Affiliated Ute as taking “a
very liberal approach to Rule 10b-5. This may represent a step beyond any point the Court has
heretofore reached.” Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Apr.
10, 1972) (from the files of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Library of Congress).
8. See Lewis D. Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891, 891–92 (1977) (footnotes omitted):
Before recent Supreme Court decisions, plaintiffs’ lawyers and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission had been relatively free to devise original and imaginative causes
of action based upon the federal securities laws. Following these decisions, however,
the entire momentum has shifted. In these recent holdings, the Supreme Court has
consistently decided in favor of the defendants and has enunciated principles that
may circumscribe the rights of plaintiffs under the federal securities laws for many
years to come.
9. THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T (Vincent Blasi ed.,
1983).
10. The threat has recently resurfaced in the recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which
intrudes upon state corporate law in a variety of ways. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
11. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977) (White, J.) (hold-
ing that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 reach only manipulative or deceptive conduct); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.) (holding that only pur-
chasers and sellers of securities can bring actions under Rule 10b-5).
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every securities casebook: Chiarella12 and Dirks13 on insider trading,
Ernst & Ernst14 on scienter, Forman15 and Landreth Timber16 on the
definition of a security. Even in those cases in which Powell did not
write, he played an important role in their selection and resolution.
The Article makes two principal contributions. First, it fills a
major gap in the understanding of Justice Powell’s work on the Su-
preme Court. John Jeffries’s otherwise excellent biography of Powell
discusses Powell’s practice as a corporate lawyer, but it does not dis-
cuss Powell’s work in securities cases.17 Securities law, however, was
of singular importance to Powell. His background as a corporate law-
yer gave him a level of experience and familiarity with the securities
laws unmatched by his colleagues. Consequently, Powell felt a special
responsibility to guide his colleagues when they faced securities law
questions. Of equal importance, Powell’s experience as a corporate
lawyer had left him with definite views on the direction that the secu-
rities laws should take. In contrast to his reputation as a swing vote in
constitutional cases, Powell had profoundly conservative views on the
proper scope of the federal securities laws, and he pushed the Court
toward holdings consistent with those views.
The Article’s second contribution is to show how Powell, more
than any other Justice, helped cabin the federal securities law. In con-
trast to most studies of the Supreme Court’s work, which rely exclu-
sively on published opinions, I draw heavily from Powell’s private
Court papers, including drafts of opinions and correspondence among
the Justices, to explore how the Court’s opinions came to their final,
published form.18 Most of the case files contain memoranda dictated
12. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
13. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
14. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
15. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
16. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
17. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., at xi (1994) (listing “six ar-
eas of commanding interest: desegregation, abortion, Watergate, the death penalty, affirmative
action, and sexual equality”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Art of Judicial Biography, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 1595, 1601 (1995) (book review) (“Nor does Jeffries show how nearly forty years in
corporate practice shaped Powell’s corporate and securities opinions for the Court.”).
18. The papers are well-organized and comprehensive. Powell took care to ensure that they
would be of use to historians. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Sally [Smith]
and Linda [Blandford] 1–2 (Feb. 28, 1979) (regarding his concern for the legibility of file copies
of correspondence and memoranda). Many of the papers relied upon were dictated by Powell
and unedited, as they were for his internal use. Consequently, there are some typographical er-
rors in selections that I quote. I quote these materials as they appear in the original documents.
The errors should not be construed as carelessness on Powell’s part, but rather an effort to
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by Powell, either to memorialize his view of a case during the summer
recess or to guide the clerk working on the case.19 Powell frequently
outlined the points that he intended to make at conference (particu-
larly in complicated cases). The papers also include Powell’s tally of
votes on certiorari as well as notes on oral argument and discussion at
the Justices’ subsequent conference.20 These materials taken as a
whole give a fuller account than is available from reading only pub-
lished opinions, providing a window into judicial behavior and how
the Supreme Court makes law. They also show how Justices work
with their clerks to draft opinions. Finally, the papers show the influ-
ence that a single Justice can have on his colleagues.
The materials also demonstrate a fact that might be obscured if
one looked only at published opinions: in interpreting the securities
laws, text and statutory structure mattered to Powell and the other
members of the Court, but policy mattered at least as much. Powell’s
policy views, grounded in his experience as a corporate lawyer, gen-
erally favored the narrower reading of the federal securities laws.
Powell favored predictability in the application of the securities laws.
Moreover, he was suspicious of the efforts of private plaintiffs and the
SEC to bring the federal securities law into areas traditionally gov-
erned by state law and private agreement. Powell led the Court to re-
verse its direction from the expansive path it had taken in the 1960s.
The cases decided during Powell’s tenure helped confine the federal
securities laws, slowing the growth of liability and checking the take-
over of state corporate law. Powell’s emergence as the Court’s securi-
ties law leader produced a counterrevolution in the federal securities
laws.
This Article proceeds in six Parts. Part I provides background on
Powell’s career before his nomination to the Court. Part II demon-
strates the leadership role that Powell played on the Supreme Court
in the field of securities law. The remainder of the Article is organ-
ized by general themes in Powell’s work in securities cases. Part III
economize on secretarial time. Powell was meticulous in editing work that was to be published;
indeed, he was sufficiently compulsive in this regard that he frequently corrected typographical
and grammatical errors in certiorari pool memoranda.
19. In addition, these papers include certiorari memoranda as well as bench memoranda.
Powell wrote extensive comments in the margins on the merits and the relative importance of
issues presented. He had the helpful habit (for a researcher) of indicating his agreement with a
point by writing “Yes” in the margin of documents that he reviewed.
20. These notes must be read with some caution, as they reflect Powell’s view of the discus-
sion at conference and his choices on what to record. His attitudes on the underlying issues no
doubt affected the record that he made.
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describes Powell’s efforts to minimize liability exposure under the se-
curities law. It focuses on cases defining “sale,” as well as the ele-
ments of Rule 10b-5, representative actions, and the implication of
private rights of action. Part IV examines Powell’s preference for
predictability in the securities laws. Predictability allows lawyers to
advise their clients of their duties under those laws, but predictability
can come into tension with the desire to limit liability, a topic dis-
cussed in the context of cases defining “securities.” Part V examines
Powell’s protection of local business from the threat of hostile take-
over. Part VI focuses on Powell’s skepticism toward the SEC’s efforts
to expand its authority, focusing in particular on his insider trading
opinions.
I.  EXPERIENCE AND OUTLOOK
Apart from William O. Douglas, who served as chairman of the
SEC before his nomination to the Supreme Court, Lewis Powell is the
only securities lawyer to serve on the Court since the federal securi-
ties laws were passed in 1933 and 1934. Although other Justices had
private practice experience, none could match Powell’s hands-on ex-
perience with the federal securities laws. Powell’s years as a corporate
lawyer would profoundly shape Powell’s work in securities law during
his time on the Court. In addition to being an experienced corporate
lawyer, Powell also had an extensive litigation practice on behalf of
corporate clients. Powell’s political activities were generally prag-
matic, based on the needs of his clients, but his involvement in na-
tional politics was ideologically motivated. Powell’s close interaction
with businessmen led him to trust their character. That trust, in turn,
made him generally hostile to what he saw as excessive regulation,
which he thought infringed on free enterprise—the first step down the
path toward socialism.
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., was born in Suffolk, Virginia and raised in
Forest Hill, a suburb of Richmond.21 When he completed his legal
education in 1932,22 Powell turned down an offer of $150 a month to
join the Davis, Polk firm in New York.23 He instead went to Christian,
21. JEFFRIES, supra note 17, at 16–18.
22. Powell took his law degree at Washington & Lee before getting an LLM from Harvard.
Id. at 36–41.
23. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Joe Carter, Managing Partner, Hun-
ton & Williams 3 (Aug. 1977).
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Barton and Parker in Richmond for a monthly salary of fifty dollars.24
No other firm in town would offer him even an office in the lean years
of the Depression.25 He left two and a half years later to join Hunton
& Williams, where he practiced (interrupted only by military service)
until his nomination to the Supreme Court in 1971.26 Hunton & Wil-
liams was Richmond’s leading firm and Powell, a consummate rain-
maker,27 became its dominant partner.28
Powell began his career as a litigator. In his first major case, a fi-
duciary claim, he represented the receiver of a failed bank against its
former directors.29 His cases were a typical mix, including negligence
cases against the Southern Railway Company,30 a tax case for a real
estate developer,31 a patent infringement case for General Motors,32
railroad reorganizations,33 and litigation over a stock subscription
agreement.34 Powell lost his only case before the Supreme Court, a
constitutional challenge to an “entrance fee” that Virginia imposed
on foreign corporations wishing to do business in the state.35 Powell
continued to litigate cases throughout his career, winning his last one,
an antitrust challenge by the Justice Department to United Virginia
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 4, 9.
27. Telephone Interview with Lawrence E. Blanchard, Jr., Former Attorney, Hunton &
Williams (Mar. 22, 2002) (describing Powell as a “master of making connections”).
28. JEFFRIES, supra note 17, at 187. Powell’s abilities evidently were apparent from the be-
ginning. When Powell was just beginning as a lawyer, his first boss, Andrew Christian, told Mor-
ton G. Thalhimer (a department store owner who would later become a client of Powell’s):
“Mark my words. Our mutual friend, Lewis Powell, is going to go to the very top of the legal
profession. He is one of the most brilliant men I have ever had the privilege of meeting and one
of the nicest.” Letter from Morton G. Thalhimer to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Mar. 17,
1976).
29. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Jody, Penny, Molly, and Lewis III
[Powell] 5 (Dec. 15, 1981).
30. Southern Ry. Co. v. Barker, 4 S.E.2d 395 (Va. 1939).
31. Camp v. Murray, 226 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1955).
32. Welch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 330 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1970).
33. Old Colony Bondholders v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 161 F.2d 413 (2d
Cir. 1947).
34. Marcuse v. Broad-Grace Arcade Corp., 180 S.E. 327 (Va. 1935).
35. Atl. Ref. Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937). Although he lost the case, Powell did win
the admiration of opposing counsel in getting the Court to hear it at all. Letter from W.W. Mar-
tin, Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia, to Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (May 20,
1936) (congratulating Powell on the grant of certiorari and “the most creditable manner by
which you won this opportunity”).
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Bank’s acquisition of a local bank; the trial concluded just a few days
before Powell’s nomination to the Court.36
Gradually, however, Powell moved toward a “general business
practice,”37 with clients ranging from Eskimo Pie to Philip Morris.38
This practice was built on a foundation of securities work. Powell re-
called that “I . . . file[d] two of the earliest registration statements
filed from the Richmond area under the Act of ‘33. This qualified me
as an ‘expert,’ with the result that I was retained to do a good deal of
securities work.”39 In a field that values precision, Powell developed a
reputation for “meticulous” work.40 Powell’s work on registered of-
ferings for Scott & Stringfellow (a local investment bank) led to other
corporate work.41 Powell advised clients on the private offering ex-
emption from registration under the Securities Act42 and corporate
governance issues,43 drafted charter amendments for preferred stock
36. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Robert P. Buford, Attorney, Hunton, Wil-
liams, Gay & Gibson 1 (May 24, 1973); Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Joe
Carter, supra note 23, at 19.
37. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Robert P. Buford 1 (May 8, 1981).
38. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Joe Carter, supra note 23, at 21, 23.
Powell never lost interest in the companies that he represented, continuing to read their annual
reports during his time on the Court. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Paul H. Riley,
Chairman of the Board, Commonwealth Natural Gas Corp. 1 (Jan. 5, 1976) (requesting the an-
nual report and quarterly statements of Commonwealth Natural Gas Corporation). He also
maintained his interest in investing, continuing to consult Harvie Wilkinson on stock recom-
mendations. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr. 1 (Mar. 25,
1982). Powell sold his stocks in companies subject to federal regulation upon joining the Court
to limit the need for recusals. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to John W. Riely, Attor-
ney, Hunton & Williams 1 (Oct. 1, 1980). While he held a significant portfolio, Powell was not
an active trader. He became quite defensive on the subject after newspaper accounts suggested
that he was an active trader and that his stock ownership was causing a substantial number of
recusals. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Ste[phen] Wermiel, Wall Street Journal 1–3
(June 15, 1981). Powell’s letter had a salutary effect, as the Wall Street Journal wrote an article
that Powell considered more balanced. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Stephen
Wermiel, Wall Street Journal 2 (Aug. 25, 1981) (thanking Wermiel for his “constructive” arti-
cle).
39. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Joe Carter, supra note 23, at 9.
40. Telephone Interview with Lawrence E. Blanchard, Jr., supra note 27 (stating that Pow-
ell was the “[t]he most meticulous securities lawyer I ever knew”).
41. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Joe Carter, supra note 23, at 10–11,
13–14.
42. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to James J. Ward and James E. Galleher 2
(Oct. 5, 1940) (advising that “an offering to ten or fifteen institutions would clearly seem to be
private, other things being consistent, whereas, an offering to from twenty to twenty-five institu-
tions may not be such a clear case”).
43. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Edwin B. Horner 1–2 (Mar. 22, 1957).
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issues,44 helped them wage proxy battles,45 and set up life insurance
companies46 and public utilities.47 In sum, Powell faced the broad
range of issues handled by the typical corporate lawyer.48
Powell also did deals. Powell represented Miller & Rhoads (a lo-
cal retailer) when it merged with Garfinckel, serving on the board of
the merged company and acting as its general counsel.49 More promi-
nently, Powell represented Albemarle (a small Virginia paper com-
pany) in its 1962 acquisition of Ethyl, a joint venture of General Mo-
tors and Standard Oil.50 Albemarle was Powell’s first major corporate
client. Powell met its president, Floyd Gottwald, in the late 1940s,
when Powell represented an investment bank that was arranging a
loan to Albemarle.51 Gottwald made Powell Albemarle’s counsel
shortly thereafter and invited him to join its board in 1953.52
Gottwald had a flair for the audacious. At the time, the Ethyl
transaction was called “Jonah swallowing the whale”;53 today, it would
be called a leveraged buyout. Albemarle, with a net worth of $25 mil-
lion and no background in the chemical industry, needed to borrow
$200 million to acquire the much larger Ethyl, which would leave it
with “an almost unheard of 85 to 90 per cent debt ratio.”54 Ethyl was
closely held by General Motors and Standard Oil, but the holding
44. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Martin Victor, Attorney, Sullivan & Cromwell 1
(Nov. 15, 1946).
45. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Edwin Hyde 1–2 (June 1, 1956).
46. Letter from Edwin B. Horner to Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Nov. 8, 1971) (“I remember
vividly in your office the day you said, ‘You cannot start a life insurance company. You have
done enough funny things.’ But at your desk First Colony was created.”).
47. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to John W. Riely, supra note 38 (discussing the
formation of Commonwealth Natural Resource Corporation).
48. He also found time to lecture to the corporations class at the University of Richmond’s
law school on “the legal problems involved in the obtaining of public capital by corporations.
This will include the registration of securities with the SEC, and also ‘intrastate within Virginia’
and ‘private placements’.” Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to William T. Muse, Dean, T.C.
Williams School of Law, University of Richmond 1 (Apr. 1, 1955). Powell also was a lecturer at
the graduate business school at the University of Virginia. Letter from Francis L. Berkeley, Sec-
retary, University of Virginia, to Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Dec. 10, 1954).
49. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Joe Carter, supra note 23, at 10–11.
50. See JEFFRIES, supra note 17, at 189–92 (describing the transaction).
51. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Anne Gottwald 1 (Aug. 16, 1982).
52. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to F[loyd] D. Gottwald, President, Albemarle Paper
Manufacturing Company 1 (Jan. 5, 1954) (“Just about the nicest thing that happened to me
during 1953 was being invited to join your Board.”).
53. Lawrence E. Blanchard, Jr., The Albemarle-Ethyl Deal in 1962, at 16 (Aug. 1974).
54. Id. at 7, 16.
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made little strategic sense for those firms.55 Despite Albermarle’s
small size, they were willing to give Gottwald a chance to get the deal
done, apparently impressed by his vision and energy. Arranging the
financing for this transaction was an enormous effort, involving a se-
ries of delicate negotiations and a fair amount of creativity. The ac-
quisition was financed through four levels of financing: insurance
companies lent the first $114 million; $16 million came from Chase
Manhattan; General Motors and Standard Oil took back $20 million
of the purchase price as debt; and $50 million in “Junior-Junior
Notes”—subordinated debt accompanied by warrants—was sold to
institutional investors.56 Standard Oil complicated the transaction by
insisting that its part in the negotiations be done in Nova Scotia so
that its gain from the sale would qualify as foreign income.57 Powell
drafted the proxy statement for the Albemarle shareholders himself,
“walking an extremely tight rope between disclosing enough but not
too much.”58 “Too much” in this context presumably meant unduly
emphasizing the risks of this high stakes gamble by Albemarle. The
deal’s success astounded Wall Street and cemented Hunton, Wil-
liams’s reputation as a corporate firm.59
Another milestone transaction was the aggregation of a number
of regional banks to create United Virginia Bankshares (UVB, now
part of SunTrust).60 Powell’s best friend was Harvie Wilkinson,61
president of the State-Planters Bank of Commerce and Trusts, Vir-
ginia’s largest bank, which was headquartered in Richmond.62 Wilkin-
son arranged for Powell to serve as general counsel of the bank and
Powell became a director in 1959.63 Powell served as much as a busi-
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id. at 15.
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 17.
59. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., The Albemarle/Ethyl Deal in 1962: Addendum to Larry
Blanchard’s Memorandum of August 1974, at 2 (July 3, 1975).
60. See JEFFRIES, supra note 17, at 188 (describing Powell’s role in helping State-Planters
Bank become United Virginia Bankshares).
61. Wilkinson and Powell attended McGuire’s University School together and became re-
acquainted when both returned to Richmond after completing their education. WILLIAM K.
KLINGAMAN, J. HARVIE WILKINSON, JR.: VIRGINIAN, BANKER, VISIONARY 8–9 (1994).
62. Id. at 73.
63. Letter from J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr., to Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Oct. 8, 1959).
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ness advisor as a lawyer; Wilkinson observed that Powell had more
business sense than most businessmen that Wilkinson knew.64
Virginia had difficulty competing with other states to attract
business because its fragmented banking structure did not allow for
the large aggregation of capital necessary to finance business devel-
opment.65 Wilkinson wanted to create a larger bank, but that goal
raised important strategic questions.66 Businesses and bankers in
smaller communities such as Lynchburg and Danville were wary of
the larger Richmond banks.67 Rather than merging the disparate
banks into one company, Wilkinson and Powell settled on a holding
company structure.68 This structure not only allowed for the banks to
retain their local identities, but also allowed management of the ac-
quired banks to retain their positions, thus neatly sidestepping a po-
tential obstacle to the plan.69
To achieve the goal of a statewide bank, however, required a
change in Virginia law.70 Fortunately, Powell moved easily among
Virginia’s political, legal, and business circles. He not only drafted the
necessary legislation, he lobbied the Virginia General Assembly on its
behalf, testifying at committee hearings.71 He also participated in the
negotiations with the banks to be joined under the holding company’s
umbrella.72 Powell served on UVB’s board,73 as he did for many cli-
ents,74 resigning only after his nomination to the Court.
Powell’s political ties benefited not only UVB, but also his other
clients, and he carefully maintained those ties. Explaining to Wilkin-
son’s son why he could not support his candidacy for Congress, Pow-
ell wrote:
64. Telephone Interview with J. Harvie Wilkinson III (Mar. 18, 2002) (commenting on his
father’s opinion of Powell).
65. KLINGAMAN, supra note 61, at 89–95.
66. Id. at 90–91.
67. Id. at 92–93.
68. Id. at 93–94.
69. Id. at 94–98.
70. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Joe Carter, supra note 23, at 17.
71. Id. at 18.
72. Telephone Interview with J. Harvie Wilkinson III, supra note 64.
73. KLINGAMAN, supra note 61, at 101.
74. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Joe Carter, supra note 23, at 30:
I served on the boards of directors of a high percentage of my corporate clients.
Where the client is a Virginia corporation, the lawyer responsible for its general legal
work often can be most useful if he serves on the board. Moreover, many clients find
that lawyers make constructive directors. . . . [P]erhaps the single best way to retain
client loyalty, as well as serve the client, was to be an active member of its board.
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I feel morally obligated to support Dave Satterfield. He has been ex-
tremely helpful to important clients of Hunton, Williams for whom I
am responsible. He has gone far beyond the ordinary “call of duty”
of a Congressman to support constituents. The House is now con-
sidering legislation which—quite literally—is a matter of life and
death to a significant part of Ethyl Corporation’s business. My team
here—including myself personally—has been working intimately
with Dave (almost daily) to amend the most objectionable features
of the proposed law. He is a member, with some seniority now, of
the important committee on Interstate Commerce—a Committee
which deals with a number of matters of vital interest to our major
clients.75
Being the leading lawyer in Richmond required a total commitment,
sometimes at the expense of personal friendships.
Powell bolstered his political connections through heavy in-
volvement in civic affairs.76 In addition to his involvement with the
American Bar Association (which he eventually led as its president),
Powell also played a number of roles with the local chamber of com-
merce, including its president.77 Powell’s connections would prove in-
valuable in his efforts to reform Richmond’s public schools and keep
their doors open in the face of desegregation.78 Powell’s wide in-
volvement in civic affairs produced the “positive by-product” of es-
tablishing his name among prospective clients as well.79
Powell’s work with businessmen in community affairs made him
a strong defender of “free enterprise” against political incursion. His
defense of free enterprise was grounded in his belief in the integrity
of American businessmen: “[S]ince about the middle Thirties the
‘business’ morals of the average American business man have been
exceptionally high.”80 Writing about his friend Wilkinson, Powell re-
75. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to J. Harvie Wilkinson III 1 (Apr. 28, 1970). Wilkinson
III bounced back from his electoral defeat to later clerk for Powell on the Supreme Court and
now serves as a judge on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
76. See Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Joe Carter, supra note 23, at 28
(“It was necessary to keep a sensible balance between community and public service activities
and a lawyer’s obligations to clients and partners.”).
77. JEFFRIES, supra note 17, at 124.
78. See id. at 131–80 (detailing how Powell worked behind the scenes to help Virginia
schools desegregate).
79. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Joe Carter, supra note 23, at 8.
80. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Morton G. Thalhimer 1 (Nov. 27, 1951). Prior to
that time, there had been lapses that had played a role in the rise of the regulatory state, Powell
thought:
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flected: “It is fashionable to criticize businessmen as being interested
only in making money for stockholders. I have never thought this was
a fair or even honest generalization. The leading businessmen in most
communities also are among the leaders in civic, educational, charita-
ble, and cultural affairs.”81
These days, some might think that describing a businessman “as
being interested only in making money for stockholders” was meant
as praise. Powell, however, saw the role of business through the lens
of his civic involvement:
The free enterprise system is now under a wide-ranging attack
from many in the media, in politics, and on the campus. Young peo-
ple are no longer taught in schools and colleges that this system—
and only this system—enabled America to achieve its greatness.
There are many who would substitute a stultifying socialism, leading
us down the road which England is following so disastrously. In a so-
cialistic system, there would be no room for men like Harvie Wilkin-
son. The great things that he has done to improve the well being of
his fellow man would be relegated to faceless bureaucrats.82
Powell was a fierce opponent of socialism throughout his career, par-
ticularly objecting to the use of the courts to redistribute wealth.83
Powell’s hostility to socialism and his hawkish views on national
defense appear to have driven his involvement in national politics.
Although he was a “Virginia Democrat” in local elections,84 he cam-
paigned for Republican presidential candidates.85 Powell feared
the comparative lack of morals in business during the latter part of the Nineteenth
Century caused a great deal of public and private criticism of business, and resulted in
the era of governmental regulation of business. This same situation developed again
following the boom of the Twenties and the collapse of the early Thirties.
Id.
81. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Virginius Dabney 3 (June 3, 1975).
82. Id.
83. See Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Joe Carter, supra note 23, at 31
(“Unfortunately, government grows ever larger and more intrusive; the legislative branch enacts
laws at every session that both require and stimulate litigation; and, increasingly, the judicial
system is exploited for the redistribution of wealth—despite the inherent inequity in such a pro-
cess.”).
84. Powell’s work on behalf of local Democrats was limited to financial support and some
speeches on behalf of politicians who were friends. See Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
to Colgate W. Darden, Jr. 1 (Mar. 15, 1976) (“Although I was always a Virginia Democrat in
state politics . . . I was never actually a participant in party affairs or decision-making.”).
85. See Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Jody, Penny, Molly, and Lewis
III [Powell], supra note 29, at 9 (stating that Powell and others organized a group called
“Democrats for Eisenhower” in the 1952 and 1956 elections).
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Franklin Roosevelt’s vendetta against the capitalist system: “I really
cannot tell you how strongly I feel that the welfare of this country re-
quires the defeat of Mr. Roosevelt . . . and the election of a man who
is sympathetic (rather than antagonistic) to the system of private
profit which has enabled this country to attain its present greatness.”86
Powell also lobbied against Roosevelt’s “Court packing” plan.87 Pow-
ell similarly feared Harry Truman and Adlai Stevenson’s “left-wing
socialism.”88 Powell campaigned for Dwight Eisenhower, helping to
organize the Virginia Democrats for Eisenhower.89 He also supported
Richard Nixon, who later appointed him to the Supreme Court.90
86. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Henry C. Riely 2 (Oct. 5, 1940).
87. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Senator Burton K. Wheeler 1 (Mar. 25, 1937) (“I
am doing what I can in a quiet way to stimulate activity against this attack on the Supreme
Court.”).
88. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Senator Harry F. Byrd 1 (Oct. 15, 1952) (“Steven-
son will be more successful than Truman in obtaining the passage of pet left-wing legislation
such as the FEPC, socialized medicine, continued deficit spending, higher taxes and the like. In
short, the trend toward socialism will inevitably be accelerated if Stevenson is elected.”).
89. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Webster S. Rhoads 1 (Oct. 13, 1952) (“I am now in
this campaign up to my neck. With the indulgence of my partners and my clients, I am averaging
only three or four hours per day practicing law. The remainder of my time, usually until about
midnight, is devoted to the campaign.”). Powell also campaigned for Eisenhower in 1956. Letter
from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Senator Harry F. Byrd 3 (Oct. 10, 1956) (“[I]f Stevenson should be
elected the trend toward an American brand of socialism will be greatly accellerated [sic]. In
short, we know that Virginia should support Eisenhower and conversely we all should do every-
thing in our power to defeat Stevenson and Kefauver.”).
90. See Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Winthrop Rockefeller, Governor of Arkansas 1
(Sept. 19, 1968) (“We are making a major effort here in Virginia to carry the state for Nixon.”);
Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Private James Harvie Wilkinson III 2 (Oct. 20, 1968) (“I am
afraid Virginia is going for Humphrey. . . . The idiot vote—and lots of otherwise sensible
votes—will go to Wallace; the Negro bloc and the straight-ticket Democrats will, of course, go
for Humphrey.”); Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Richard M. Nixon 1 (Oct. 27, 1960):
I appreciate very much your letter concerning my support in the campaign. I want
you to know that I think, regardless of the outcome, that you are making a magnifi-
cent effort against the most formidable odds. I have also been proud of the way in
which you have stood by your principles, and not endeavored to ‘out promise’ your
opponent.
Powell’s appointment to the Court put an end to active involvement in politics, but not his in-
terest. See Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr. 1 (Nov. 4, 1980)
(“I write this on election day, with ‘butterflies’ very much in my tummy.”). Powell’s abstention
from politics even extended to not voting. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Senator
Harry F. Byrd, Jr. 1 (Dec. 27, 1980). He did, however, continue to advise Senator Byrd on po-
litical issues. See id. (advising Byrd to join the Republican Party); Letter from Senator Harry F.
Byrd, Jr., to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Nov. 21, 1980) (soliciting Powell’s views on points to
be made to President-elect Reagan); id. (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.)
(noting that “Harry came to my chambers and we had an interesting, off-the-record discus-
sion”). Powell was pleased by Nixon’s victory over McGovern. See Letter from Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., to Edwin Hyde 1 (Nov. 8, 1972) (opining that the election had turned out better than
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II.  POWELL’S INFLUENCE
Powell’s experience as a corporate lawyer lent him credibility
with his colleagues on the Supreme Court in securities law cases.
Powell worked diligently to maximize that influence, coming well
prepared to conferences in securities cases, having mastered the often
complicated facts and reduced a carefully thought-out analysis to
writing.91 Powell believed in hard work and organization, and his
thorough preparation may have given him an edge in the Court’s de-
liberations. In a frequently technical area where the other Justices
were unlikely to have strongly held views, Powell’s superior knowl-
edge and preparation were a powerful force. And Powell was not
afraid to use that influence from his earliest time on the Court. Un-
like many areas of the Court’s docket that Powell was confronting for
the first time,92 he knew securities law and was confident of his views.
Those views remained very much informed by his experience as cor-
porate counsel.93
Consider the first securities case in which Powell participated,
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum.94 The Court split 4-4
at conference, with Justice White passing.95 After sending Justice
White a memorandum on the merits, Powell—not content to wait on
Justice White’s response—sent a memorandum to his law clerk the
hoped). He strongly favored Ronald Reagan over Jimmy Carter. See Letter from Justice Lewis
F. Powell, Jr., to Virginius Dabney et al. 1–2 (Nov. 18, 1980):
[M]y relief that the country will not be in such inept hands for the next four years is
tempered by the fear that our economic problems are too intractable to be resolved in
the short term by any government. . . . I do think that the federal judiciary will benefit
substantially from the change in Administration.
He worried, however, about the boldness of some of President Reagan’s policies. See Letter
from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr. 1 (Apr. 8, 1982) (“Granted that the
President has inherited much of his economic problems from the excesses of a welfare state
from Roosevelt through Carter, and from a world-wide recession, it does seem to me that
Reagan’s simplistic notions have been carried to a dangerous extreme.”).
91. See, e.g., Memorandum, Characteristics of Common Stock, N.Y. v. Foreman [sic] (Apr.
22, 1975) (outlining features of stock that this instrument lacked, including transferability, vot-
ing rights tied to ownership, the opportunity to profit and dividends).
92. See E-mail from Chris Whitman (former Powell clerk) to Adam Pritchard (Apr. 18,
2002) (stating that Powell was hazy on some distinctions in torts and civil rights cases).
93. Telephone Interview with John Buckley (former Powell clerk) (June 5, 2002).
94. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
95. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Kern
County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 1 (Dec. 8, 1972). Powell’s notes indicate that
Justice Blackmun tentatively voted to reverse, but subsequently switched his vote. Id.
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next day, instructing him to begin working on an opinion.96 Powell ex-
plained that “[a]s I led the discussion at the Conference, I would
think the chances are good that the opinion would be assigned to me
if we have a majority. If I am in the minority, I will wish to dissent.”97
As a strategic matter, Powell noted that “[t]here is obvious advantage
in our circulating a draft at a fairly early date.”98 Being first to write
improved his chances of getting the crucial fifth vote. This memoran-
dum from Powell’s first securities case strikes a note that would be-
come familiar in subsequent cases—Powell leading the discussion and
expecting to write the opinion in his area of expertise.99
Within a few years, Powell was also confident in his role as the
Court’s securities law expert. Consider the following passage from a
memorandum in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries:
If I should vote with the majority, there is a fair possibility—I
would guess—that the opinion would be assigned to me in view of
my having written several SEC cases. In view of the relevance of
Ernst and Ernst to a central issue in this case, the Conference will
expect me take the lead in advising the Conference whether the
standard of liability imposed by CA2 (see Judge Timber’s opinion)
is compatible with the standard we adopted in Ernst and Ernst.100
After only four years on the Court, Powell had established the securi-
ties laws as his domain. As it happened, however, Powell’s expecta-
96. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to William C. Kelly, Jr. 1 (Dec. 10,
1972).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2.
99. Powell did not hesitate to remind his colleagues of his superior experience. Objecting
to a passage in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger characterizing a bank as lending money to
“obtain” the pledge of securities, Powell invoked his work as counsel to State Planters and
United Virginia Bank:
Any bank officer who makes a loan for the purpose of obtaining an inchoate interest
in collateral should be fired. Collateral may be indispensable to the extension of
credit, but lending officers of the bank I represented were instructed never to make a
loan on the assumption that it probably could be repaid only by liquidating the bor-
rower’s collateral.
Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 1–2 (Jan. 8, 1981).
Chief Justice Burger modified the offending language.
100. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to File, Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.
2 (Aug. 26, 1976).
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tion that the case would be assigned to him proved wrong, as the
Chief Justice kept it for himself.101
More often, Powell’s hard work in preparation for conference
was rewarded with the opinion assignment. Not only did Powell write
some of the most important cases during his tenure, he dominated in
sheer numbers, writing close to thirty percent (twelve of forty-one) of
the majority opinions in securities cases in which he participated. As
the chart below demonstrates, this is more than any other Justice
during that period.
Table 1
Supreme Court Federal Securities Law Decisions
During Lewis F. Powell, Jr.’s Tenure102
Cases For
Cert.
Majority Majority
Opinions
Dissent Majority%
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 41 40 40 12 1 98%
Antonin Scalia 2 0 2 0 0 100%
Sandra Day O’Connor 11 6 11 2 0 100%
John Paul Stevens 32 16 25 3 7 78%
William H. Rehnquist 44 29 42 4 2 95%
Harry A. Blackmun 45 26 38 3 7 84%
Warren E. Burger 43 26 42 6 1 98%
Thurgood Marshall 45 19 32 4 13 71%
Byron R. White 46 35 39 3 7 85%
Potter Stewart 32 23 30 4 2 94%
William J. Brennan, Jr. 46 24 27 5 19 59%
William O. Douglas 11 5 2 0 9 18%
The chart also demonstrates that Powell rarely found himself in
the minority. Of the forty-one securities cases in which Powell par-
101. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 3 (1977). The Court sidestepped the scien-
ter issue, instead holding that the Williams Act did not provide a cause of action for damages to
a defeated bidder in a takeover contest. Id. at 35; see infra notes 269–72 and accompanying text.
102. A Westlaw search of the SCT database within the period June 7, 1972, to June 26, 1987,
and with the query “Securities Act,” “Exchange Act,” Investment Company Act,” or “Invest-
ment Advisors Act” yielded forty-one cases.
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ticipated on the merits, he dissented only once.103 This record of suc-
cess is more remarkable when one considers that Powell consistently
took the most pro-business position of any Justice in securities cases.
Powell’s one dissent took a more conservative position than the ma-
jority. One looks in vain for more conservative positions than Pow-
ell’s in either published dissents or internal conference notes.104 By
contrast, in Powell’s more widely noticed constitutional law opinions,
he often found the middle ground in some multi-factor balancing test
that may have had stronger roots in political expediency than in con-
stitutional principle.105 Not surprisingly, this gave Powell a reputation
among Court followers as a “swing vote.” That description does not
fit Powell’s work in the field of securities law; he was a fixture in the
majority, but it was a consistently conservative majority.
Powell was proud of the work that he was doing to curb the SEC
and the plaintiffs’ bar and pleased by the reception that his work re-
ceived among his friends in the corporate bar. Writing to his former
law clerk, Powell noted that:
[T]he Harvard Law Review . . . did a real hatchet job on Ernst &
Ernst. That part of the Supreme Court Review must have been writ-
ten by a summer intern at the SEC. The experienced corporate bar
(many of whom spoke to me at the ABA meeting in Atlanta and
also at the Virginia Bar meeting) view Ernst & Ernst as a landmark
decision, the result being compelled by the language, legislative his-
tory and structure of the Act. I remain more than content with the
opinion.106
Powell wrote his opinions with practicing lawyers, not law students, in
mind.107
103. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 104 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger
has the same percentage of votes in the majority as Powell over this period, but his percentage is
inflated by his not infrequent practice of reserving his vote until a majority emerged so he could
assign the opinion.
104. The only exception would be Rehnquist’s dissent in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see infra notes 206–12 and accompanying text.
105. See JEFFRIES, supra note 17, at 560–61 (stating that Powell was a centrist who kept an
open mind to all sides).
106. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Gregory K. Palm 1 (Jan. 1, 1977). The
“hatchet job” refers to The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 56, 255 (1976).
107. Judges apparently were also part of that audience. Powell sent a copy of Ernst & Ernst
to Judge Henry Friendly, telling Judge Friendly that his “opinions and writing contributed sig-
nificantly to our resolution of . . . [the] case[].” Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Judge
Henry J. Friendly 1 (Apr. 6, 1976). Judge Friendly responded that he “was delighted both at the
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Perhaps Powell’s success in bringing the Court to narrow the
scope of the securities laws stemmed from the fact that there was no
one on the other side to counter Powell’s views. Of the forty-one
cases in which Powell participated, only four involved 5-4 votes.
Douglas had been chairman of the SEC, but he was a marginal figure
by the time Powell joined the Court, and he retired early in Powell’s
tenure. Justice Brennan served during Powell’s entire tenure and op-
posed Powell in securities cases more that any other Justice, but Jus-
tice Brennan did not have Powell’s interest or experience in the secu-
rities laws. Justice Brennan’s undisputed intellect and coalition-
building skills were saved for more politically charged cases, leaving
the securities law as Powell’s domain.108
Powell’s influence was felt not only through his opinions and af-
fect on outcomes, but also in the Court’s agenda. The chart also dem-
onstrates that Powell, more than any other Justice, was responsible
for the substantial number of securities law cases the Court heard
during his tenure. From 1933 to 1971, the Court decided thirty securi-
ties cases, an average of less than one per term.109 The Court averaged
three securities cases per term for the fifteen full terms that Powell sat
on the Court. Powell voted to grant certiorari in forty of the forty-six
securities cases granted during his time on the Court (and three cases
heard the term following his retirement). In the fifteen terms since
Powell’s retirement, the Court has heard only seventeen securities
cases, an average of slightly more than one per term.110 While the
smaller docket since Powell’s retirement accounts for some of this de-
cline, the Court’s diminished interest in the securities law persists
even after the numbers are adjusted to reflect the smaller overall
docket. During Powell’s tenure, securities cases were two percent of
result and at your skillful handling of the problems.” Letter from Judge Henry J. Friendly to
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Apr. 9, 1976).
108. This may have been a shrewd strategic choice on Justice Brennan’s part; by letting
Powell have his way in the cases that he cared about, Justice Brennan may have built a reservoir
of good will that he could tap in the cases about which he cared the most.
109. H.W. Perry quotes an anonymous Justice on this point: “[T]here was a time when four
members simply weren’t interested in hearing Securities and Exchange Commission cases. . . .
Now I believe the Court is more disposed to hearing those cases.” H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING
TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 261 (1991). Perry
also quotes an anonymous Justice for the proposition that “Justice [unnamed] is intensely inter-
ested in the securities area.” Id. at 262. Although this is speculation, the unnamed Justice is al-
most certainly Powell.
110. If the October 1987 Term is excluded, during which three cases in which Powell voted
to grant certiorari were heard, the average drops below one per term.
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the Court’s docket; since his retirement, securities cases have made
up only one percent.111
Powell enhanced his influence over the Court’s docket with his
willingness to write dissents from the denial of certiorari in securities
cases.112 Powell wrote five such dissents during his time on the Court,
persuading the Court to grant certiorari four times.113 Other Justices
wrote only four dissents from denial in securities cases during Pow-
ell’s tenure, and none of those resulted in a grant of certiorari.114 Since
111. Totals are taken from the Harvard Law Review’s annual Supreme Court volume; secu-
rities case totals are derived from Westlaw searches of the SCT database within the period June
26, 1987, to December 31, 2002, for the terms “Securities Act,” “Exchange Act,” Investment
Company Act,” and “Investment Advisors Act.”
112. It was also not unusual for Powell to note on certiorari memoranda that he would
“write if not granted.” E.g., Preliminary Memorandum, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, to
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Feb. 17, 1978 Conference) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr.); Preliminary Memorandum, Dirks v. SEC, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Nov. 12,
1982 Conference) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.); Preliminary Memoran-
dum, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Sept. 29,
1986 Conference) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
113. John Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, 450 U.S. 1005, 1005 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari); Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari,
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman 1 (Jan. 16, 1974); Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Dis-
sent from Denial of Certiorari, TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis 1 (Oct. 12,
1978); Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari, Carpenter v. United
States 1 (Dec. 10, 1986); Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari,
Pinter v. Dahl 1 (Apr. 10, 1987). Powell’s failure to persuade his colleagues to grant certiorari in
Nuveen may be explained by the fact that Justice Stevens had written the relevant lower court
decision while he was a judge on the Seventh Circuit. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d
790 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.).
It is apparently not unusual for dissents from denials to result in a grant of certiorari. See
PERRY, supra note 109, at 171 (quoting an anonymous Justice: “Many times a dissent from de-
nial will pick up a fourth vote.”). Perry got estimates that ten to thirty dissents from denial per
term picked up additional votes. Id. at 173. Powell does not appear to have carried over this
willingness to write at the certiorari stage to other areas; he was less likely to write dissents from
denial than most of his colleagues. See id. at 186–87 (reporting that Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stewart all wrote more dissents from denial than Powell, during the
period 1976–80).
114. The one that stands out is Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1115 (1985) (White, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari), which raised the issue of whether horizontal common-
ality was required for an investment contract. Id. at 1115–16. Powell was absent from the Court
at the time due to complications from surgery. It is inconceivable that he would have voted
against hearing the case, given the clear conflict and the importance of the issue. It remains un-
resolved. The other three are Dupuy v. Dupuy, 434 U.S. 911, 911 (1977) (White, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari) (deciding the standard of care required of plaintiffs in Rule 10b-5
actions), Yeomans v. Kentucky, 423 U.S. 983, 983 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting from the denial
of certiorari) (determining whether sovereign immunity applies in a securities case), and Sennott
v. Rodman & Renshaw, 414 U.S. 926, 926 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting from the denial of cer-
tiorari) (deciding the standard for control person liability under section 20(a) of the Exchange
Act).
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Powell’s retirement, only one securities case has resulted in a pub-
lished dissent from the denial of certiorari.115
Powell’s influence over the Court’s docket persisted to the end of
his career. Powell’s last securities law opinion during his Court tenure
was a dissent from denial that persuaded his colleagues to grant re-
view (his second116 of the term). Pinter v. Dahl117 raised the issue of the
application of the in pari delicto defense.118 Dahl purchased interests
in an oil and gas venture from Pinter and encouraged friends, rela-
tives, and business associates to invest as well.119 When the invest-
ments soured, Dahl sued Pinter for failing to register the offering with
the SEC.120 Pinter raised the in pari delicto defense, based on Dahl’s
solicitation of the other investors, but the Fifth Circuit rejected it.
Powell disagreed with this result:
[S]ophisticated investors who purchase unregistered securities place
themselves in a no-lose situation. If the investment proves profit-
able, the buyer comes out ahead. If the venture is unprofitable, the
buyer can sue to recover his investment, with interest, in a § 12(1)
action. . . . [Dahl] faces no sanctions of any kind for his participation
in the illegal transactions. Moreover, § 12(1) imposes liability with-
out regard to whether the seller intended to defraud the buyer. Ab-
sent an in pari delicto defense, buyers will indeed obtain an “en-
forceable warranty” that their investment will be profitable.121
Powell’s complaint here seemed to concern section 12(1)’s liability
without fault for the sale of unregistered securities122 as much as the
Fifth Circuit’s application of the in pari delicto defense. The “en-
forceable warranty” he invoked exists whether or not there is an in
pari delicto defense. And under the interpretation of “seller” that
Powell appeared to favor, the disappointed buyers might well seek
115. J. Alexander Sec., Inc. v. Mendez, 511 U.S. 1150, 1150 (1994) (O’Connor, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari) (determining the availability of punitive damages in an arbitration
proceeding against a broker-dealer).
116. The other was Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 19. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
117. 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
118. Id. at 624. The case also raised the definition of “seller” under section 12(1) of the Se-
curities Act. This issue appears to have been of less concern to Powell, although it is an impor-
tant holding of the Court. Id. at 625.
119. Id. at 626.
120. Id. at 627.
121. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Dissent From Denial of Certiorari, Pinter v. Dahl,
supra note 113, at 5–6.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 77l (2000).
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relief from Dahl as well as Pinter, so there would be some sort of
sanction.
Notwithstanding the weakness in Powell’s position, he nonethe-
less continued to wield sufficient influence in this area that he was
able to attract two more votes so the case could be heard.123 By the
time the case was argued, Powell had retired. Although Powell’s ar-
gument for the in pari delicto defense was rejected in a footnote,124 the
Court did recognize a form of the defense.125
In sum, Powell was the Court’s leader in securities law.126 That
leadership is reflected not only in Powell’s many majority opinions,
but also by his extraordinary winning percentage and influence over
the Court’s docket. Powell’s extensive experience in the area, bol-
stered by his willingness to write at the certiorari stage when other
Justices did not recognize the importance of a securities issue, made
him a force to be reckoned with. These advantages were magnified by
Powell’s hard work and thorough preparation. No other Justice could
(or perhaps, would) match his mastery of the facts of the cases and
the law in this area.
III.  CURTAILING LAWSUITS
The proliferation of securities class actions was still a nascent
trend in the 1960s. The lower courts, particularly the Second Circuit,
steadily broadened the litigation exposure that corporations faced
under the securities laws,127 a trend validated by the Supreme Court’s
123. At the initial conference, only Powell and Justice Rehnquist favored a grant, with even
Justice Rehnquist’s support a tepid “Join 3.” Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
from the Conference on Pinter v. Dahl 1 (Apr. 3, 1987). Justices White and O’Connor switched
their votes. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Pinter v.
Dahl 1 (Apr. 17, 1987).
124. Pinter, 486 U.S. at 637 n.13.
125. See id. at 639 (“Thus, the in pari delicto defense may defeat recovery in a § 12(1) action
only where the plaintiff’s role in the offering or sale of nonexempted, unregistered securities is
more as a promoter than as an investor.”).
126. This observation is made by others as well. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gu-
lati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of
Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 138–46 (2002) (stating that Powell is the
exception that proves the rule that Supreme Court Justices do not have much interest in devel-
oping securities expertise).
127. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that a
corporation need not have engaged in a securities transaction to be sued under Rule 10b-5).
Other cases can be found in Ruder, supra note 5.
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1964 decision in J.I. Case v. Borak.128 Powell played a key role in
stemming that tide in a series of cases involving the requirements for
a cause of action under Rule 10b-5, the definition of “sale,” proce-
dures applicable to representative actions, and judicial implications of
private rights of action. Congress would not step in to curb securities
class actions until 1995 when it adopted the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act;129 Powell and the Supreme Court began the process
of limiting securities class actions in the mid-1970s.
Powell’s distrust of litigation reflected his experience as a corpo-
rate lawyer. Before hearing Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston,130
which raised the question of the standard of proof in private causes of
action under Rule 10b-5, Powell made the following “somewhat per-
sonal” observations in a memorandum to his law clerk:
In balancing the “equities” or policy considerations relevant to
the standard of proof, I . . . know from my corporate experience in
the latter years of my practice that the increase in damage suits has
certain negative effects. . . .
The typical private damages action under the Securities Acts
takes place several years after the alleged fraud. There are bankrupt
companies today that, only a year or two ago, were widely viewed as
fine investments. Jurors—and indeed judges—tend to be influenced
by the present rather than conditions existing at the time of the al-
leged fraud. Information that may not have seemed important then
can loom quite large years later. The number of suits have multi-
plied, and sometimes damages have been large and—as your memo-
randum noted—reputations destroyed.
One consequence of all of this is that many of the ablest people
in our country no longer will serve on boards of directors. I know
this from personal experience. Even insurance covering directors is
usually limited to negligence and not fraud. Premiums are high, an
expense consumers ultimately pay. Our basic economic system—the
free enterprise system—is a “risk” system and investors should not
expect guaranteed equity investments in particular.
128. 377 U.S. 426, 435 (1964) (finding that federal courts have the power to grant all neces-
sary remedial relief in shareholder suits).
129. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
130. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
072903 PRITCHARD.DOC 09/03/03 4:54 PM
2003] JUSTICE POWELL 865
Against this background, if the following information is readily
obtainable on Lexis it might be interesting, and possibly relevant to
the standard of proof: How many 10b cases have there been since
Fleschman was decided in 1951? Has the number accelerated in re-
cent years? Will Lexis identify suits filed against various categories
of defendants: persons who sign registration statements, officers and
directors, underwriters, experts—particularly accounting firms. My
impression is that a good many small accounting firms no longer will
work on registration statements.
In the literature in this area, is there any discussion . . . as to the
public interest that may be adversely affected by opening the field
wide to damage suits that have never been expressly authorized by
Congress.131
This passage captures several themes that drove Powell’s efforts to
rein in securities fraud class actions. First, Powell considered the
judge-made remedy under Rule 10b-5 to be a species of federal com-
mon law, and thus appropriate for judges to consider policy in defin-
ing its limits.132 Second, Powell understood, based on experience
counseling corporate clients, the consequences that the phenomenon
of class action lawsuits had for corporations and their officers and di-
rectors.133 Finally, Powell was profoundly suspicious of judicially cre-
ated private causes of action not specifically authorized by Congress.
From Powell’s perspective, the expansion of securities fraud lawsuits
based on implied rights of action was creating a litigation crisis. That
perception of crisis would influence the outcome in a number of cases
that came to the Supreme Court.
131. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Jim Browning 1–2 (Sept. 13, 1982).
132. Powell’s clerk failed to turn up any useful empirical work on the topic. Memorandum
from Jim [Browning] to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Sept. 29, 1982).
133. The SEC and the Solicitor General were arguing for a preponderance of the evidence
standard. Bench Memorandum, Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, to Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. 17 (Sept. 9, 1982). Powell agreed with his law clerk that “the SG undervalues a professional’s
reputation” and the harm to that reputation from a jury finding that the defendant (in this case
an accounting firm) acted with deceptive intent. Id. (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Pow-
ell, Jr.). Powell instead favored the common law “clear and convincing” evidence standard.
Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Jim Browning, supra note 131, at 1. Powell’s
influence was not felt in this particular case. After writing this memorandum, Powell recused
himself when he learned that his son-in-law’s investment banking firm was a defendant in a
similar suit. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 1 (Nov.
11, 1982). With no one to advocate for the higher standard of proof at the Conference, the
Court unanimously upheld the preponderance standard advocated by the SEC. Huddleston, 459
U.S. at 390. Deference to agency expertise still had bite when there was not an expert Justice
taking the contrary position.
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This Part proceeds in four Sections. Section A discusses cases
limiting the reach of Rule 10b-5. Section B deals with representative
actions, including both class actions and derivative suits. Sections C
and D deal with threshold issues: the definition of sale and the judi-
cial implication of private causes of action from regulatory statutes.
The consistent theme of Powell’s work across these subject areas is
the need to rein in lawsuits.
A. The Construction of Rule 10b-5
A trilogy of Rule 10b-5 cases from the mid-1970s—Blue Chip
Stamps,134 Ernst & Ernst,135 and Santa Fe Industries136—established the
Supreme Court’s intention to reverse the expansion of Rule 10b-5.
These cases are the cornerstone of the counterrevolution in the the
federal securities law, not only in substance, but perhaps more impor-
tantly, in style. That style sent a strong message to the lower courts to
reverse their expansive course in interpreting the securities laws.
Blue Chip Stamps marks the rhetorical high point of the Supreme
Court’s counterrevolution in the federal securities laws. Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court holds that a private plaintiff must
be a purchaser or seller of securities to state a claim under Rule 10b-
5.137 The Court was wary of the SEC’s efforts (as amicus) to change
the rule through the courts rather than Congress.138 Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion is notable, however, for its skepticism regarding
securities fraud class actions. Justice Rehnquist warned that “litiga-
tion under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in
degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general”
and the risk that the threat of enormous discovery costs could pro-
duce “in terrorem” settlements.139 Justice Rehnquist’s opinion has
134. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
135. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
136. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
137. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 754–55. That rule had been established in the Second
Circuit for more than twenty years. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463–64 (2d
Cir. 1952).
138. Powell noted at argument that “Brennan asked if SEC had ever asked Congress to
change Rule—it has been with us for 20 yrs. Answer was ‘No.’” Handwritten notes of Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Argument in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 4 (argued
Mar. 24, 1975). Despite his skeptical question, Justice Brennan voted against the rule.
139. Justice William H. Rehnquist, First Draft Opinion, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores 16 (circulated May 5, 1975).
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been a common citation in subsequent Supreme Court and lower
court opinions reining in class actions.140
Powell was not happy with the opinion, which “reaches correct
result—but meanders and wobbles about in a most unlawyerlike
manner!”141 Powell fretted that the opinion apologized excessively for
its holding and that it paid insufficient attention to the statute’s “lan-
guage” and “legislative history.”142 In light of his “special interest in
this subject” Powell wrote a concurrence emphasizing the statutory
language.143 Powell thought the rule was compelled by text, legislative
intent, long history, and “policy considerations . . . extending standing
(who may) to sue” which were particularly relevant in “a private
cause of action . . . wholly of judicial creation.”144 Those policy con-
cerns grew out of his own experience, as Powell explained:
Absolute factual accuracy with respect to a corporate enterprise is
impossible, except with respect to certain hard facts (e.g., some bal-
ance sheet items). The outcome of pending litigation, the effect of
relatively new legislation, the possible enactment of adverse legisla-
tion, the expenditures needed to meet escalating environmental
regulations, the likelihood and effect of new competition or of new
technology and many similar matters of potential relevancy, must be
addressed in registration statements and prospectuses. In adminis-
tering the 1933 Act, the SEC traditionally and consistently has en-
couraged and often required offerors to take conservative postures
in prospectuses, especially with respect to judgmental and unfavor-
able matters. If a different philosophy now were to be read into the
1934 Act, inviting litigation for arguably misleading understatement
as well as for overstatement of the issuer’s prospects, the hazard of
“going to market”—already not inconsequential—would be im-
measurably increased.145
Powell’s understated concurrence has not received the same attention
as Justice Rehnquist’s shrill dicta on the dangers of vexatious class ac-
140. E.g., Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 189 (1994).
141. Justice William H. Rehnquist, First Draft Opinion, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores 1 (circulated May 5, 1975) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
142. Id. (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
143. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice William H. Rehnquist 1 (May 13,
1975).
144. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 7 (n.d.).
145. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Chambers Draft Concurring Opinion, Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores 5 n.4 (May 1975).
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tion litigation; perhaps this reflects changes in attitudes toward class
action litigation since Blue Chip was decided.
Powell wrote the second case in this trilogy, Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,146 the Court’s seminal opinion on the state of mind re-
quired for liability under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.147 Al-
though Powell’s opinion discouraged securities fraud class actions al-
leging “fraud by hindsight,” the question he left unanswered—the
state of mind required for fraud under section 10(b)—continues to be
the central dispute in securities class actions today. Here Powell’s
preference for predictability fell short.
Ernst & Ernst arose from a claim against an accounting firm for
failing to uncover the long-running fraudulent scheme of a brokerage
house’s principal.148 The plaintiffs alleged that Ernst & Ernst had
aided and abetted the fraud by its negligence.149 The question for the
Supreme Court was whether negligence would suffice to state a claim
under section 10(b), or whether a higher state of mind was required
to establish liability.150
Powell’s view of the case was colored by his concern about a re-
lated issue: the liability of third parties for misstatements. Powell ob-
served in his “summer memo,” written after reading the briefs during
the Court’s summer break:
As we had occasion recently to note in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, private causes of action for damages under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have evolved expansively by judicial interpre-
tation. The decision of CA7, if affirmed by us, would advance this
process to new frontiers. Damage liability could be imposed for
negligence not only upon the contracting party (the brokerage firm
in this case), but also upon a “third party” accounting firm.151
146. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000).
148. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 189–90 (1976).
149. Id. at 190.
150. Id. at 193.
151. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to File, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 5
(Aug. 21, 1975). Powell returned to his concern with extending third party liability later in the
memorandum:
[A] negligence standard applicable to auditors would invite litigation based on a sim-
ple averment of absence of due care, not merely in the recording of the facts as re-
flected by the company’s books but in failing properly to discover mismanagement or
fraud. Third party suits of this kind brought years after the occurrence of the alleged
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Powell was at least as concerned with the identity of the defendant as
he was with the standard of liability. Powell distrusted lawsuits that
extended liability “too far.”152
Powell was assigned the opinion, and in a memorandum to his
law clerk reviewing a draft, he noted that “[w]e do not discuss the ab-
sence of ‘privity’ in the common law sense between Ernst & Ernst
and respondents. I view this as an important fact, and indeed one that
could be controlling with me.”153 Powell recognized, however, that the
Court had not granted certiorari on this question and he did not think
a majority could be assembled to dismiss on absence of privity. A
holding based on lack of privity would have had profound conse-
quences for the law of securities fraud; it suggests that Powell would
have had little trouble voting for the Supreme Court’s controversial
decision in Central Bank,154 written by his successor, Anthony Ken-
nedy, which foreclosed liability for aiders and abettors.155 Given the
case’s posture, Powell satisfied himself by drafting a footnote high-
lighting his “policy concerns.”156
On the question of the required state of mind, Powell, in a
somewhat impatient tone (for him)157 objected to his clerk’s distinc-
tion between “‘knowing or intentional misconduct’, on the one hand,
and negligence or ‘negligent misfeasance’, on the other.”158 Powell
preferred the middle ground established by Judge Arlin Adams in a
concurrence to a Third Circuit opinion:
negligence and viewed with “hind-sight” vision, would impose a high risk of liability
on accountants.
Id. at 8.
152. This concern also provoked Powell to write his dissent from the denial of certiorari in
John Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, 450 U.S. 1005, 1005 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting from the denial
of certiorari). Powell strenuously objected to the Seventh Circuit’s holding in that case that rea-
sonable care for an underwriter under section 12(2) required “independent investigation such as
examination of the accountant’s work papers underlying the certified financial statements.”
Memorandum from Paul Cane to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Feb. 6, 1981) (handwritten notes
of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
153. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Greg Palm 3 (Feb. 4, 1976).
154. Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
155. Id. at 191.
156. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976); Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Suggested Note to Be Added to the Opinion of the Court, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 1–2
(Feb. 20, 1976).
157. Telephone Interview with Christine Whitman (former Powell clerk), Apr. 17, 2002.
158. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Greg Palm, supra note 153, at 2.
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Judge Adams in Korn [sic] (at p. 287) used language that I like:
“An intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.”
Adams, p. 285, also referred to Judge Friendly’s formulation as
including “recklessness” that amounts to fraud. What would you
think of our using the term “scienter” and defining it early in the
opinion, using the Adams/Friendly terminology?159
This discussion suggests that Powell thought that recklessness would
satisfy the scienter requirement. The first part of this suggestion was
adopted, with the eventual opinion defining scienter as “a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”160 The fi-
nal opinion, however, did not incorporate recklessness, specifically
reserving the question.161
Why not resolve this critical issue? The answer is fairly mundane.
Powell, despite his desire to offer guidance to the bar, had a general
preference for not addressing questions unnecessary to the decision.
Accordingly, he left resolution of this issue to a subsequent case.162
This preference to leave questions to another day sits in considerable
tension with Powell’s preference for predictability. Resolution of this
critical question would have made the securities laws much easier to
apply.
Powell could have settled the law in Ernst & Ernst, but held
back. The Supreme Court has avoided the question of whether reck-
lessness satisfies section 10(b) for another twenty-five years. Powell
can be forgiven for failing to anticipate that the Court would not re-
solve the issue; the Court’s appetite for securities law cases would
wane after he left the Court. A sharp conflict has now emerged
among the circuits on this issue, but the Court continues to deny cer-
tiorari.163 It seems unlikely that Powell would have ducked the issue if
159. Id. (citing Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 285, 287 (3d Cir. 1972)
(Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring))).
160. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
161. Id.
162. Telephone Interview with Greg Palm (former Powell clerk) (June 6, 2002).
163. The appellate courts agreed that allegations of recklessness satisfy the scienter re-
quirement. See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disor-
ders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 629, 651
n.78 (2002) (citing cases). Congress, however, put the question back into play when it passed the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as
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he were still on the Court. If the Court had resolved the issue before
Powell retired, it appears that a majority would have supported reck-
lessness. Powell’s memorandum in Ernst & Ernst suggests that he fa-
vored recklessness,164 while Justices Brennan, Blackmun,165 Stevens,166
and Marshall167 favored a negligence standard, so they presumably
would have voted for recklessness over a knowledge requirement. In
this one area where Powell’s view might have led to a more expansive
interpretation of the securities law, he never registered his vote.
The final case in the trilogy, Santa Fe Industries v. Green,168 is the
Court’s most sweeping defense of state corporate law. The Second
Circuit held that a short form merger authorized by Delaware law,169
which “froze out” the company’s minority shareholders, violated
Rule 10b-5.170 That court held that “no allegation or proof of misrep-
resentation or nondisclosure [was] necessary” to state a violation of
Rule 10b-5; a breach of fiduciary duty was sufficient.171 Moreover, that
breach of fiduciary duty arose out of federal, rather than state, com-
mon law.172 The decision was startling enough to Powell that he dic-
tated a nine-page memorandum summarizing it; he spent little time,
however, criticizing the decision because it seemed so obviously
wrong:
As the title of § 10b indicates, it is concerned with “manipulative
and deceptive devices.” I would not have thought, until CA 2’s
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The Reform Act requires plaintiffs alleging securi-
ties fraud to plead with particularity “facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000) (emphasis added). This
legislative evasion has produced a diverse array of circuit court interpretations, some courts ad-
hering to their prior holding accepting pleading based on recklessness, with others demanding
more, and the Ninth Circuit going so far as to require “deliberate recklessness.” See Grundfest
& Pritchard, supra, at 666–77.
164. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to File, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 6–8 (Aug.
21, 1975).
165. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder (Dec. 5, 1975).
166. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Aaron v.
SEC (Feb. 27, 1980).
167. Justice Marshall joined Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion in Aaron v. SEC, which
favored a negligence standard. See 446 U.S. 680, 703–04 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that section 10(b) does not require scienter).
168. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
169. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974).
170. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1299 (2d Cir. 1976).
171. Id. at 1287.
172. Id. at 1286.
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opinion, that anyone would have deemed a merger to be such a de-
vice solely because the price offered dissenters was “grossly” below
fair market value so long as there was no misstatement or omission
of a material fact. The purpose of § 10b and Rule 10b(5) is to substi-
tute full disclosure for the doctrine of Caveat Emptor.
Nor would I have thought that § 10b was intended to create a
federal commonlaw [sic] of corporations contrary to valid state stat-
utes.173
Despite Powell’s surprise at the Second Circuit’s ruling, four Justices
voted for some variant of it. Justices Brennan and Marshall voted to
affirm because appraisal was not an adequate remedy, and Justices
Stevens and Blackmun voted to reverse only because they thought
that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated inadequacy.174 The lure of a
federal common law of corporations had a base of support on the
Court, but not a majority.
Justice White’s straightforward holding for the Court is that
fraud requires a misrepresentation or nondisclosure,175 but he went
out of his way to defend the role of state corporate law:
The reasoning behind a holding that the complaint in this case al-
leged fraud under Rule 10b-5 could not be easily contained. . . . The
result would be to bring within the Rule a wide variety of corporate
conduct traditionally left to state regulation. In addition to posing a
danger of vexatious litigation which could result from a widely ex-
panded class of plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5, this extension of the
federal securities laws would overlap and quite possibly interfere
with state corporate law. Federal courts applying a ‘federal fiduciary
principle’ under Rule 10b-5 could be expected to depart from state
fiduciary standards at least to the extent necessary to ensure uni-
formity within the federal system. Absent a clear indication of con-
173. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to File, Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green 9 (Dec.
27, 1976) (citations omitted).
174. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green 1–2 (Jan. 21, 1977). Justice Marshall later changed his mind and joined Jus-
tice White’s opinion for the Court. Letter from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justice Byron R.
White 1 (Mar. 11, 1977).
175. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977). The Court dealt with a
similar issue under section 14(e) in another case, Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S.
1, 8 (1985) (holding that “‘manipulative’ acts under § 14(e) require misrepresentation or nondis-
closure”), but Powell was recovering from complications from surgery and did not participate in
the decision. His notes on the preliminary memorandum indicate his agreement with the lower
court, which was affirmed. Preliminary Memorandum, Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., to Jus-
tice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Sept. 24, 1984) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
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gressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial por-
tion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securi-
ties, particularly where established state policies of corporate regula-
tion would be overridden.176
The Supreme Court was drawing a line in the sand to preserve state
corporate law from the development of a “federal corporate law” by
the lower courts.177
B. Representative Actions
Powell appears to have been unnerved by the spread of securities
class actions, and he wrote two opinions for the Court slowing the
trend. The first is the Court’s seminal opinion on class action proce-
dure: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.178 The case contains both securities
and antitrust allegations, but its implications extend well beyond
those core areas of business law. Powell described it as “the major test
case involving the contours of a proper class action case under Rule 23
[of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], as well as the notice re-
quirements in a class action case compelled by Due Process.”179
The claim was based on price fixing by New York Stock Ex-
change member firms in the commissions charged for trading in “odd
lots” (trades of less than one hundred shares).180 The district court
held that class members need not be given individual notice because
176. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478–79 (citations and footnotes omitted).
177. Santa Fe’s lesson on the need to preserve state corporate law was reaffirmed in Burks v.
Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), in the context of investment companies. Burks raised the question
of whether the independent directors of an investment company had the authority to dismiss a
derivative claim. Id. at 473. The Second Circuit held that the directors did not have the authority
to dismiss the suit, invoking a federal common law rule based on the policies of the Investment
Company Act, which was silent on the issue. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1209 (2d Cir. 1978).
The SEC argued that a federal rule should apply, but that rule would not bar the independent
directors from dismissing the claim. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Ami-
cus Curiae, Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (No. 77-1724). The Supreme Court held that
state law controlled. Burks, 441 U.S. at 478. The only controversy raised by the case was how
emphatic the endorsement of state law would be. The opinion was assigned to Justice Brennan,
but Powell and Justice Stewart were “not happy with his grudging approach to authority of the
disinterested Board members.” Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., First Draft Opinion, Burks v.
Lasker 1 (circulated Apr. 18, 1979) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.). Justice
Stewart wrote a concurrence suggesting blanket deference to state law was appropriate, which
Powell joined. Justice Potter Stewart, First Draft Concurring Opinion, Burks v. Lasker 1 (cir-
culated Apr. 30, 1979).
178. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
179. Preliminary Memorandum, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
1 (Oct. 11, 1973 Conference).
180. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 160.
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their claims were so small that they would be unlikely to opt out.181
Powell, however, did not want Rule 23’s interpretation to be deter-
mined by the facts of a particular case: “we must decide case on prin-
ciple of general application—not on a guess as to what members of
class will do.”182 General principles, of course, would limit the discre-
tion of lower courts in subsequent cases. The district court also had
imposed ninety percent of the costs of notice on the defendants based
on its “preliminary” assessment that the defendants were likely to be
found liable.183 Powell distrusted this procedural innovation: this “re-
quirement that a party pay his adversary’s cost is unique in the law.”184
This case stands out from many of the cases studied here, however, in
that the Second Circuit had also balked at the district court’s innova-
tion, reversing both the ruling on notice and the imposition of costs
on the defendants.185 The Second Circuit had reversed on another
ground as well, holding that the class was unmanageable because
there were no practical means by which any recovery could be paid to
the actual class members.186
This final holding raised complications. Appellate jurisdiction
over the first two issues was clear under the Cohen doctrine as an ap-
pealable final order.187 The manageability question was appealable
only under the “death knell” doctrine, under which a case can be ap-
pealed if the denial of class certification would mean that the case
would be abandoned as uneconomical.188 A majority (Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun,
and Powell) thought there was jurisdiction over the manageability is-
sue, but Justices Rehnquist and Stewart strongly disagreed.189
The opinion was assigned to Powell. With a substantial majority
on the notice and costs issues (only Douglas disagreed and his views
181. Id. at 166–67.
182. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., for the Argument in Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin 2 (Feb. 25, 1974).
183. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.D.R. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
184. Id. at 6.
185. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563, 569–70 (2d Cir. 1968).
186. Id. at 569–70.
187. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546–47 (1949) (holding that an
order is appealable where it is a “final disposition of a claimed right which is not an ingredient
of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it”).
188. Preliminary Memorandum, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin 3 (Oct. 1, 1973 Conference).
189. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin 1–2 (Feb. 27, 1974).
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were tentative),190 Powell determined to steer clear of the difficult ju-
risdictional issue posed by the manageability question.191 Nonetheless,
Powell worried about the ability of courts to manage class actions of
the size and complexity seen in Eisen. He wrote (in a footnote that
did not make its way into the opinion):
This case’s history well illustrates the array of intractable problems
latent in this type of class action. With competent counsel and in a
District and Circuit uniquely experienced in complex civil litigation,
this suit—in which appealing policy and legal considerations are im-
plicated on both sides—has defied rational resolution. It suggests the
need for thoughtful reexamination of some of the assumptions that
underlie the class action rules, with due recognition of the need for
some form of class action relief, and also rules which in fact can be
administered within the framework of the adversary system with
reasonable expedition and fairness to all concerned.192
Powell was not the sort to use judicial opinions to advocate reform
(although he implemented a few with his opinions), but even this
guarded footnote shows his concern, which other members of the
Court shared. Chief Justice Burger wrote (in a private note to Powell,
not shared with the conference): “I hope this will ‘contain’ the drift
for government-by-class-action. What we need is vigorous action by
appropriate regulatory agencies when these brokers get out of line.”193
190. Id. at 1.
191. There was a conflict among the circuits, as Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings and Loan
Association, 560 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1977), in which the Seventh Circuit had rejected the “death
knell” doctrine, id. at 277, was being held for the decision in Eisen. Despite the conflict, Powell
recommended that certiorari be denied in Winokur. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Pow-
ell, Jr., to the Conference 3 (May 29, 1974). This deferral led to a different outcome, as the
Court rejected the doctrine four years later. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477
(1978). Given the majority in favor of the “death knell” doctrine in Eisen, this is a surprising
result, but Powell’s conference notes reflect an 8-1 vote against the doctrine in Coopers & Ly-
brand, with only Justice Brennan disagreeing, and even Justice Brennan ended up joining Jus-
tice Stevens’s opinion for the Court. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the
Conference on Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay 1–3 (Mar. 24, 1978). This decision’s effect has
been ameliorated somewhat by the adoption of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), which
gives discretion to appellate courts to entertain class action certification questions. See generally
15 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3912 (2d ed.
1992).
192. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Suggested Note to Be Added to the Opinion of the Court,
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin 1 (Apr. 27, 1974).
193. Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (May 22,
1974) (handwritten notes of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger).
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Powell’s opinion was a step toward “containing” class actions,194 but
class actions continue as a threat to the securities industry.195
Powell struck another blow against representative actions the
same term, although the facts of the case were sufficiently unusual
that the effect of the holding was limited. Powell summarized the con-
trolling issue in Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroos-
took Railroad Co.196 this way:
(CA1 seems to be throwing the law books away!) CA1, over-ruling
DC, held that a 99% stockholder of corp may bring a derivative
stockholders’ suit in name of corp vs. the former owner of control-
ling stock in the corp. for mismgt.
CA1 allowed suit on theory that although the Resp. (present 99%
owner) alleged no injury or damage to itself (+ no fraud at time it
acquired the 99% interest), Resp. was entitled to sue for general
benefit of public’s interest in railroads. In short, Resp. was self ap-
pointed Atty-Gen.197
The suit—somewhat vaguely—alleged claims under the federal secu-
rities laws and antitrust laws, as well as state statutory and common
law.
Powell looked to principles of equity to resolve the case. A ma-
jority agreed with Powell that the First Circuit should be reversed, al-
though no clear consensus emerged at the conference as to the basis
for reversal.198 Powell’s opinion is carefully grounded in “the settled
principle of equity that a shareholder may not complain of acts of
194. Not surprisingly, Powell’s opinion was met with hostility by class action advocates.
Powell clipped the article with their reactions, but made no notation of his own. Linda Charlton,
Impact of Ruling by Court Studied: Lawyers See Strong Effect on Class-Action Suits by Con-
sumer Groups, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1974, at 29.
195. That industry has secured greater protection from class actions through an industry-
wide practice of arbitration. The Court decided three cases implicating arbitration in the field of
securities law during Powell’s tenure. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973). Powell, while generally favoring arbitration, does not
appear to have had a significant influence on the Court in this area.
196. 471 U.S. 703 (1974).
197. Preliminary Memorandum, Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook
R.R. Co. 1 (Jan. 4, 1974 Conference) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
198. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Bangor
Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co. 1–2 (Apr. 17, 1974).
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corporate mismanagement if he acquired his shares from those who
participated or acquiesced in the allegedly wrongful transactions.”199
Powell expressed skepticism at the “private attorney general”
concept (striking the same note that Chief Justice Burger had shared
in his Eisen letter): “Quite apart from purely equitable considera-
tions, there is sound reason to leave the safeguarding of the public in-
terest in the soundness of railroads and the quality of their service to
the regulatory authorities rather than to encourage some concept of
‘private attorney general’ litigation.”200 Justice Marshall’s invocation
of the concept provoked Powell’s (private) disdain. Powell recorded
Justice Marshall’s view at conference as “Party who stole money
should give it up.”201 Powell’s reaction: “Wow! this sounds like Robin
Hood.”202 Justice Marshall’s dissent, with its “typical juvenile style”
provoked even more scorn.203 According to Powell (an avid hunter),
Justice Marshall
fired, at random, a load of birdshot—some remotely relevant but
most of them irrelevant. He seems to overlook the fact entirely that
the parties for whom he sheds tears (the minority stockholders and
creditors) may bring suit on their own behalf; nothing precludes
them, and they have asserted no injury.204
Powell’s uncharacteristically exasperated tone may have reflected just
end-of-the-term tension (the published responses are more meas-
ured),205 but it also seems plausible that he viewed regulation by class
or representative action as an abuse of the litigation process.
199. Bangor Punta Operations, 471 U.S. at 710. One complication was the fact that the claim
was not, in fact, a derivative claim, but instead had been brought directly by the affected corpo-
ration, which caused Powell and his clerk some difficulty in drafting the opinion. Telephone In-
terview with John Buckley, supra note 93. In the end, they simply relied on the principle that a
court of equity should not confer windfall gains on parties who have not suffered damages.
200. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to John Buckley 3 (May 20, 1974).
201. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Bangor
Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., supra note 198, at 2.
202. Id.
203. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Draft Dissenting Opinion, Bangor Punta Operations, Inc.
v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co. 4 (circulated June 13, 1974) (handwritten notes of Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr.). Powell instructed his clerk to “answer summarily some of the more absurd
points.” Id. at 1 (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
204. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to John Buckley 2 (June 14, 1974).
205. Powell might vent his frustration with his colleagues in the privacy of his chambers, but
he took care to not allow that frustration into his opinions. Powell “preferred understatement in
responding to dissents.” Telephone Interview with John Buckley (former Powell clerk), supra
note 93. This restraint no doubt enhanced his influence with his colleagues.
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The last case during Powell’s tenure affecting procedures in secu-
rities fraud class actions is Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.206 Parklane
Hosiery raised the question whether issues resolved against a defen-
dant in an SEC enforcement action were entitled to collateral estop-
pel effect in a subsequent private action.207 The case is significant, not
only for the procedural advantage it affords class action plaintiffs, but
more importantly for the coercive threat it affords the SEC. Defen-
dants in SEC enforcement actions are loath to contest the agency’s
charges in court, given the ruinous liability exposure an adverse deci-
sion would create for them in a follow-on class action. As a result, the
overwhelming majority of SEC enforcement actions are resolved
through consent decrees, with defendants agreeing to pay fines and/or
have injunctions entered against them, but without any admission of
wrongdoing.208
Given Powell’s suspicion of the SEC, it is a little surprising that
he would acquiesce in a decision that affords the agency such lever-
age.209 Moreover, Powell’s law clerk pointed out (and Powell agreed)
that allowing “class action plaintiffs . . . to gain a ‘free ride’ following
a successful government enforcement suit” was inconsistent with the
concept of class action plaintiffs serving as “‘private attorneys gen-
eral.’”210 Powell nonetheless joined Justice Stewart’s majority opinion
upholding the use of collateral estoppel. Justice Rehnquist, in his dis-
sent, worried that the Court’s:
decision will have the result of coercing defendants to agree to con-
sent orders or settlements in agency enforcement actions in order to
preserve their right to jury trial in the private actions. In that event,
the Court, for no compelling reason, will have simply added a pow-
erful club to the administrative agencies’ arsenals that even Con-
gress was unwilling to provide them.211
206. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
207. Id. at 324.
208. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 860 (3d
ed. 2001) (“Most SEC enforcement proceedings (over 90 percent) are settled, not litigated.”).
209. The issue was highlighted in an amicus brief filed by the Washington Legal Foundation.
“Bobtail” Bench Memorandum, Parklane Hoisery Co., Inc. v. Shore, from David W[estin] to
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 5 (Oct. 27, 1978).
210. Id. at 14.
211. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 355–56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Powell conceded that Justice Rehnquist had written a “good dissent–
–but I still agree with Stewart’s opinion.”212 Whether Powell’s close
friendship with Justice Stewart influenced his views here is impossible
to say.
C. Definition of Sale
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel213 presented a
sympathetic case for extending the coverage of the securities laws.
John Daniel had worked for over twenty years under a collective bar-
gaining agreement between Teamsters Local 705 and a variety of em-
ployers. That agreement included a pension fund arrangement under
which employees qualified for a pension if employed “for at least 20
consecutive, continuous and uninterrupted years immediately pre-
ceding retirement.”214 Daniel could not meet the “continuous” service
requirement because he had been laid off for a three-month period at
one point during his employment.215 Daniel claimed that he had been
deceived about the continuity requirements for vesting of the pen-
sion. More creatively, he asserted that his participation in the pension
plan was the sale of a security and therefore subject to the federal se-
curities laws.216 The district court and Seventh Circuit agreed.217
Powell found the lower courts’ holdings “close to being absurd”
with “far reaching” results.218 Daniel faced four obstacles to his claim:
(1) contributions to the pension plan were made by his employers, not
him; (2) he was required to participate in the plan; (3) the scheme at
issue was a “defined benefit” plan, under which the benefits did not
vary with the fund’s performance; and (4) application of the federal
securities laws to pension plans threatened to interfere with the sepa-
rate federal regulatory scheme for pensions.219 Daniel needed to show
212. Justice William H. Rehnquist, First Draft Dissenting Opinion, Parklane Hosiery Co.,
Inc. v. Shore 1 (circulated Dec. 22, 1978) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
213. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
214. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 6–7, Int’l Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (Nos. 77-753, 77-754).
215. Id. at 8.
216. Id. at 7–8.
217. Daniel v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541, 547 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff’d, 561 F.2d
1223, 1231 (7th Cir. 1977).
218. Preliminary Memorandum, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, to Justice Lewis F. Pow-
ell, Jr., supra note 112, at 1 (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
219. Bench Memorandum, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
1, 21–22 (Aug. 21, 1978) (identifying the plan’s compulsory, noncontributory, and defined-
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both that his interest in the pension plan was a “security” (obstacles
(3) and (4) went to this question) and that there had been a “sale” of
that interest to him (obstacles (1) and (2) went to this point). The
court of appeals found a “security” because the pension fund was
similar to a mutual fund or variable annuity, and a “sale” because
Daniel had made an investment decision to participate in the pension
plan by foregoing alternative employment opportunities.220 The lower
courts distinguished Congress’s regulation of pension plans as “con-
cerned with the administration of such funds . . . rather than regula-
tion of circumstances of entry into the plan.”221
Powell worried that the lower courts’ decisions could dramati-
cally expand the scope of the securities laws: “any offer + acceptance
of employment might views as an investment [contract]” and, there-
fore, the sale of a security.222 He also thought that it could not be
squared with the Court’s focus upon economic realities in the defini-
tion of a “security.”223 Powell’s colleagues agreed; the conference vote
was 8-0 to reverse, with Powell stunned to find even Justice Blackmun
in accord.224
Chief Justice Burger’s assignment of the opinion to Powell made
a narrow opinion unlikely. Powell saw securities law opinions as an
opportunity to shape the law, not just resolve conflicts among the
lower courts. Powell added to the draft that “[t]he SEC present posi-
tion with respect to the term ‘sale’ is quite unsupportable.”225 Specifi-
cally, Powell questioned the SEC’s position that “it is possible to re-
gard a particular financial transaction as constituting a sale under
certain provisions of the Securities Act but not under others.”226 The
implicit concern here was that the SEC was trying to extend its reach
benefit characteristics as the three primary issues in determining whether the plan was a secu-
rity, and then examining whether applying the securities laws interfered with ERISA).
220. Daniel, 561 F.2d at 1237, 1243.
221. Daniel, 410 F. Supp. at 549.
222. Bench Memorandum, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
supra note 219, at 14 (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
223. J. Mark Fisher, Note, The Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Laws
to Compulsory, Noncontributory Pension Plans After Daniel v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 64 VA. L. REV. 305, 307–08, 314 (1978) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Pow-
ell, Jr., on the margins of a photocopy).
224. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel 2 (Nov. 3, 1978) (revealing that Powell had punctuated Justice Blackmun’s
vote to reverse with two exclamation points).
225. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., First Draft Opinion, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel 20
(Dec. 4, 1978) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
226. Id.
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by applying the antifraud rules, without risking a backlash from Con-
gress if it applied its burdensome registration requirements to the
same transactions.227 A “sale” is a “sale,” Powell thought. Faced with
objections from Justice White and Chief Justice Burger,228 however,
Powell eliminated this language and reserved the question.229 The
Court’s holding is limited to the conclusion that the pension plan in
question was not an investment contract, and therefore, not a secu-
rity.230
The definition of “sale” soon returned to the Court. Bankers
Trust Co. v. Mallis raised the issue of whether the pledge of stock to
secure a loan was a “sale” of that security for purposes of Rule 10b-
5.231 For Powell, the answer was no:
A pledge is not a transfer of title. It involves neither a purchase nor
a sale, and my recollection . . . is that nothing whatever in [the Acts
of ‘33 and ‘34] suggests or implies that either the pledge or the re-
lease of securities from a pledge constitutes a purchase or sale within
the meaning of the Securities Acts.232
The Second Circuit’s contrary conclusion provoked Powell’s usual re-
action: “the case appears to represent an attempt to extend signifi-
cantly the reach of § 10(b) far beyond the original intent of the Secu-
rities Acts.”233 Powell appears frustrated by the Second Circuit’s
indifference to the Court’s prior rebukes of that court’s expansion of
the securities laws: “Our cases refute view that 10(b)5 [sic] is a license
to federalize corp. law generally. Santa Fe, Blue Chip, Foreman [sic]
227. Bench Memorandum, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
18 (Aug. 21, 1978) (citation omitted):
[T]he SEC has taken the position that almost every form of injustice that results from
a failure to disclose information violates § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. That
agency has been free to do this in part because it has not enforced a concomitant reg-
istration requirement, a burden that would both swamp the agency and engender sub-
stantial political pressure to amend the securities laws. A determination that a sale
means the same thing for both registration and fraud might encourage the SEC to
take a more responsible position in these cases and to husband its resources for those
situations where the securities laws were meant to apply.
228. Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Dec. 26, 1978).
229. Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Jan. 2,
1979); Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 1 (Jan. 11,
1979).
230. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569 n.22 (1979).
231. Id. at 382.
232. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Nancy Bregstein 2 (Oct. 25, 1977).
233. Id. at 3.
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(Act of ‘33). I think CA2 is dead wrong!”234 Powell characterized the
Solicitor General’s argument supporting that court’s position as “ab-
surd in the context of normal commercial transactions.”235
The vagaries of litigation, however, complicated the case. The
plaintiffs changed their theory at oral argument, declining to defend
the Second Circuit decision.236 Worse yet, it turned up that there was
no document recording the judgment of the district court, suggesting
that the Second Circuit may have lacked jurisdiction.237 The Court
split 4-4 at conference. Powell joined with Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist to reverse, while Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Stevens voted to affirm.238 Justice Blackmun was
absent from the conference.239
Looking for a way out of the deadlock, Justice Brennan (in the
absence of the Chief Justice) assigned Justice Rehnquist the task of
sorting out the judgment issue.240 Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
requirement of a separate document memorializing the judgment
could be waived and, therefore, that the Second Circuit had jurisdic-
tion.241 Justice Rehnquist had a majority for this position,242 thus forc-
ing the Court to address the merits. But the Court was divided
equally on the merits and Justice Rehnquist feared an affirmance by
an equally divided court. Justice Rehnquist worried that “[w]ith
Harry’s voting records in 10(b)(5) [sic] cases, I think affirmance
showing him out would be tantamount to ratifying the CA2 opinion
even though we wrote nothing.”243 Justice Rehnquist therefore pro-
posed a strategic retreat, dismissing the petition for certiorari as im-
234. Bench Memorandum, Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1
(Nov. 18, 1977) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
235. Bench Memorandum, Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1
(Nov. 28, 1977) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
236. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Argument in Bankers Trust
Co. v. Mallis 3 (Nov. 30, 1977).
237. Memorandum from Bob Comfort to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Nov. 30, 1977).
238. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Bankers
Trust Co. v. Mallis 1–2 (Dec. 2, 1977).
239. Id. at 3
240. Note from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Feb. 28,
1978).
241. Justice William H. Rehnquist, First Draft Opinion, Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis 1 (cir-
culated Dec. 19, 1977).
242. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Warren, and Stevens joined Justice Rehnquist’s position on
jurisdiction. Note from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note
240, at 1.
243. Id.
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providently granted (a “DIG”).244 As two of the votes for affirmance
were willing to acquiesce in a dismissal (Justices White and Stevens),
Justice Rehnquist got a majority for this course and the petition was
dismissed.245
This meant that whether a pledge was a sale remained an open
question two years later when Rubin v. United States246 made its way
to the Court.247 Rubin differed, however, in that it raised the issue un-
der section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, rather than the 1934 Act. Although
Section 3(a)(14) of the 1934 Act defines a sale as “any contract to sell
or otherwise dispose of” a security,248 Section 2(3) of the 1933 Act de-
fines “sale” as “every contract of sale or disposition of a security or
interest in a security, for value.”249 Congress’s inclusion of “every” and
“interest” pushed toward a broad definition. Powell was unmoved by
this textual distinction—the policy reasons for excluding this transac-
tion from the scope of the securities law were the same. He agreed
with his law clerk that “applying § 17(a) to commercial loans seems to
extend the scope of the 1933 Act beyond its purposes. Second, there
seems to be no practical need for the extension.”250 Powell’s concerns
were mitigated, however, by the fact that section 17(a) did not give
rise to a private cause of action and any interpretation by the Court
would not control a 10b-5 case.251 In any event, Powell’s support in
Bankers Trust evaporated in Rubin; Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist all switched sides. Powell bowed to reality and
voted to uphold the broad interpretation.252
Powell’s acquiescence left him in the position of damage control.
Powell was disappointed by Chief Justice Burger’s “simplistic” opin-
244. Id.
245. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 388 (1978); Handwritten notes of Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis 1 (Mar. 6, 1978).
246. 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
247. Preliminary Memorandum, Rubin v. United States, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1
(Apr. 11, 1980 Conference) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
248. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2000).
249. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (2000).
250. Bench Memorandum, Rubin v. United States, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 13 (Sept.
16, 1980) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.) (noting Powell’s agreement with his
clerk).
251. Id. at 16.
252. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Rubin v.
United States 3 (Nov. 14, 1980).
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ion,253 but he offered to join it if Chief Justice Burger would refrain
from citing
the 1963 case of SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, quoting lan-
guage to the effect that federal security laws must be construed “not
technically and restrictively but flexibly to effectuate [their] reme-
dial purposes.”
A number of more recent decisions, for example, Hochfelder re-
lied on by your opinion, have looked primarily to the plain language
of the securities acts. These are highly technical and well drawn stat-
utes, and as you make clear by the remainder of your opinion this
case falls within the explicit language of §§2(3) and 17(a). Thus, the
quote from Capital Gains Research Bureau is unnecessary and per-
haps could be viewed as undercutting to some extent your reliance
on the statutory language itself.254
The quoted language was a staple of the SEC’s briefs, reflecting the
interpretive style that Powell was anxious to expunge from the securi-
ties laws.255 Powell also wanted a footnote reserving the status of
pledges under the 1934 Act.256 Chief Justice Burger dropped the of-
fensive language from Capital Gains, but he declined to include the
footnote explicitly reserving the question under the 1934 Act.257 Pre-
dictably, the lower courts have interpreted the 1934 Act definition of
“sale” to include pledges of securities.258 Powell might have gained
more by challenging Chief Justice Burger on the “sale” issue, rather
than the inclusion of the cite to Capital Gains, which was a matter of
style rather than substance.259
253. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, First Draft Opinion, Rubin v. United States 1 (Jan. 7,
1981) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
254. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 1 (Jan. 8,
1981) (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)).
255. See id. at 1–2 (stating that Chief Justice Burger’s opinion was “speaking broadly” and
inaccurately).
256. Id. at 2.
257. Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Jan. 8,
1981).
258. See, e.g., Chem. Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939–40 (2d Cir. 1984)
(relying upon Chief Justice Burger’s analysis in Rubin v. United States, that a pledge is an offer
or sale under sections 2(3) and 17(a)).
259. Powell’s efforts to root out the Capital Gains decision were for naught, as the Court’s
most recent opinion in this area (expanding the reach of the securities laws) invokes the case.
SEC v. Zandford, 122 S.Ct. 1899, 1903 (2002). The Court decided one other case during Powell’s
tenure that touches upon the “offer or sale” language, United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768
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D. Private Rights of Action
The implication of private rights of action under federal statutes
was of paramount importance to Powell. Powell worried that novel
causes of action for securities law violations could impose crippling
liability. Accordingly, his work in this area is characterized by a con-
sistent effort to curtail causes of action not authorized by statutory
text. The Court’s 1964 decision in J.I. Case v. Borak reflected a liberal
attitude toward implying private rights of action.260 Proponents of im-
plied private rights relied on broad readings of congressional pur-
pose.261 Powell, by contrast, emphasized the possible interference with
regulatory schemes that could result from the judicial creation of pri-
vate rights of action. In addition, Powell worried about the separation
of powers issues raised by courts expanding their own jurisdiction
through the creation of private rights of action.
The first securities case during Powell’s tenure to generate con-
troversy over implied private causes of action was Piper v. Chris-Craft
Industries.262 The facts of the case were convoluted, with two bidders,
Chris-Craft and Bangor Punta, vying to take over the Piper Aircraft
Corporation (controlled by the Piper family).263 After many twists,
Bangor Punta ultimately prevailed, and Chris-Craft sought damages
under section 14(e) and Rule 10b-6 of the Exchange Act, alleging that
Bangor Punta, the Piper family, and First Boston (Bangor Punta’s
(1979), but Powell was absent from argument due to complications from surgery and therefore
did not participate in the decision. Justice William Brennan, First Draft Opinion, United States
v. Naftalin 1 (May 8, 1979).
260. See 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1964) (“It appears clear that private parties have a right un-
der § 27 to bring suit for violation of § 14 (a) of the Act.”).
261. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 1174–75 (stating that one needs to interpret the Se-
curities Act and Exchange Act in a way that does not frustrate their purpose).
262. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). An earlier case raising the question of the implication of a private
right of action from a regulatory scheme, Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421
U.S. 412 (1975), had generated no controversy. The Securities Investor Protection Act
(“SIPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(b) (2000), gave the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(“SIPC”) the power, in its discretion, to apply for a decree invoking the protections of the SIPA.
Id. That power was subject to oversight by the SEC, which was authorized, again in its discre-
tion, to apply to the relevant district court for an order requiring the SIPC to cover a particular
situation. Id. Notwithstanding this regulatory scheme, the Sixth Circuit had held that investors
had a private cause of action to enforce the SIPC, despite the absence of any mention of such a
cause of action in the statute. SEC v. Guar. Bond & Sec. Corp., 496 F.2d 145, 150 (6th Cir.
1974). The Court unanimously voted to reverse. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., from the Conference on Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour 1–2 (Mar. 19, 1975).
263. Piper, 430 U.S. at 4–9.
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underwriter) had violated the securities laws in gaining control of
Piper.264
Powell viewed the question of scienter as central to the case:
the language of Section 10(b) and of Section 14(e) is sufficiently
similar to justify the conclusion that the Ernst and Ernst holding
with respect to § 10(b) will govern § 14(e). My preliminary impres-
sion is that CA2 (Judge Timbers) enunciated and applied a standard
of liability considerably less severe than the scienter standard we
adopted in Ernst and Ernst.265
In addition to the textual similarities between sections 10(b) and
14(e), Powell also identified “identical policy reasons” to those that
had driven the decision in Ernst & Ernst: “When a court implies a
cause of action for damages, it should hesitate—even if the first hur-
dle is cleared (π is within specially protected class)—to impose a low
standard (threshold) of liability.”266 On the question of whether a
cause of action should be implied at all for defeated tender offerors,
Powell doubted that they warranted protection: “Offerors can take
care of themselves (always corps. of some size).”267 Powell was also
troubled by the damages award, which had little relation to any eco-
nomic harm: “The $35 mil. judgment exceeds entire net worth (net
equity) of Piper . . . .”268
The Court sidestepped the scienter issue, instead holding that the
Williams Act did not provide a cause of action for damages to a de-
feated bidder in a takeover contest. The Court applied the four-factor
test previously announced in Cort v. Ash:269 (1) whether the plaintiff is
a member of the “class for whose especial benefit the statute was en-
acted”; (2) whether there is any expression of legislative intent to cre-
ate or deny a private cause of action; (3) whether a private remedy
would be consistent with the purposes of the legislative scheme; and
264. Id. at 4–5.
265. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to File, Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.
2 (Aug. 26, 1976).
266. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. 2 (Oct. 4, 1976).
267. Id. at 3.
268. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. 1 (Oct. 5, 1976). Powell had previously noted that First Boston faced
“the imposition on it of three times the amount of damages that would be imposed under sec-
tion 11 of the 1933 Act.” Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to File, Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., supra note 265, at 3.
269. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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(4) whether the cause of action is one “traditionally relegated to state
law.”270 The critical factor here was that target shareholders, not rival
bidders, were the class that Congress intended to protect by enacting
the Williams Act.271 Powell had no quarrel with this reasoning, al-
though he worried that “there is some incongruity in distinguishing,
for standing purposes, between injunctive and damage relief.”272
Health problems forced Powell to miss the Court’s next foray
into implied rights of action in securities law.273 Powell also missed the
argument in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis,274 but the
Court split 4-4,275 so it was set for reargument the next term. In his
draft dissent from the initial denial of certiorari (the Court subse-
quently voted to grant), Powell proposed a high threshold for imply-
ing a private right of action: “Recent decisions of this Court have re-
affirmed that private causes of action will be inferred from securities
statutes only if such an inference is consistent with the language and
history of the statute and is necessary to avoid subversion of Con-
gress’ purpose in passing the statute.”276 Rare will be the case where
the implication of a private right of action is “necessary to avoid sub-
version of Congress’ purpose”—if it were “necessary,” presumably
Congress would have provided for it. Never a proponent of implied
rights, Powell was now actively hostile:
I have come to think that the Court has gone much too far in infer-
ring federal private causes of action where Congress has chosen to
remain silent. Principles of federalism, where state courts tradition-
ally have exercised jurisdiction over a particular type claim, should
require that Congress confront openly the question whether there
270. Piper, 430 U.S. at 37–41 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).
271. See id. at 26–36 (discussing the legislative history of the Williams Act).
272. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 1 (Dec. 30,
1976).
273. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568–69 (1979) (finding no private cause
of action under section 17(a) of the Exchange Act, which requires broker-dealers to keep books
and records as required by the SEC). Powell appears to have agreed with the result: “§ 17(a) is
not an anti-fraud statute. It proscribes nothing. It merely requires reports. § 18a provides reme-
dies.” Preliminary Memorandum, Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, to Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. 1 (Nov. 22, 1978 Conference) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.); JEFFRIES,
supra note 17, at 536.
274. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
275. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Argument in TransAmerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis 1 (Oct. 2, 1979) (“Last Spring Aff.: WJB, BRW, TM, JPS.
Rev.: WHR, HAB, PS, CJ”); JEFFRIES, supra note 17, at 536.
276. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., First Draft Opinion, Dissenting from Denial of Certiorari,
TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis 3 (Oct. 12, 1978).
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are sound reasons for also authorizing federal court suits. One even
can suspect that the draftsmen and sponsors of legislation, taking
note of what can be described as the eagerness of federal courts to
enhance their own jurisdiction, deliberately avoid legislative hear-
ings and controversy simply by drafting statutes in what [Deputy
Solicitor General Frank] Easterbrook calls a “neutral” fashion.277
Powell was ready to rethink implied private rights of action.
Powell fired the first volley in this debate before TransAmerica
could be reargued. Cannon v. University of Chicago278 involved the
question of the implication of a private right of action under Title IX,
which prohibits sex discrimination by universities receiving federal
aid.279 Powell dissented, arguing that “[w]hen Congress chooses not to
provide a private civil remedy, federal courts should not assume the
legislative role of creating such a remedy and thereby enlarge their
jurisdiction.”280 J.I. Case v. Borak281 was singled out for special scorn,
as a
decision both unprecedented and incomprehensible as a matter of
public policy. The decision’s rationale, which lies ultimately in the
judgment that “[p]rivate enforcement of the proxy rules provides a
necessary supplement to Commission action,” ignores the fact that
Congress, in determining the degree of regulation to be imposed on
companies covered by the Securities Exchange Act, already had de-
cided that private enforcement was unnecessary. More significant
for present purposes, however, is the fact that Borak, rather than
signaling the start of a trend in this Court, constitutes a singular and,
I believe, aberrant interpretation of a federal regulatory statute.282
Justice Powell continued in a footnote, “[a]lthough I do not suggest
that we should consider overruling Borak at this late date, the lack of
precedential support for this decision militates strongly against its ex-
tension beyond the facts of the case.”283 The expansion of private
rights of action during the 1960s had fueled the expansion of the secu-
rities laws and Powell was now ready to tackle head-on the source of
the problem.
277. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to “Clerk” 6–7 (Feb. 20, 1979).
278. 441 U.S. 677 (1979)
279. Id. at 681–83.
280. Id. at 730–31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
281. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
282. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 735–36 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote and citation omitted).
283. Id. at 735 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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When TransAmerica was finally reargued, Powell worried that
the damages remedy that the plaintiffs were seeking “would allow cir-
cumvention of Ernst + Ernst, Blue Stamps [sic], etc.”284 Whether this
result was appropriate was a question for Congress; the issue for the
Court was what Congress intended.285 Powell found Congress’s inten-
tion clear from the text of the statute: the Investment Advisors Act
conferred jurisdiction over suits in equity, but unlike the Securities
Act and Exchange Act, omitted jurisdiction over suits at law.286 For
Powell, anxious to narrow the reach of the federal securities law, this
textual difference was decisive.
The split in the Court that had required putting the case over for
reargument reemerged. This time, however, Powell joined Justices
Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist in voting against the recognition
of the private right of action; Chief Justice Burger, who had agreed
with the latter three after the first argument, was now “reserv[ing]
judgment.”287 Justice Stewart now said he agreed with Powell’s inter-
vening dissent in Cannon, but he had voted with the majority only
“because of vote in Bakke” which Powell notes was also true of Jus-
tice Rehnquist.288 The random intervention of Bakke had preserved
the private right in Cannon, but the consensus supporting private
rights of action was eroding.
284. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Argument in TransAmerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, supra note 275, at 3 (discussing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S.185 (1976) and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)).
285. Id.
286. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., for the Conference on TransAmerica
Mortgage Advisor, Inc. v. Lewis 1 (Oct. 4, 1979).
287. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., for the Conference on TransAmerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis 1 (Oct. 5, 1979).
288. Id. at 1, 3 (referring to Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978)). Justices Stewart and Rehnquist had avoided the constitutional issue in Bakke by
agreeing with Justice Stevens that the affirmative action plan challenged there was prohibited
by Title VI of the Education Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000), which forbids discrimi-
nation on the basis of race. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring). That necessarily
supposed that Bakke had a private right of action to assert his claim. The two felt obliged to up-
hold the private right of action in Cannon, thus creating a five-vote majority in that case. Hand-
written notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Cannon v. Univ. of Chi-
cago 1 (Jan. 12, 1979) (noting in regard to Justice Stewart: “Reverse (unhappily) . . . In view of
vote last term in Bakke, ‘I’m stuck.’”); id. at 3 (noting in regard to Justice Rehnquist, “Reverse
reluctantly. Bakke should have won on 14th Amend., + WHR is uncomfortable with his vote on
VI. But can’t think of principled way to reverse his vote in Bakke.”). Justice Brennan noted at
the time of Bakke that there was probably a majority that would have voted against a private
right of action under Title VI, but he did not include Justice Stewart in that majority. Lee Ep-
stein & Jack Knight, Piercing the Veil: William J. Brennan’s Account of Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 341, 358 (2001).
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With Chief Justice Burger on the fence, however, TransAmerica
was not the case for rethinking the Court’s private right of action doc-
trine. Justice Stewart, who undertook the opinion in an effort to get a
majority, did not repudiate the four-factor test of Cort v. Ash, but he
took a step toward Powell’s position in emphasizing that “[t]he dis-
positive question remains whether Congress intended to create any
such remedy.”289 Powell was willing to go along with this approach, al-
though he filed a brief concurrence noting that he saw Justice Stew-
art’s opinion as “compatible with my dissent in Cannon v. University
of Chicago.”290
He also lobbied Justice Stewart (in a private letter) to define nar-
rowly the equitable action for rescission that the Court was recogniz-
ing.291 At Powell’s urging, Justice Stewart added a footnote limiting
the restitution available under the Act.292 Powell also argued (to no
avail) against citing “Borak at all. An anomaly when decided, and in
light of more recent cases (especially Touche, Ross, and your opinion
in this case), I view Borak as a ‘dead cock in the pit.’”293 Powell
wanted to eradicate all vestiges of the interpretive attitude that had
fueled the expansion of the federal securities laws in the 1960s. In this
quest he appears ultimately to have prevailed—the Court now re-
quires that Congress speak in “clear and unambiguous terms” when it
creates a private right of action.294
Two terms later in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston295 the
Court squarely faced the mechanism responsible for that expansion:
the implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5.296 The question
logically preceded the question of whether section 10(b) afforded a
private cause of action for conduct that would be actionable under
the explicit private cause of action provided by section 11 of the Secu-
rities Act. While Powell was “tempted” to vote that there was no pri-
vate cause of action under section 10(b), he pulled back from repudi-
289. TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979).
290. Id. at 25 (Powell, J., concurring).
291. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice Potter Stewart 1 (Oct. 30, 1979).
292. TransAmerica, 444 U.S. at 24 n.14.
293. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice Potter Stewart, supra note 291, at 1;
see also TransAmerica, 444 U.S. at 15.
294. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 325–26 (2002).
295. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
296. Id. at 379. The statute of limitations had run on the plaintiffs’ section 11 claim at the
time they filed suit. Preliminary Memorandum, Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, to Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 6 (Feb. 19, 1982 Conference).
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ating a cause of action that went back more than thirty years.297 Hav-
ing conceded the existence of the private right of action under section
10(b), Powell saw no defensible basis for carving out exceptions when
the securities laws expressly provided causes of action.298
IV.  PREDICTABILITY
Determinate legal rules allow lawyers to counsel corporate cli-
ents who are trying to stay within the law. Determinate rules, how-
ever, also provide a roadmap for those seeking to evade the policies
behind those laws. The latter possibility does not appear to have con-
cerned Powell unduly. In a 1967 speech to a conference of financial
executives, Powell canvassed the state of antitrust law, fretting that
“the trend of merger decisions seems steadily into the smog of uncer-
tainty—rather than toward higher visibility and predictability.”299
Powell was open to amendment of the antitrust laws to clarify their
application. A revised antitrust code would allow “economic realism,
rather than nebulous and varying legal concepts, . . . [to guide] corpo-
rate expansion.”300 Like most corporate lawyers, Powell favored pre-
dictability.
Powell’s preference for predictability carried over to the inter-
pretation of the securities laws. That preference was generally, but
not always, consistent with his desire to limit liability. For example,
Powell argued in Gordon v. NYSE301 that
it would be grossly inequitable to impose liability of this magnitude
[a claimed $1.5 billion in damages, plus attorneys fees] upon private
parties who have, for nearly 40 years, followed a practice to the
knowledge of the government and with the full approval of the
agency established by the Congress to regulate this business.302
297. Bench Memorandum, Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, from Jim [Browning] to Jus-
tice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 20 (Sept. 9, 1982).
298. See id. at 1, 11 (stating that the all-inclusive language made it difficult to carve out ex-
ceptions). The Court addressed one additional case raising the question of an implied right of
action under the securities laws, but the conclusion that there was no private right was uncon-
troversial. Daily Income Fund v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 541 (1984).
299. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Trends in Antitrust, Address Before the Conference of Fi-
nancial Executives, Williamsburg, Virginia 14 (June 17, 1967) (transcript).
300. Id. at 17.
301. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
302. Memorandum to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 2 (Mar. 27, 1975); see also Gordon, 422
U.S. at 691 (holding that SEC oversight renders the NYSE immune from antitrust liability for
fixing commission rates among its members); United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694, 734–35
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Powell could not countenance springing liability on firms for well-
settled business practices, particularly when those practices had re-
ceived the imprimatur of regulatory approval. Powell’s aversion to
unanticipated liability exposures would be a recurring theme in secu-
rities cases.
A. Short Swing Profits under Section 16(b)
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum303 involved the
recovery of short swing profits under section 16(b) of the Exchange
Act.304 The facts were somewhat convoluted, but the basic question
was a recurring one: when a bidder for a company loses out to a com-
peting bidder, what is the status under section 16(b) of profits derived
from the losing bidder’s “toehold” acquisition? Occidental Petroleum
acquired a twenty percent stake in Kern through a tender offer,
thereby making it a statutory insider within the meaning of section
16.305 Kern then arranged a defensive transaction, in the form of a sale
of assets, with Tenneco at a substantial premium above Occidental’s
offer.306 This put Occidental in a difficult position. If Kern sold its as-
sets and dissolved within six months of the purchase making Occiden-
tal a ten percent holder, the resulting distribution of Tenneco stock to
Kern’s shareholders could be considered a “sale” of its Kern stock. If
so, Occidental’s profits on the exchange could be subject to disgor-
gement under section 16(b). Critically, Occidental could not control
the timing of the exchange.307 Tenneco did not want a large block of
its stock in potentially hostile hands, so it entered into an option
agreement with Occidental whereby Tenneco could repurchase the
Tenneco shares that Occidental would receive after the Kern asset
sale.308 The option could not be exercised, however, until six months
and one day after the closing of Occidental’s tender offer, thereby
(1975) (holding that certain sales practices of investment companies are immune from antitrust
liability because of SEC oversight).
303. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
304. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000). Section 16(b) provides for the disgorgement of trading prof-
its by insiders (defined to include holders of more than ten percent of a company’s equity) re-
sulting from purchases and sales, or sales and purchases, within six months of each other. Id.
305. Kern County Land Co., 411 U.S. at 585.
306. Id. at 586.
307. See id. at 587 (noting that if the Kern-Tenneco merger were approved and successfully
closed, Occidental would have to exchange its Kern shares for Tenneco stock and would be
locked into a minority position in Tenneco).
308. Id.
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putting that part of the transaction outside section 16(b)’s window.309
Tenneco exercised the option, but nonetheless caused its acquisition
subsidiary, New Kern, to file suit against Occidental for recovery of
its profits under section 16(b).310
The conference split 4-4, with Justice White passing.311 With the
outcome in doubt, Powell wrote a memorandum to Justice White.
There was general consensus that the option agreement was not a
sale, but the exchange of shares pursuant to the asset sale posed a
closer question.312 Powell argued that the statutory language itself
compelled the conclusion that the exchange of shares was not a sale:
“The concept of a purchase or sale necessarily connotes volition, i.e.,
a willing or conscious act on the part of the 10% owner. There was no
such act in this case, and the absence of it seems to me to be disposi-
tive.”313 The sale of assets required only a majority vote of Kern’s
shareholders and California law did not provide for appraisal.314 Ac-
cordingly, Occidental had no alternative to the exchange: “[T]here
may have been a ‘shotgun wedding’ but there certainly was no sale.”315
Justice White joined Powell’s side to form a majority. The Chief
Justice assigned the opinion to Justice White, perhaps to keep a wa-
vering member of the majority on board. Although Powell agreed
with Justice White’s general approach, Powell felt that the opinion
did not emphasize sufficiently that the exchange of shares was invol-
untary. Powell wrote that he would consider a concurrence because
the “[b]ar needs an answer to this question. This opinion is fact ori-
ented [and] gives little guidance.”316 Powell thought Justice White un-
duly emphasized “whether O[ccidental] could have had insider in-
309. Id. at 588.
310. Id. at 590. The Exchange Act’s antiwaiver provision precluded Tenneco from contrac-
tually waiving its rights under section 16(b). See 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2000) (“Any condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this title
or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be
void.”).
311. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Kern
County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 1 (Dec. 8, 1972) (indicating that Justice
Blackmun tentatively voted to reverse, but subsequently switched his vote).
312. Id.
313. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice Byron R. White 2 (Dec. 9,
1972).
314. Kern County Land Co., 411 U.S. at 586 n.9.
315. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice Byron R. White, supra note
313, at 3.
316. Justice Byron R. White, First Draft Opinion, Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Pe-
troleum Corp. 1 (circulated Mar. 6, 1973) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
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formation,”317 an “immaterial”318 concern, because “Occidental could
not [and] did not arrange the merger.”319 Powell also disliked Justice
White’s reference to the fact that appraisal was not available, which
Powell considered “not a dispositive fact,” and the statement that
“[w]e do not suggest that an exchange of stock pursuant to a merger
may never result in § 16(b) liability.”320 Powell favored a more
sweeping holding offering clearer guidance. He feared that courts and
lawyers would struggle to apply Justice White’s flexible standard, a
concern that has proved to be justified.321
Powell joined Justice White’s opinion, but drafted a concurrence,
noting that “the courts and counsel have been perplexed as to the ap-
plicability of § 16(b) to a wide variety of ‘unorthodox’ transactions.
Counsel called upon to advise clients with respect to such transactions
have lacked definitive guidance.”322 A “factually oriented ‘pragmatic’
approach” might be necessary in some cases, even though it risked
being “inexact” and “even subjective.”323 But “the Court need not
have reached in this merger case the inquiry which is the focus of at-
tention under the ‘possibility of abuse’ test, with its focus on the de-
fendant’s access to inside information.”324 That inquiry was “immate-
rial” because Occidental “could neither have blocked the merger nor
assured its consummation. . . . There was simply no act of volition—
indeed no relevant act at all—on the part of respondent with respect
to the accomplishment of the merger.”325
Powell’s “volitional” approach would have provided a more de-
terminate test than Justice White’s possibility-of-abuse standard.
Powell was willing to tolerate private planning to avoid the coverage
of section 16(b); he thought that the abuses Congress sought to curb
through the statute were remote.326 Powell noted in his memorandum
317. Id. at 16 (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
318. Id. at 14 (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
319. Id. (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
320. Id. at 18 (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
321. See COX ET AL., supra note 208, at 1001 (“Ever since the Supreme Court announced its
Kern County pragmatic approach, the lower courts have had trouble applying it.”).
322. Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., Draft Concurring Opinion, Kern County Land Co. v. Occi-
dental Petroleum 1 (Mar. 10, 1973).
323. Id. at 2.
324. Id. at 3.
325. Id. at 4–5.
326. In a memorandum to his law clerk in a subsequent section 16(b) case, Powell wrote
[i]n truth, as you know from our discussions, even one who enjoys the status of a 10%
stockholder is not entitled by virtue of that status to any inside information. To be
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to his clerk asking him to review the concurrence that “I know from
professional experience that this is an area which creates considerable
doubt and confusion. My concurrence will not help much, but it may
put the question which lawyers usually are called upon to answer in a
little sharper focus.”327 Powell’s file does not reveal why he decided
against publishing the concurrence, to which Justice White had “no
objection whatsoever.”328 Perhaps Justice White’s reminder that Occi-
dental was already a ten percent shareholder when it extended its
tender offer caused Powell to rethink the wisdom of his concurrence;
getting into this question might require the Court to resolve the issue
of “whether these shares obtained by the tender offer should be
treated as having been obtained all at one time or at separate
times.”329 The majority was fragile enough without taking on this
question.330
sure, if such a stockholder is able to place a representative on the board, the stock-
holder may end up obtaining the information. This would certainly be true if an indi-
vidual owned 10% and also served as an officer or director. But absent a presence on
the board there would be a clear violation of 10b-5 for a corporation (or its officers or
directors) to disclose to any stockholder information not available to all holders.
Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Carl Schenker 4–5 (Nov. 19, 1975).
327. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Larry A. Hammond 1 (Mar. 10,
1973).
328. Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Mar. 12, 1973).
329. Id.
330. The question of whether the purchase that makes an individual a ten percent holder is
subject to section 16(b) subsequently came to the Court in Foremost-McKesson v. Provident
Securities Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976). Provident had sold its assets to Foremost-McKesson in ex-
change for convertible debentures and cash. Id. at 235. If converted, the debentures would have
made Provident a 10 percent holder of Foremost’s equity. Id. at 236. Provident did not convert,
but instead promptly sold the debentures to an investment bank pursuant to an underwriting
arrangement. Id. Foremost-McKesson then filed suit under 16(b) to recover Provident’s profits.
Id. at 237.
In his notes for use at the Court’s conference, Powell argued that under the plain lan-
guage of the proviso, “Provident was not a 10% holder at time of purchase. At that time it was
zero holder.” Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., for the Conference on Fore-
most-McKesson v. Provident Securities Co. 1 (Oct. 10, 1975). Moreover, the purpose of the
statute—to prevent the unfair use of information—would not be served by liability in this case
because “[u]ntil one becomes 10% holder, Congress has concluded there is little likelihood of
obtaining inf[ormation] to use unfairly. 16(b) is directed vs. insiders. One is not an insider under
statute until he owns 10%. What information can he acquire ‘simultaneously’ with purchasing
10%?” Id. at 2. Powell also argued that a statute requiring “liability w/o fault” such as section
16(b) should be “construed strictly—not expansively.” Id. at 3. The equities, “altho[ugh] irrele-
vant” did not favor Foremost-McKesson, which sold the debentures to Provident “with full
knowledge . . . that they would be sold.” Id. Powell’s observation that this was “[n]ot a pretty
posture for a litigant who is relying on a statute designed to prevent unfairness!” may have
resonated with some of his colleagues. Id. Powell’s final argument was grounded in experience:
“Proviso distinguishes bet[ween] officers + directors—and 10% owners. There is a reason: Vast
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B. Materiality
Materiality arises in virtually every securities lawsuit, whether
brought by a private litigant, the SEC, or the Justice Department. The
higher the standard for materiality, the lower the risk that corpora-
tions will run afoul of the securities laws. The Court addressed this
ubiquitous issue in only one case during Powell’s tenure, TSC Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.331 The Seventh Circuit had held that cer-
tain omissions from a proxy statement were material as a matter of
law because they “might have been considered important by a rea-
sonable shareholder.”332
Powell saw this formulation as an “unrealistic standard,”333 a view
perhaps colored by his perception of the case as a “strike suit.”334
Powell instead argued at conference for his reading of the Second
Circuit’s standard: a “significant likelihood that a reasonable investor
would consider the information important in arriving at his choice of
action.”335 Powell characterized this standard as “middle-of-road” and
argued that “courts should avoid extreme standards either of laxity or
liability” when dealing with a “judicially created” remedy.336 Powell’s
characterization seems a bit strained here. Although the private right
of action under Rule 10b-5 is judicially created, the materiality lan-
guage is drawn from the statute and applies to both private and SEC
actions.
After articulating the standard, Powell then went through a care-
ful explication of the facts in arguing that the Seventh Circuit had
erred in holding that the omissions were material as a matter of law,
rather than leaving them for the jury.337 Powell’s thorough preparation
paid off, as the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart, Marshall, and
Rehnquist agreed with him across the board.338
difference between managerial insiders + stockholders.” Id. Having served on numerous corpo-
rate boards, Powell was well placed to assess the access to information enjoyed by stockholders.
331. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
332. Preliminary Memorandum, TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., to Justice Lewis F. Pow-
ell, Jr. 2 (July 1, 1975).
333. Id. at 1 (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
334. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 1 (n.d.).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 2.
337. Id. at 3–5.
338. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Argument in TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 1–2 (Mar. 5, 1976).
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Powell liked Justice Marshall’s draft opinion, with two small ex-
ceptions. Justice Marshall wrote that “[o]ur cases have not consid-
ered, and we have no occasion in this case to consider, what showing
of culpability, if any, is required to establish the liability under
§ 14(a).”339 The “if any” drew Powell’s ire—even the suggestion of
strict liability was anathema—and Justice Marshall withdrew the of-
fensive language. Powell also objected340 to a footnote reserving
judgment “as to how the standard of materiality and its application
might be altered in a case involving a contested election.”341 Powell
the corporate lawyer could not have been comfortable with the no-
tion that the supposedly objective standard for materiality might vary
with the context in which it was applied. Even Justice Blackmun, no
friend of defendants in securities cases, shared this concern.342 The of-
fending footnote was removed. The standard adopted in TSC eventu-
ally became the general standard of materiality under the securities
laws.343
C. Definition of Security
The definition of a security is a threshold issue in securities law.344
Unless a transaction involves a security, the federal securities laws do
not apply. Prior to Powell’s appointment, the Supreme Court held
339. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Draft Opinion, TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc. FN-4 n.7
(circulated June 2, 1976) (emphasis added). Focused as they were on the summary judgment
awarded to plaintiffs in this case, none of the Justices appears to have given any thought to the
implications that precluding pretrial materiality determinations might have on defendants who
were seeking dismissal.
340. See id. at 1 (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.) (“Good opinion. I’ll join.
But I’ll write or talk to TM about notes 7 + 11.”).
341. Id. at FN-7 n.11.
342. See Letter from Justice Harry F. Blackmun to Justice Thurgood Marshall 1 (June 9,
1976) (stating that Justice Blackmun would join the opinion if footnote 11 were dropped).
343. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1987) (adopting the TSC standard of ma-
teriality). Powell voted to grant certiorari in Basic. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Pow-
ell, Jr., from the Conference on Basic, Inc. v. Levinson 1 (Feb. 20, 1987). Somewhat surprisingly,
the second issue in that case, the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption of reliance, went unre-
marked on by Powell. Reliance does not appear to have been an important issue for Powell. See
Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on John Nuveen & Co.
v. Sanders (Oct. 31, 1980) (noting that Powell would not grant certiorari on the question
“whether [a] person who never saw [the] prospectus could sue” under Section 12(2) because the
“[m]arket may be affected”).
344. COX ET AL., supra note 208, at 117.
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every instrument it reviewed to be a security.345 During Powell’s ten-
ure, the Court decided five cases raising this question, rejecting the
security label in three. Powell wrote four of these five opinions on the
definition of “security.” His sustained effort in this area confined the
securities law to instruments that commonly would be understood as
investments.
Powell’s evolution in this area is striking. Powell focused on
“economic reality” to rein in the definition of security in United
Housing Foundation v. Forman.346 That emphasis conflicted with
Powell’s goal of predictability; looking at economic reality suggested
a case-by-case analysis of financial instruments to determine whether
they were a security, a less than comforting prospect for corporate
lawyers advising clients. When that unpredictability became unman-
ageable in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth347 and Gould v. Ruefen-
acht,348 Powell pulled back from the full implications of “economic re-
ality.”
As Powell saw it, the transaction at issue in Forman had none of
the characteristics of investment. The plaintiffs had purchased
“stock” in a nonprofit housing cooperative subsidized by the State of
New York which allowed them to rent apartments in the coopera-
tive.349 One senses in this passage Powell’s exasperation with the Sec-
ond Circuit’s ongoing efforts to expand the securities laws:
In this case members of Co-op City have not bought stock or real
estate for investment purposes but rather have purchased living
quarters generously subsidized by the State of New York. Certainly
there was no profit motive, as no rational person would purchase an
apartment in this nonprofit housing co-op as an investment for
profit. . . . Nor can it even be suggested that the promoters of the
cooperative, including the State of New York, sold shares in Co-op
City as a means of raising venture capital for a profitmaking opera-
tion. Indeed, the promoter is a nonprofit corporation. Nothing in the
345. Randall W. Quinn & Paul Gonson, Development of the Securities Law in the Supreme
Court: The Definition of “Security” and the Implication of Private Rights of Action, 35 HOW. L.J.
319, 320–25 (1992).
346. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
347. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
348. 471 U.S. 701 (1985).
349. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Second Draft Opinion Dissenting from Denial of Certio-
rari, United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman 1 (Jan. 16, 1974).
072903 PRITCHARD.DOC 09/03/03 4:54 PM
2003] JUSTICE POWELL 899
instant transaction partakes of the kind of investment traditionally
found to be within the scope and purpose of the securities laws.350
The Second Circuit’s “novel” conclusion that this transaction in-
volved a security ignored economic reality. “Novel” was not praise
when Powell was describing legal decisions.
The SEC predictably came in on the side of the plaintiffs, arguing
for the broadest possible interpretation. In this case, the agency was
not arguing for a strained interpretation of statutory text: “[t]he
shares issued by Riverbay Corporation are securities because they are
stock” and “stock” is specifically enumerated in the Exchange Act’s
definition of security.351 Powell, however, was not persuaded by this
statutory literalism. He seldom was inclined to defer to the SEC’s
agency expertise, and that inclination was bolstered in this case by the
fact that the SEC had reversed its prior position.352 In his view, the la-
bel “stock” was misapplied to this instrument.
Looking through form to substance became the central theme of
Powell’s eventual opinion for the Court. “Because securities transac-
tions are economic in character Congress intended the application of
these statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a transac-
tion, and not on the name appended thereto.”353 The economic reali-
ties reflected expenditures on housing, not investments, and labeling
the purchase “stock” could not change that fact.
There is no indication in Powell’s papers that he ever considered
the possibility that the label “stock” could be dispositive. While it
might have been the wrong result on the facts in Forman, a holding
that the instrument was a security would have been readily side-
stepped in the future by simply choosing another label (say, “housing
units”). More importantly, it would have made the definition of secu-
rity considerably more predictable. Perhaps the message was as im-
portant as the holding for Powell. As Powell saw it, private plaintiffs
and the SEC were attempting to push the securities laws into areas
350. Id. at 4.
351. Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities and Exchange Commission at 7, United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (No. 74-157) (citing section 3(a)(10) of the Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10 ) (2000)).
352. See Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973) (concluding that condominiums
are not securities).
353. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).
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that Congress had never intended that they reach. His instinct for
predictability could not overcome that visceral reaction.354
354. The Court decided one case involving the definition of a security in which Powell did
not write the opinion. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), involved two instruments
that potentially could be a security: (1) a certificate of deposit issued by a bank; and (2) a unique
contract negotiated between two parties for an investment in a business. Id. at 554. The second
question particularly worried Powell: “If the agreement here—unique on its facts— is a ‘secu-
rity,’ a vast number of business [contracts] will come under Act. (Sad case!)” Handwritten notes
of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Argument in Marine Bank v. Weaver 1 (Jan. 8, 1982).
Both instruments ultimately were held not to be securities, but the Chief Justice’s opinion for
the Court further muddied the water on the definition of a security.
On the question of whether a CD is a security, Chief Justice Burger sensibly enough said
no. Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 559. Certificates of deposit are not among the enumerated catego-
ries in the definition of security. 15 USC § 77b(a)(1) (2000). More importantly, the risk of hold-
ing the instrument is virtually eliminated by federal banking regulation and deposit insurance.
Chief Justice Burger confused the matter, however, in responding to a concern raised by Justice
Stevens. Justice Stevens urged that the Court’s holding not preclude later holdings that a CD is
a security under the Investment Company Act (despite identical language in the definition) or
that a CD might somehow become a security in secondary market trading, even though it was
not one at the time of issue. Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger 1 (Mar. 4, 1982). Despite the implausibility of these concerns (and not needing Justice
Stevens for a majority), Chief Justice Burger obliged:
It does not follow that a certificate of deposit or business agreement between trans-
acting parties invariably falls outside the definition of a ‘security’ as defined by the
Federal statutes. Each transaction must be analyzed and evaluated on the basis of the
content of the instruments in question, the purposes intended to be served, and the
factual setting as a whole.
Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 560 n.11. This caveat rendered the Court’s holding good for only one
case—a CD could reemerge as a security in the next case, making it very difficult for lawyers to
advise their clients on the status of the instrument.
Chief Justice Burger got further off track in addressing whether the privately negotiated
investment was a security. He notes that the owners of business “distributed no prospectus to
the Weavers [plaintiffs] or to other potential investors, and the unique agreement they negoti-
ated was not designed to be traded publicly.” Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, First Draft
Opinion, Marine Bank v. Weaver 8 (circulated Mar. 1, 1982). Powell objected that these facts
were “immaterial,” but he did not share his concerns with Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 1, 8
(handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.). Powell presumably would have written a
cleaner opinion, focusing on the fact that the unique contract, tailored through the negotiations
of the parties, was not within the realm that Congress had sought to regulate. Alternatively, the
case might have been resolved on a lack of “horizontal commonality,” i.e., no “common enter-
prise” among investors. The Court did not take this tack, leaving unresolved the issue whether
horizontal commonality is required to satisfy the “common enterprise” test. Instead, Chief Jus-
tice Burger’s loose approach raised the possibility that a variety of private placements of in-
struments commonly thought to be securities (e.g., preferred stock) might be outside the reach
of the securities laws. See Marc I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the
Definition of “Security”: The “Context” Clause, “Investment Contract” Analysis, and Their
Ramifications, 40 VAND. L. REV. 489, 490 (1987) (“[T]he Court’s analysis in Weaver has re-
sulted in a great deal of uncertainty about the circumstances under which instruments clearly
fitting within the statutory definition should be denied coverage and when other, more unusual,
transactions similarly ought to be excluded.”). Unless, of course, the Court decided that they
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Powell returned the definition of security to the path of predict-
ability in his last two opinions in this area, although it required going
against his strongest instinct. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth355 and
its companion case, Gould v. Ruefenacht,356 involved the “sale of busi-
ness” doctrine. Under that doctrine, the sale of an entire business, if
achieved by the sale of 100 percent of a company’s stock (or perhaps
just a majority), was outside the securities law.357 The “sale of busi-
ness” doctrine was at least questionable given the specific enumera-
tion of stock in the definition of “security.” The lower courts, how-
ever, had held that common stock was not a security unless it also met
the test for an “investment contract.”358 That test, set forth by the Su-
preme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,359 required an expectation of
profits from the efforts of others.360 A purchaser of 100 percent of a
company’s stock typically could not satisfy this requirement because
of the control conferred by majority ownership. The notion that the
Howey test applied to all financial instruments got support from Pow-
ell’s opinion in Forman, with its focus on “economic realities,” and its
observation that the Howey test “embodies the essential attributes
that run through all of the Court’s decisions defining a security.”361
Although this dicta hardly compelled the lower courts’ decisions,
Powell’s instinct again was to cabin the federal securities laws (and
their liability exposures) narrowly. The sale of an entire company,
whether done by merger, sale of assets, or the sale of stock, typically
would be negotiated face-to-face. The potential buyer could demand
those disclosures relevant to him; the state common law of fraud
would assure the credibility of those disclosures.
Powell had endorsed the “sale of business” doctrine a decade
earlier in a draft concurrence in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.:362
It is unnecessary to say that no acquisition of an entire business,
where the method employed is transfer of stock, is ever convered
were securities based on the flabby caveat that Chief Justice Burger had included at Justice
Stevens’s urging.
355. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
356. 471 U.S. 701 (1985).
357. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 694–95.
358. Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities and Exchange Commission at 4, Landreth Timber
Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (No. 83-1961).
359. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
360. Id. at 298.
361. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852–53 (1975).
362. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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[sic] by 10(b) of the Act. There may be situations where the sub-
stance or essence of the transaction is in fact the purchase and sale
of securities. But certainly in a case where one large business inter-
est is seeking to acquire the entire business of another large interest
for the purpose of operating it, if [sic] blinks reality to say that a se-
curity’s [sic] transaction occurs within the language and intent of §
10(b). In this case Alberto-Culver’s purpose was to acquire these
business entities—their assets and going concern value—in Western
Europe. Alberto-Culver desired to operate these businesses itself,
and was free from the time of acquisition to convert them into such
business forms as best suited its tax and business purposes. It is plain
that Alberto-Culver had no interest in merely becoming a share-
holder in Scherk’s enterprises. In short, the purchase here was not in
any realistic sense a security’s [sic] transaction. It was the 100% ac-
quisition of businesses by a strong, sophisticated purchaser fully ca-
pable of making all necessary investigations, and which indeed did
make such investigations through American and European and [sic]
accountants.
There is nothing in the history or language structures of the Se-
curities Acts of 1933 and 1934 which remotely suggest an intent or
purpose to apply to transactions such as this or to afford protection
to parties such as Alberto-Culver.363
Powell objected to bringing the federal securities laws into negotia-
tions between sophisticated commercial parties. The “sale of busi-
ness” doctrine provided the hook by which Powell could limit the
reach of the securities laws. Powell chose not to publish his Alberto-
Culver concurrence, however, apparently satisfied by Justice Stew-
art’s specific reservation of the question in the majority opinion.364 So
Powell was free to consider the question de novo.
At the certiorari stage in Landreth and Gould, Powell favored
the “sale of business” doctrine,365 a view that he still held the next
spring when he reviewed the case prior to argument:
363. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Rough First Draft Concurring Opinion, Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co. 5–6 (June 2, 1974).
364. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Suggested Note to Be Added to the Opinion of the Court,
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 1 (June 6, 1974); Justice Potter Stewart, Fourth Draft Opinion,
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 1 (circulated June 7, 1974) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr.) (“My suggested note 8 is included.”).
365. Powell wrote on the certiorari pool memorandum that he was “inclined to agree” with
the Ninth Circuit’s application of the doctrine. Preliminary Memorandum, Landreth Timber Co.
v. Landreth 1 (Sept. 24, 1984 Conference) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
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As I had some familiarity with both of these statutes, I confess to a
rather strong bias in favor of CA9’s position that one must look to
the substance of the transaction, rather than rely solely to the term
“stock,” to conclude that the anti-fraud provisions of these Acts ap-
ply. Although the SG struggles to distinguish my decision in United
Housing Foundation v. Forman, I am not yet persuaded.
To all intense [sic] purposes, both of these transactions in-
volved—in effect —the transfer of assets rather than securities in the
normal sense of the term. This is more obvious where 100% of the
business was bought than in the case where an individual purchased
only 50% of the stock. But both cases involve types of transactions
that I doubt anyone, at the times these statutes were enacted, would
have believed were covered by any provisions of these two federal
laws.366
Powell nonetheless conceded that the Solicitor General made “strong
arguments.”367 Powell also wondered whether the doctrine should be
applied to the sale of a smaller percentage of stock.368
Wrestling with this last question evidently changed Powell’s
mind, with a push from his law clerk. That clerk, Lynda Simpson, ad-
vised Powell that “the determination of whether stock is a ‘security’
in these cases will depend on extensive fact-finding as to whether con-
trol has passed and how active in management the purchaser be-
comes, inquiries that make the ‘sale of business’ doctrine more than a
little elusive to apply.”369 Moreover, she noted, “[i]t doesn’t make
much sense to me that the same stock is or is not a ‘security’ depend-
ing on how much of it was sold or who bought it.”370 Simpson’s invoca-
tion of predictability resonated with Powell’s preference for clear
rules: Powell noted “Linda [sic] may be right.”371 He wrote in his notes
prepared before argument that he saw this lack of predictability as a
“serious weakness” in the “sale of business” doctrine.372 By the time
366. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Lynda [Simpson] 2–3 (Mar. 7, 1985).
367. Id. at 3.
368. See id. at 4 (“Is Gould different because he bought only 50%. What if he had bought
25%?”).
369. Bench Memorandum, Gould v. Ruefenacht, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 8 (Mar. 5,
1985).
370. Memorandum from Lynda [Simpson] to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 3 (Mar. 7, 1985).
371. Id. at 4 (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
372. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., for the Argument in Gould v. Rue-
fenacht and Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth 1 (Mar. 21, 1985).
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of conference, Powell voted with his colleagues in rejecting the doc-
trine, after first “express[ing] my doubts at length.”373
Powell was assigned the opinions for a unanimous Court.374 In the
Landreth opinion, he limited Forman’s “economic reality” test to the
definition of “investment contract.” The “investment contract” test
would not be allowed to swallow specifically enumerated categories
of security.375 Forced to choose between predictability of application
and his aversion to expanding the scope of the securities laws, Powell
opted for predictability: “uncertainties attending the applicability of
the Acts would hardly be in the best interests of either party to a
transaction.”376 It helped that the expanded reach of the securities
laws easily could be avoided—by structuring a transaction as an asset
sale, a corporate lawyer could sidestep the securities laws. There is no
evidence that grappling with the sale of business doctrine caused
Powell to reconsider Forman’s focus on economic realities and the
uncertainty that it had engendered.
Powell was afforded one final opportunity to contribute to the in-
terpretation of “security.” After retiring from the Supreme Court,
Powell sat by designation for a number of years on the Fourth Cir-
cuit.377 His opinion in Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson
Trawlers, Inc.378 holds that a general partnership interest is not an
“‘investment security.’”379 Powell was wary of turning partnership dis-
putes into a federal case via the securities laws.380 The decision is no-
table for Powell’s rejection of the notion that “courts must examine
[the] business acumen” of an investor found to be a general partner
when deciding whether the partnership interest qualifies as an “in-
vestment contract.”381 Powell thought that “[u]nless a person is in-
competent I have thought that a general partner is bound by the
terms and conditions of the partnership agreement. Otherwise, it
373. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Landreth
Timber Co. v. Landreth 2 (Mar. 29, 1985).
374. Justice Stevens evidently had a change of heart, as he subsequently dissented. Landreth
Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 697 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
375. Id. at 691.
376. Id. at 696.
377. JEFFRIES, supra note 17, at 560.
378. 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988).
379. Id. at 241–42.
380. Telephone Interview with Bob Werner (former Powell clerk) (May 22, 2002).
381. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Bob [Werner] 2 (Jan. 18, 1988).
072903 PRITCHARD.DOC 09/03/03 4:54 PM
2003] JUSTICE POWELL 905
seems to me the law would be chaotic.”382 Here, Powell did not have
to choose between predictability and his goal of limiting the securities
laws.
V.  THE TAKEOVER WARS
Powell’s efforts to curtail the expansion of the federal securities
law are seen most clearly in the conflict with state corporate law. The
Supremacy Clause requires that state law must give way when federal
and state law conflict,383 but judges nonetheless have substantial lati-
tude in interpreting the scope of federal law and identifying conflicts.
The longstanding clash between state corporate law and federal secu-
rities law was exacerbated when a wave of hostile takeovers reached
its zenith during Powell’s last years on the Court.384 The states were
taking the lead in discouraging takeovers. The SEC was in the op-
posing corner, attempting to use federal law to head off state efforts
to restrict the market for corporate control.385 In this dispute, the
question was not whether one was “for” or “against” business; one
had to take sides for or against management. Powell was firmly in the
promanagement camp.
The following passage from Powell’s concurrence in Edgar v.
MITE Corp. reflects his concern for protecting management:386
The corporate headquarters of the great national and multi-national
corporations tend to be located in the large cities of a few States.
When corporate headquarters are transferred out of a city and State
into one of these metropolitan centers, the State and locality from
which the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly. Manage-
ment personnel—many of whom have provided community leader-
ship—may move to the new corporate headquarters. Contributions
382. Id. at 3.
383. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
384. PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURINGS 44–
49 (3d ed. 2002) (collecting statistics on the incidence of hostile takeovers).
385. Tender Offer Reform Act of 1984, H.R. 5693, 98th Cong. (1984) (proposing, at the
SEC’s urging, that the Williams Act be expanded to give the SEC jurisdiction over anti-
takeover devices); Telephone Interview with Steve Lamb (former SEC attorney) (May 30,
2002).
386. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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to cultural, charitable, and educational life—both in terms of leader-
ship and financial support—also tend to diminish when there is a
move of corporate headquarters.387
Powell’s discussion here smacks of small-town protectionism, i.e., pre-
serving the ability of states to extract rents from corporations in ex-
change for the protection of incumbent management.
Powell would not have labeled himself a protectionist, but simply
a conservative anxious to preserve the sort of business community
that he had known. In Powell’s business world, businessmen like Har-
vie Wilkinson (and, for that matter, Powell himself) were engaged in
building communities as well as businesses. The corporate bottom
line was relevant, but it was not the only goal. Powell, having spent so
many years in corporate boardrooms, paid scant attention to the in-
terests of shareholders, noticeably absent from his discussion here.
Also absent is any attempt to deal with the consequences that this
view would have for the goal of preserving a common market among
the states, if states are to be allowed to protect their local favorites
from takeover by big city firms. Powell’s “Chamber of Commerce”
perspective ultimately prevailed in the Supreme Court and the mar-
ket for corporate control was seriously undermined.
A. Virginia’s Anti-Takeover Statute
Powell had a personal interest in state anti-takeover laws—he
had lobbied to enact the first one. Virginia was the first state (pre-
dating even the federal Williams Act) to adopt an anti-takeover stat-
ute in response to the tender offer wave of the late 1960s.388 Powell
worried that the then-existing regulatory void meant that a tender
“offer may be sprung upon unwary management almost overnight.”389
Powell’s worries became more acute when one of the great conglom-
erates of the 1960s, Tenneco, targeted Newport News Shipbuilding
for a takeover.390 Although Newport News was not a regular client,
the company came to Powell when it needed legislation to ward off
Tenneco.391
387. Id. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring).
388. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to 13.1-728.9 (Michie 1999).
389. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Trends in Antitrust, Address at the Conference of Financial Ex-
ecutives, supra note 299, at 15.
390. Note from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Joe [Carter] 1 (Apr. 18, 1981).
391. Telephone Interview with Joe Carter (former partner, Hunton & Williams) (May 21,
2002).
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Powell’s connections helped: he was a longtime supporter of Ed-
ward Lane, who sponsored the legislation.392 Lane introduced a bill
that would apply to offers for more than ten percent of a company’s
shares for companies that were both incorporated and doing business
in Virginia. Based on a mark-up of a predecessor bill of the Williams
Act,393 the bill’s provisions track the federal law.394 Powell lobbied for
the bill on behalf of Newport News, meeting with Virginia’s Attorney
General (whom Powell had supported in his election campaign)395 and
appearing before both House and Senate Committees of the General
Assembly.396 A member of Powell’s “team,”397 Joe Carter, was sent to
“pound[] the halls of the General Assembly with Cootie Holt [New-
port’s general counsel] begging our friends to save Newport News
Ship from being taken over.”398
The legislation passed the assembly and was signed into law by
Governor Mills Godwin (another beneficiary of Powell’s support).399
Powell thanked Lane for his leadership in enacting “a constructive
bill in the overall public interest of stockholders and management of
392. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Ed[ward E. Lane] 1 (July 28, 1953) (congratulating
Lane on his election); Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Ed[ward E. Lane] 1 (May 13, 1957)
(pledging to support Lane “in the coming election, as I always have in the past”); Letter from
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to [F.] Carlyle [Tiller] 1 (June 21, 1957) (forwarding “checks for Ed Lane”
from Powell and two of his partners); Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Ed[ward E. Lane] 1
(Nov. 10, 1965) (congratulating Lane on his reelection).
393. Telephone Interview with Michael Dooley (Professor, University of Virginia School of
Law) (Feb. 22, 2002).
394. The Virginia statute includes a specified period for the offering, a requirement that of-
ferors take up shares from oversubscribed offers pro rata, a series of disclosure requirements, an
antifraud provision, and both criminal and civil liability provisions (including a private right of
action). The act was later amended in 1980 to reach so-called “creeping tender offers,” i.e.,
large-scale open-market purchases. The Fourth Circuit struck down the amendment as imposing
an undue burden on interstate commerce. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 582 (4th Cir.
1983). A successor statute was upheld by the Fourth Circuit on the basis of Powell’s opinion in
CTS. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 65 F.3d 1172, 1182 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that,
although “the Virginia statutes impose some incidental burden on interstate commerce, we find
the burden outweighed by the interest of Virginia in regulating its corporations”).
395. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Bob [Y. Button] 1 (Nov. 10, 1965).
396. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Billing Records (Jan. 22, 1968–Feb. 29, 1968).
397. Telephone Interview with Joe Carter, supra note 391.
398. Letter from Joe Carter to Lewis [F. Powell, Jr.] 1 (Apr. 22, 1981).
399. Note from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Joe Carter 1 (Apr. 18, 1981) (“As I recall, you and I
drafted the Virginia statute for Newport News Shipbuilding Company, and then the company
backed down on using it against Tenneco. We ‘lobbied’ it through the legislature, and persuaded
Mills Godwin to sign it.”); Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Mills [E. Godwin] 1 (Mar. 9,
1968) (congratulating Godwin on “a most successful session of the General Assembly”).
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Virginia corporations and the communities they serve.”400 Despite
Powell’s victory for Newport News in the legislature, the company
soon abandoned its resistance and agreed to be acquired by Ten-
neco.401 Newport News’s president was shown the door shortly there-
after.402
B. The Williams Act
The federal Williams Act,403 adopted shortly after the Virginia
statute in 1968,404 first made its way to the Supreme Court in 1975.
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.405 raised the question of remedies
under the Act. Rondeau acquired more than five percent of Mosinee
Paper’s shares, but unwittingly failed to file with the SEC the notices
required by the “early warning” provision of the Act.406 Although
Rondeau subsequently filed the required notices, the company filed
suit and the Seventh Circuit barred Rondeau from voting the shares
he acquired after the filing date for five years.407
Powell thought the injunction was “an absurd penalty, where
there was no showing of prejudice or injury to [Mosinee].”408 Powell
knew the potential mischief that could result from putting a weapon
of this sort into the hands of management: “Suits by mgt. (like this) is
a standard tactic to frustrate tender offers.”409 Despite Powell’s un-
easiness with tender offers, he was not prepared to discard the equi-
table rule requiring a showing of irreparable harm for an injunction.410
At conference, only Justice Brennan disagreed, and he offered no jus-
400. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Ed[ward E. Lane] 1 (Mar. 9, 1968); see also Letter
from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Mills [E. Godwin], supra note 399, at 1 (thanking Godwin for his
“full support” of the legislation).
401. Newport News and Tenneco Discuss a “Consolidation”, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1968, at
7; Tenneco Agrees to Buy Biggest U.S. Shipbuilder, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1968, at 11.
402. Tenneco’s Walker Mfg. and Newport News Units Shift Top Management, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 13, 1968, at 26.
403. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 14(d)–(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)–(e) (2000)).
404. Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 569 (1968).
405. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
406. Id. at 51–53.
407. Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1974).
408. Preliminary Memorandum, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., to Justice Lewis F. Pow-
ell, Jr. 1 (Dec. 6, 1974 Conference) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
409. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., for the Argument in Rondeau v. Mo-
sinee Paper Corp. 1 (argued Apr. 15, 1975).
410. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp. 2 (Apr. 18, 1975).
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tification for his position.411 The Court voted to reverse seven to one
(Justice Douglas was absent).412
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court is a straightforward
application of well-settled principles of equity. The opinion is notable
only for its reading of the legislative history of the Williams Act.
Chief Justice Burger argued that the legislative history
expressly disclaimed an intention to provide a weapon for manage-
ment to discourage takeovers bids or prevent large accumulations of
stock which would create the potential for such attempts. Indeed,
the Act’s draftsmen commented upon the “extreme care” which was
taken “to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of
management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid.”413
This passage did two significant things: (1) it transformed rather
transparent denials by Congress of its intent to discourage hostile
takeovers into the governing rationale of the Williams Act; and (2) it
laid the groundwork for the preemption arguments that the Court
would later address and finally reject in CTS.414 None of the Justices—
including Powell, who was well-aware of the anti-takeover purpose of
legislation of this sort—commented upon the passage at the time.415
The Court again interpreted the Williams Act narrowly in Piper
v. Chris-Craft Industries,416 holding that the Act did not provide a
cause of action for damages to a defeated bidder in a takeover.417
Powell urged Chief Justice Burger to “imply no view as to liability” in
his opinion for the Court because if it
could be construed as impliedly affirming the CA2 standard of li-
ability, the management of target corporations may well be deterred
from interposing a vigorous defense against takeover bids for fear of
being sued for relatively trivial inaccuracies or overstatements. A
takeover fight resembles an election contest. There must be reason-
411. Id. at 1.
412. Id. Justice Rehnquist later switched his vote, dissenting without opinion. Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 65 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
413. Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 58–59 (quoting S. REP. NO. 550, at 3 (1967)).
414. See infra notes 448–479 and accompanying text.
415. Powell’s only suggestion, which was ultimately adopted, was that equitable relief should
remain available in the face of an ongoing violation. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 1 (June 5, 1975); Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger to the Conference 1 (June 5, 1975) (accepting Powell’s suggestion).
416. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). Piper is discussed in the Section on private rights of action. See supra
notes 262–72 and accompanying text.
417. 430 U.S. at 45.
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able latitude for hyperbole, for widely differing opinions as to value,
as to management and other relevant facts. There is nothing in the
Williams Act that is intended to limit expression of this kind.418
Management needed freedom to defend itself against takeovers be-
cause “[n]ot infrequently, the tender offeror is a predatory type com-
pany that seeks control for the purpose of liquidating (sometimes
‘looting’) the target company to the disadvantage of minority stock-
holders.”419 Powell did not want the Williams Act to restrain corpo-
rate incumbents from defending their positions.
C. Preemption
Rondeau and Piper set the stage for a trilogy of cases addressing
whether the Williams Act preempted state take anti-takeover laws
and the constitutionality of those state laws under the Dormant
Commerce Clause. In the first, Leroy v. Great Western United
Corp.,420 Great Western had made an unsolicited tender offer to the
shareholders of Sunshine Mining Company, a Washington corpora-
tion with its principal mining operations in Idaho.421 The Fifth Circuit
had upheld an injunction by a Texas district court barring the director
of Idaho’s Department of Finance from enforcing Idaho’s antitake-
over statute against Great Western.422 The Idaho statute added fur-
ther delay and disclosure requirements beyond those imposed by the
Williams Act.423 In addition, it required the approval of tender offers
by state regulators.424 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Idaho stat-
ute placed an undue burden on interstate commerce, thus violating
the Dormant Commerce Clause. In addition, the statute frustrated
the purposes of the Williams Act, and therefore was preempted.425
418. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 2 (Dec. 30,
1976).
419. Id.
420. 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
421. Preliminary Memorandum, Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., to Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. 1–3 (Jan. 5, 1979 Conference).
422. Great W. United Corp. v. Leroy, 577 F.2d 1256, 1286 (5th Cir. 1978) (“[W]e agree with
the district court that the Idaho takeover law is invalid.”).
423. See id. at 1279 (“Idaho’s statute is preempted, because the market approach to investor
protection adopted by Congress and the fiduciary approach adopted by Idaho are incompati-
ble.”).
424. Bench Memorandum, Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
14 (Apr. 6, 1979).
425. Great W. United Corp., 577 F.2d at 1286.
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Powell conceded that “the potential availability of tender offers
is valuable to shareholders in almost all corporations as an incentive
to efficient management,” but he worried that “the Williams Act is a
weak statute that does not adequately protect shareholders of a target
co.”426 Despite his sympathies for the purposes of Idaho’s law, Powell
thought that it “may have gone too far, especially by not limiting its
Act to Idaho corp[oration]s and in requiring approval by Idaho com-
mission.”427
If the Court were to get to the merits, at least eight Justices
thought the Idaho statute should be struck down, although they dis-
agreed on the rationale. A majority, however, believed that the Texas
district court lacked jurisdiction.428 Justice Stevens was assigned the
opinion; he reversed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling that venue was proper
in the Texas district court.429 Despite Justice Stevens’s freelancing, he
got a majority, perhaps because none of the other Justices wanted to
tackle the thorny jurisdictional issues. Justice White (joined by Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall) dissented, but he did not address the
merits of Great Western’s claim.430 The constitutional status of state
antitakeover provisions remained at sea.
The opportunity for clarification arose soon enough, but once
again the Justices were badly splintered. Edgar v. MITE Corp.431 pre-
sented a constitutional challenge to Illinois’s antitakeover statute,
which, like the Idaho statute, applied to corporations that operated in
426. Bench Memorandum, Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
supra note 424, at 1 (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
427. Id.
428. Justice White, along with Justices Brennan and Marshall, wanted to affirm the Fifth
Circuit’s decision. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp. 2 (Apr. 20, 1979). The Chief Justice, along with Justice
Rehnquist, agreed that the statute ran afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause as well as the
Williams Act. Id. at 1, 3. Justice Stewart favored only preemption and Justice Blackmun thought
it only unconstitutional. Id. at 1–2. None of these four, however, thought that the Texas district
court had jurisdiction over the Idaho securities regulator, either under the Texas long arm stat-
ute or the jurisdictional provision of the Exchange Act. Id. at 1–3. Powell thought that the Texas
long-arm statute, but not the Exchange Act, conferred jurisdiction. Id. at 3. The assertion of ju-
risdiction on these facts, however, would violate the Due Process Clause. He did not offer a
view on the merits. Id. Finally, Justice Stevens was uncertain on jurisdiction, but felt that the
case could be reversed for improper venue. Id. If the Court were to reach the merits, Justice
Stevens thought the statute was “bad,” but Powell’s notes do not record Justice Stevens’s ra-
tionale. Id.
429. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 186 (1979).
430. Id. at 187.
431. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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Illinois, whether or not they were incorporated under Illinois law.432
An additional similarity to the Idaho statute was found in the Illinois
provision’s requirement that a state regulator approve tender offers.433
The other similarity to Great Western was a procedural complica-
tion—the potential acquirer had dropped its offer by the time the
case reached the Court. At first glance, the case looked moot. Moreo-
ver, the SEC recently had adopted rules which would preempt stat-
utes of this sort.434 The Justices nonetheless decided to note probable
jurisdiction. Having noted jurisdiction, however, a majority voted for
mootness, and Justice Marshall was assigned to write the opinion.435
Powell went along with the majority although he expressed the opin-
ion that he thought—“[i]f we reach merits”—the statute was pre-
empted.436
Only after Justice Marshall circulated his draft did things begin
to go off track.437 A series of shifts among the Justices resulted in a
majority favoring mootness becoming a majority striking down the Il-
linois law under the Dormant Commerce Clause.438 Justice White
mustered only a plurality of three, however, for his opinion that the
432. Id. at 627.
433. Id.
434. Preliminary Memorandum, Edgar v. MITE Corp., to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 6–7
(May 1, 1981 Conference). The SEC preempted the first generation of state antitakeover laws
with its Rule 14d-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (2000). This rule was referred to at the SEC as
the “kneecap” rule because Chairman Harold Williams had instructed John Huber to cut the
state statutes off at the kneecap. Telephone Interview with Steve Lamb, supra note 385. Edgar
provided substantial authority for upholding the rule. See Nat’l City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp.,
687 F.2d 1122, 1132 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that to force National City Lines to comply with
both SEC and state rules “[would be] impossible and [would] frustrate[] the purposes of the
Williams Act”).
435. Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Conference 2 (June 18, 1982).
436. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Edgar v.
MITE Corp. 2 (Dec. 2, 1981).
437. Justice Thurgood Marshall, First Draft Opinion, Edgar v. MITE Corp. 1–11 (circulated
Feb. 1, 1982).
438. At the end of it all, Justice Rehnquist circulated the following summary of the maneu-
vering:
1) Justice Marshall circulates opinion for the Court. 2) Justice Brennan joins. 3) Jus-
tice Rehnquist joins. 4) Justice Powell joins. 5) Justice White circulates a dissent. 6)
Justice Stevens circulates a dissent. 7) Justice Blackmun joins Justice White. 8) Justice
O’Connor joins Justice Stevens. 9) The Chief Justice joins Justice Marshall. 10) Jus-
tice Rehnquist changes vote. 11) The Chief Justice changes vote. 12) Justice White
circulates opinion for the Court. 13) Justice Marshall circulates dissent. 14) Justice
Brennan joins Justice Marshall. 15) Justice Stevens circulates concurring opinion. 16)
Justice Rehnquist circulates dissent. 17) The Chief Justice joins Justice White. 18)
Justice O’Connor concurs. 19) Justice Powell concurs. 20) Justice Blackmun concurs.
Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Conference, supra note 435, at 2.
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Williams Act also preempted the law. Three Justices who had thought
that the Idaho statute was preempted in Great Western (Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist) did not register their votes on the
merits in MITE (their views appear to have been the same) because
they saw the case as moot.439 Focused on the procedural issue, they
appear to have ignored the case’s implications for substantive regula-
tion.
Powell also believed that the case was moot and had endorsed
preemption at conference.440 Despite his belief that the case was moot,
he had intended to join Justice White’s opinion when it was first cir-
culated.441 He switched course, but nonetheless provided the fifth vote
striking down the law under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Powell
declined to join Justice White’s holding that the statute was pre-
empted by the Williams Act and unconstitutional under the Dormant
Commerce Clause because it directly regulated interstate commerce
occurring wholly outside Illinois in the shares of public companies.442
Powell joined only Justice White’s more limited holding that the Illi-
nois statute imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce rela-
tive to the state interest.443 The result was to preserve more room for
state anti-takeover legislation. Powell noted with interest that the
“Virginia Act (that I helped write and ‘lobbied’ through Va Legisla-
439. Handwritten notes of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., from the Conference on Edgar v.
MITE Corp. 1–3 (n.d.).
440. Id. at 3.
441. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note 436, at 2; Justice Byron R.
White, First Draft Opinion, Edgar v. MITE Corp. 1 (circulated May, 28, 1982) (handwritten
notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell) (“Though I am not persuaded on ‘mootness’ issue, if BRW
gets a court I’ll join it.”). Powell switched in spite of the recommendation of his law clerk, John
Wiley, who argued that the preemption analysis was the narrowest basis on which to decide the
case because it:
applies only to tender offer laws, and could have no possible application to state blue
sky statutes. In addition, I agree with the numerous commentators on this point that
Congress sought to preserve a neutrality with which state takeover laws—although
completely well intentioned and perhaps of superior wisdom—do undoubtedly inter-
fere. This interference is plain from the frequency with which target companies at-
tempt resort to state statute protection.
Memorandum from [John Wiley] to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 2 (June 16, 1982). Wiley de-
clined to discuss the case with me. My speculation, to some extent confirmed by Powell’s con-
currence and subsequent opinion in CTS, is that Powell preferred the Commerce Clause basis
because he was more concerned with preserving some room for state antitakeover laws than he
was with blue sky law. In any event, state blue sky laws have now been largely preempted by
Congress, Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2000); Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (2000),
while state antitakeover provisions have been left untouched.
442. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 630–43 (1982).
443. Id. at 646–47.
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ture) has been followed—in substance—in 36 states.”444 Powell’s ef-
forts preserved that legacy. Powell joined Justice White’s undue bur-
den reasoning because it
leaves some room for state regulation of tender offers. In a period in
our history marked by conglomerate corporate formations essen-
tially unrestricted by the antitrust laws, it is far from clear to me that
the Williams Act’s policy of “neutrality” operates fairly or in the
public interest. Often the offeror possesses resources, in terms of
professional personnel experienced in takeovers as well as in capital,
that vastly exceed those of the takeover target. This disparity in re-
sources may seriously disadvantage a relatively small or regional
target corporation. The Williams Act provisions seem to assume
corporate entities of substantially equal resources. Moreover, in
terms of general public interest, when corporate headquarters are
moved away from a city and State inevitably there are certain ad-
verse consequences. . . . [T]he Williams Act should not necessarily
be read as prohibiting state legislation designed to assure—at least
in some circumstances—greater protection to interests that include
but often are broader than those of incumbent management.445
The criticism of the Williams Act did not make it into print, but not
because Powell had doubts about the substance. He subsequently ob-
served that, “I think the Williams Act has been a disaster as it encour-
ages giant corps. to ‘take over’ smaller corps.”446 Powell here equates
Congress’s grudging tolerance of tender offers in the Williams Act
with encouragement, a reading difficult to square with the legislative
history.447 Perhaps this was a plausible reading in a context in which
444. Justice Byron R. White, First Draft Opinion, Edgar v. MITE Corp., supra note 441, at 1
(handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.). Powell had considered at the certiorari stage
whether his role in drafting the Virginia statute required recusal and had concluded that it did
not. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 434, at 2 (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr.) (“I wrote Va Act—I think it was the first state law—but I’ll not disqualify[.]”).
445. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Concurring Opinion, Edgar v. MITE Corp. 1–2 (June
21, 1982).
446. Preliminary Memorandum, Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., to Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. 1 (Sept. 24, 1984 Conference) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
447. See Mary E. Kostel, Note, A Public Choice Perspective on the Debate over Federal Ver-
sus State Corporate Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 2129, 2140–46 (1993) (describing the original intent of
the Williams Act, the Act’s proponents, and evidence presented at the Congressional hearings).
Justice Stevens’s objection to Justice White’s preemption argument was more substantial:
I agree with you that when Congress enacted the Williams Act, it took extreme care
to avoid tipping the scales of either in favor or management or in favor of possible
takeovers. However, it seems to me that there is a significant difference between
adopting such a policy of neutrality with respect to federal legislation that Congress
was enacting, and requiring states to follow the same policy. As of now, I am not per-
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the SEC was relying on the Williams Act to preserve a free market
for corporate control (or at least a market controlled by the SEC, not
the states).
Powell got his chance to preserve some space for state protection
of local corporations five years later in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America.448 States had gone back to the drawing board after the
twin setbacks in MITE and the SEC’s adoption of its preemptive
rules. Indiana’s effort was typical of the second generation of anti-
takeover statutes. It required a potential acquirer (defined as anyone
acquiring certain threshold percentages of the company’s shares) to
obtain the approval of a company’s “disinterested” shares (defined as
shares not owned by the acquirer or management) before it would be
allowed to vote its own shares.449 Thus, a hostile tender offeror would
be precluded from using its voting power to remove incumbent man-
agement without the approval of the company’s independent share-
holders. The Indiana statute was more narrowly cast than the Illinois
statute struck down in MITE. The Illinois statute applied to corpora-
tions with their principal executive offices in Illinois or that were in-
corporated in Illinois, as long as the corporation had the requisite
number of shareholders in Illinois.450 The Indiana statute was limited
to corporations organized under the law of Indiana, with their princi-
pal place of business and a substantial shareholder presence in that
state.451 It also lacked the requirement that the offer be approved by a
state regulator, which had proved problematic in MITE and had been
preempted by the SEC.452
The Seventh Circuit relied on MITE to invalidate the Indiana
statute on both Commerce Clause and preemption grounds.453 Need-
suaded that Congress intended to prevent the states from loading the scales one way
or the other. You are, of course, dead right in your analysis of the Illinois statute as
being loaded in favor of management.
Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Byron R. White 1 (June 1, 1982). Justice
O’Connor thought that the “Williams Act did not preempt the state law because Congress had
not expressed such an intent.” Letter from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to Justice Byron R.
White 1 (April 23, 1982).
448. 481 U.S. 69, 73–74 (1987).
449. Id.
450. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 627 (1982).
451. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-4(a) (1986), quoted in CTS, 481 U.S. at 72–73.
452. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639 (plurality opinion) (adopting the Seventh Circuit’s finding that
the statute “allows the Secretary of State of Illinois to pass on the substantive fairness of a ten-
der offer”).
453. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 262–64 (7th Cir. 1986).
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less to say, Powell strongly disagreed with Seventh Circuit Judge
Richard Posner’s enthusiasm for the economic benefits of tender of-
fers.454 Powell saw the case as an opportunity to cut back on MITE’s
preemptive reach, but he was pessimistic about his chances of success.
He was pleasantly surprised when the votes were there to note prob-
able jurisdiction rather than affirm,455 but he still doubted that he
could muster a majority on the merits. Powell remained anxious to
curb the takeover wave that seemed to be sweeping the nation: “I still
adhere to my view that the Williams Act has become an economic
disaster—a view that increasingly is being held by responsible
economists. Indeed, hearings are now pending in the Congress to con-
sider appropriate means of curbing takeover bids, and the bypassing
in effect of antitrust laws.”456 Justice White’s opinion in MITE, how-
ever, loomed as a substantial obstacle to tolerating a more mercantil-
ist economic view:
My brief concurring opinion in MITE summarizes my basic ob-
jections to the Williams Act and particularly the way it has been ap-
plied so expansively. But MITE is “the law,” and I would find it dif-
ficult to sustain the complex Indiana Statute in light of the reasoning
of the Court’s opinion in MITE. If my law clerk has any ideas in this
respect, they would be more than a little welcomed!457
Powell now regretted his vote to give Justice White a majority in
MITE, but he nonetheless considered it controlling.458 Powell needed
a way around MITE to save the “beneficial” Indiana statute.459
Powell’s clerk found a path out in the internal affairs doctrine.
The Court had traditionally deferred to state regulation of corpora-
454. Bench Memorandum, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., from Ronald [Mann] to
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 5 (Feb. 11, 1987) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.)
(Powell’s response to Posner’s view that “tender offers are uniformly good for the economy”
was a resounding “NO!”).
455. Preliminary Memorandum, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., to Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. 1 (Sept. 29, 1986 Conference) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.) (“If
other Justices show any interest I could Note this case, but I expect this will be affirmed.”).
456. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to File, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of Am. 1 (Feb. 6, 1987).
457. Id. at 4.
458. Bench Memorandum, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., from Ronald [Mann] to
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note 454, at 18 (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr.) (“I voted wrongly [in MITE]”).
459. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to File, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of Am. 1 (Feb. 2, 1987) (noting that the district court and the Seventh Circuit found the Indiana
statute significantly different from the Illinois statute in MITE).
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tions established under their laws. Should this deference extend to in-
terstate transactions in shares created under that authority? Powell’s
clerk identified the “internal affairs” doctrine as the critical issue:
If you think State corporate governance should be limited strictly to
laws that affect the attributes of shares and transactions by the cor-
poration itself, you will find that Indiana has overstepped its bounds.
On the other hand, if you think States legitimately can act to protect
shareholders from being coerced in ways that effect major corporate
changes, you will find the law satisfactory.460
The internal affairs doctrine would allow Powell to protect manage-
ment from the threat of takeover.
Powell found himself with some unexpected allies at confer-
ence—Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist, who thought the
Idaho and Illinois statutes were preempted by the Williams Act,461 saw
no conflict between the Indiana statute and that law.462 Nor did they
see a problem under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Moreover, Jus-
tice Scalia who had taken Chief Justice Burger’s seat,463 saw no pre-
emption issue and took a much narrower view of the reach of the
Dormant Commerce Clause.464 Justice O’Connor shared Powell’s fed-
eralist streak.465 The result was a 6-3 majority to uphold the Indiana
statute, with Justice Rehnquist giving Powell the assignment.
Powell saw the balancing of state interests against the burden on
interstate commerce as relatively straightforward. In his view:
[The Indiana] regulations . . . will be relatively ease [sic] for tender
offering corporations to comply with if their offers are agruably [sic]
beneficial to the Indiana corporation and its shareholders. It is not
easy to see any “burden” other than possible delay in bringing a
460. Bench Memorandum, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., from Ronald [Mann] to
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note 454, at 22.
461. See Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Edgar v.
MITE Corp. 1–4 (Dec. 2, 1981) (noting that Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist found
preemption by the Williams Act); Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the
Conference on Leroy v. Great Western 1–3 (Apr. 20, 1979) (same).
462. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of Am. 1–2 (Mar. 4, 1987).
463. More precisely, Justice Rehnquist succeeded Chief Justice Burger and Justice Scalia
was confirmed as Justice Rehnquist’s replacement.
464. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., supra note 462, at 1.
465. Id. (noting that Justice O’Connor found no preemption by the Williams Act nor a sig-
nificant burden on commerce).
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tender offer to fruition—hardly a significant burden on a reasonable
and beneficial tender proposal.466
Powell discounts here the significant costs that delay can impose on
an offeror, both in terms of financing and time for target management
to obstruct bids or seek out a “white knight.”467 These risks increase
substantially if a tender offer must be held open for fifty days, rather
than the twenty required by the Williams Act. The draft opinion as-
serted that:
If a majority of the target company’s shareholders think the offer is
attractive, it is likely that a majority will tender their shares on the
twentieth business day, and that a majority of the target company’s
shareholders will vote to accord voting rights to the offeror so that
the transaction can be consummated. Once the shares are tendered,
the opportunities for incumbent management to defeat the tender
offer by lobbying its own shareholders are greatly reduced.468
Powell seems on shaky ground here; at best his conjecture about
shareholder behavior is speculation, at worst it is implausible. Why
would a shareholder tender at the earliest point, rather than waiting
to see if a better offer from a third party emerged while the vote was
pending? An offeror would certainly take into account the risk of
losing its target in determining whether to launch a bid at all. Powell’s
corporate law experience, grounded in the more leisurely dealmaking
pace of the 1950s and 1960s (the Ethyl deal, managed under stringent
deadlines, nonetheless took nearly three months to close),469 was
badly out of date in the junk-bond-fueled 1980s. This passage was cut
before circulation to the other Justices.
Another discarded passage provides further evidence that Powell
was out of touch with the contemporary takeover market:
It may well be that a successful tender offer will result in more effec-
tive management or may have such other benefits as providing
466. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Ronald [Mann] 3 (Mar. 18, 1987).
467. Powell, of course, was aware of the strategic advantages afforded management by de-
lay. In MITE, his law clerk had written that “forcing delay is a known weapon in tender offer
battles.” Bench Memorandum, Edgar v. MITE Corp., from John Wiley to Justice Lewis F. Pow-
ell, Jr. 9 (Nov. 25, 1981). Powell’s response? “Of course—but ‘tender offers’ are not inevitably
good.” Id. (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
468. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Opinion, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am. 28 n.7
(Mar. 19, 1987).
469. Lawrence E. Blanchard, Jr., The Albemarle-Ethyl Deal in 1962, supra note 53, at 2, 7–8
(describing Powell’s role in the deal).
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needed diversification. Yet, we know of no convincing evidence that
the type of conglomerates that may result from repetitive take over
offers are in fact more efficient or that the owners of shares in the
resulting conglomerate are benefited [sic].470
Powell is responding to the 1960s takeovers wave, in which unrelated
businesses were combined into diversified conglomerates. He was
rightly skeptical that shareholders would benefit from these transac-
tions. The takeovers of the 1980s, however, were driven by efficiency
gains from breaking up these conglomerates, and the evidence that
shareholders benefited from this process is simply overwhelming.471
The note was toned down in the final opinion.472
Powell was on stronger ground in emphasizing the analogy be-
tween Indiana’s voting procedure for tender offers and shareholder
votes required by state corporate law for mergers or asset sales.473
Voting requirements are a traditional means to protect shareholders
from expropriation. To be sure, the contexts in which shareholder
votes are required have the risk of unfair valuation because they gen-
erally lack the market test by which tender offers are judged, but the
analogy is at least plausible. Expropriation is a risk only with “two-
tier” tender offers, in which a lower back-end price may induce
shareholders to tender at the front end even if they deem the offered
consideration inadequate. Powell recognized “that the percentage
that really are coercive is relatively small.”474 The opinion cloaks the
weakness of this point in deference to the “empirical judgments of
lawmakers.”475 Nonetheless, distinguishing permissible uses of share-
holder voting from impermissible uses would have been difficult.476
470. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Rider A, p. 43, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am. 2 n.*
(Mar. 20, 1987).
471. RONALD GILSON & BERNARD BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS (1995); Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical
Evidence Since 1980, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Winter 1988, at 49.
472. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Rider A, p. 43, CTS Corp.v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., supra
note 470, at 21.
473. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Ronald [Mann], supra note 466, at 4
(“Virginia required, as did many other states, a two-thirds vote on a merger. In addition, the
state prescribes the requisite vote on a sale of all corporate assets and a liquidation.”).
474. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Ronald [Mann] 2 (Mar. 20, 1987).
475. CTS, 481 U.S. at 92.
476. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Rider A, p. 39, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.
1 (Mar. 20, 1987).
[This] beneficial free market system depends at its core upon the fact that a corpora-
tion—except in the rarest situations—is organized under, and governed by, the laws
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Moreover, state authority over voting rights was supported by tradi-
tion: “No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly es-
tablished than a State’s authority to regulate domestic corps, includ-
ing the voting rights of shareholders.”477 By implication, the SEC’s
authority in this area was questionable absent explicit legislative
authorization.
CTS proved to be the death knell of the free market for corpo-
rate control. Marty Lipton’s invention of the “poison pill” proved to
be a much more potent defense than any state legislation, and CTS
made it essentially invulnerable to legal attack. When combined with
a staggered board, the poison pill becomes unassailable,478 a result
foreshadowed by Powell in CTS.479 An important tool in harnessing
managers to serve the interests of shareholders has been undercut
substantially as a result. Whether Powell would have favored this re-
sult, or thought that it went “too far,” is impossible to say.
VI.  THE SEC
Before Powell’s confirmation, the SEC had enjoyed phenomenal
success in the Supreme Court, winning every case in which it was a
party from 1941 through 1971.480 Powell’s arrival coincided with a pre-
cipitous decline for the agency in the Court, and the change did not
go unnoticed. Shortly after the agency’s high-profile loss in Chi-
arella,481 the Wall Street Journal noted that the Supreme Court was
disagreeing with the SEC with much greater frequency and gave “the
credit—or blame—for the court’s position to Justice Lewis Powell,
former corporate lawyer who has written many of the majority opin-
ions in these cases.”482 Powell evidently was anxious for the SEC to
of the state of its incorporation. These law [sic] govern the voting rights of sharehold-
ers that directly apply to a variety of corporate transactions including takeover bids.
Id.
477. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Opinion, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., su-
pra note 468, at 37.
478. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 891 (2002) (finding that staggered boards
double a target’s likelihood of remaining independent).
479. CTS, 481 U.S. at 85–86 (discussing potential delay in effecting takeovers resulting from
classified boards).
480. See Conard, supra note 6, at 196.
481. See infra notes 538–561 and accompanying text.
482. Stephen Wermiel & Stan Crock, High Court Rulings Are Putting SEC on Shorter
Leash, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1980, at 30.
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get the message—he sent his law clerk to discuss the Court’s securi-
ties cases with the Journal reporter doing the story.483 What explains
Powell’s seeming hostility to the agency?
As a corporate lawyer, Powell’s relationship with the SEC had
not always been smooth. Like most securities lawyers, Powell found
the agency to be unreasonable at times. Taking a break from the in-
vasion of North Africa to complain to a colleague about a client’s loss
before the agency, Powell wrote:
I had hoped the war . . . would temper the crusading order of SEC
[sic], and that [the client] would receive moderate and fair treat-
ment. It is extremely disappointing to find that agencies of the Gov-
ernment are still fighting an internal war against capitalism when the
unified energies of all should be concentrated on fighting the very
urgent and real war for physical survival. Also one of the things I
hope we are fighting for is the survival of a just and fairly regulated
capitalism. Personally, I believe capitalism (i.e.—the right to private
property and moderate profit) is an essential component of democ-
racy.484
While Powell was far from being an advocate of laissez faire (“fairly
regulated capitalism,” “moderate profit”), he objected to the SEC’s
perceived heavy-handedness.
Powell was afforded a chance to rein in the SEC, but he declined.
Later, in a memorandum to his children, Powell described his deci-
sionmaking process:
Walter S. Robertson, a partner in Scott & Stringfellow, and a per-
sonal client of mine, became Assistant Secretary of State for the Far
Since 1975, the SEC has made its views known to the Supreme Court in 18 cases. The
Justices have ruled against the SEC in 12 of them. The contrast couldn’t be sharper
with the period from 1934, when the commission was established, to 1974. In 60 ap-
pearances as a party or friend of the court, the SEC won 48 Supreme Court cases.
Id.
483. Letter from Stephen Wermiel, Reporter, Wall Street Journal, to Justice Lewis F. Pow-
ell, Jr. 1 (July 17, 1980) (“I had a pleasurable chat with John Sallet and wanted to express my
thanks to you for your kind assistance.”); Telephone Interview with Jonathan Sallet, Clerk for
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (May 21, 2002). When the story did not immediately appear, Powell
wrote to Wermiel to inquire. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Stephen Wermiel, Re-
porter, Wall Street Journal 1 (Aug. 8, 1980).
Other coverage was less favorable. The New York Times quoted Arthur Miller: “This is a
pro-business Court . . . [and Powell in particular] has a Virginia plantation mentality. I have a
hunch that possibly he thinks the Civil War went the wrong way.” Louis Kohlmeier, Justice
Powell: For Business, a Friend in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1976, at F5.
484. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to George Gibson 1 (Nov. 25, 1942).
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East in the Eisenhower Administration. He called me from the
White House early in 1953 and said that the President would ap-
point me Chairman of the Securities & Exchange Commission if I
would accept the position. Again, I conferred with clients, senior
partners at Hunton & Williams and—of course—with Jo. Although I
had done a good deal of SEC work, and the Chairmanship of the
SEC would assure a substantial law practice thereafter, my partners
wanted me to stay in Richmond. I had commenced to develop major
clients of my own . . . and also—having been away nearly four years
during the war—I preferred to remain in my native city and state
and concentrate on being a lawyer.485
Powell liked being a corporate lawyer, spurning many attractive of-
fers that would have taken him away from his practice.486 As it turned
out, Powell ended up wielding far greater influence over the securities
laws as a Justice than he would have exercised as a chairman of the
SEC.
Powell objected most to the SEC’s efforts to expand its jurisdic-
tion. In a memorandum to a clerk, he wrote:
My first experience in corporate as distinguished from trial practice
was in the representation of Virginia investment banking firms. I
therefore have some familiarity with the Securities Acts, and also
with the way in which they have been administered. Generally, I
think these acts have been among the best of the regulatory statutes.
But the SEC always has sought to expand its reach. The history of
10b-5 is an example.487
485. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Jody, Penny, Molly, and Lewis III
[Powell], supra note 29, at 10–11; see also Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Walter S. Robert-
son, Attorney, Scott & Stringfellow 1 (Feb. 26, 1953) (removing his name from consideration for
Chairman of the SEC); Letter from Walter S. Robertson, Attorney, Scott & Stringfellow to
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Mar. 2, 1953) (expressing his regret as to Powell’s decision). Shortly after
the offer of the SEC chairmanship, Ralph Demmler, appointed chairman after Powell declined,
asked Powell if he would be interested in being a commissioner. Powell again declined (without
telling Demmler of the earlier offer). Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Ralph H. Demmler,
Attorney, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay 1 (Apr. 23, 1953); Letter from Ralph H. Demmler, At-
torney, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay to Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Apr. 27, 1953).
486. Powell also declined a position teaching law at the University of Virginia. Letter from
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Dean F.D.G. Ribble, University of Virginia 1 (May 10, 1958). Powell
later declined the considerably greater prestige of the presidency of the University, as well as
the presidency of his alma mater, Washington & Lee, not to mention seats on the Fourth Circuit
and the Virginia Supreme Court. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Jody,
Penny, Molly, and Lewis III [Powell], supra note 29, at 11–13.
487. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Jim Browning, supra note 131, at 1.
072903 PRITCHARD.DOC 09/03/03 4:54 PM
2003] JUSTICE POWELL 923
He was also suspicious of the SEC’s support for private class actions:
the “SEC usually favors all π. I can’t recall a case in which this was
not so.”488 Although he disagreed with the SEC’s aggressive interpre-
tations of the securities laws, Powell recognized the need for public
enforcement. Shortly after handing the SEC a stinging defeat in Chi-
arella, Powell wrote: “[I] have considered the SEC to be one of the
better independent Agencies. It has served its basic purpose well, and
the original statutes were—I thought—remarkably well drafted for
their intended purposes.”489 It was the SEC’s effort to expand its
authority—not its existence—that troubled Powell.
This Part explains how Powell translated his skepticism regarding
the SEC’s efforts to expand its authority into a judicial campaign to
rein in the SEC. It first addresses a number of cases in which the SEC
was rebuked by the Supreme Court for attempts to expand its
reach.490 It then turns to insider trading, the area in which Powell dealt
the agency its most stinging losses.
488. Bench Memorandum, Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, from Jim [Browning] to Jus-
tice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note 297, at 17 (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr.).
489. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Michael P. Dooley, Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Virginia 1 (Oct. 25, 1980).
490. The Court did give the SEC one victory based on deference to agency expertise. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 56–57 (1977). E.I. du Pont involved the un-
winding of a holding company structure that the DuPont family had created for their holdings in
the DuPont company. Id. at 48. The holding company, Christiana, was to be merged into
DuPont, with the Christiana shareholders to receive DuPont shares in the merger. Id. at 49.
Christiana fell within the definition of an investment company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (2000).
Since Christiana was the Dupont family’s personal holding company, it was an affiliate of
Dupont, and thus the merger was interested under § 17(a) of the Investment Company Act. Id.
§ 80a-17(a). As an interested merger, SEC approval was required. Id. § 80a(17(b). The SEC ap-
proved the merger as “fair” because the merger ratio reflected the net asset value of Christiana
(its assets were primarily DuPont stock) and the transaction did not dilute the interests of the
DuPont shareholders. Collins, 432 U.S. at 51. The Eighth Circuit reversed the SEC’s decision.
Collins v. SEC, 532 F.2d 584, 605 (1977). The Eighth Circuit held that the SEC applied the
wrong legal standard to the transaction, which the court held to be fair market value of the
Christiana stock. Id. at 591. The Christiana stock traded at a substantial discount to net asset
value, largely due to tax disadvantages of the holding company structure and embedded capital
gains in the DuPont stockholdings. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 432 U.S. at 49–50. The
Eighth Circuit believed that, in an arms-length transaction, the tax benefits of the transaction
would have been shared with the DuPont shareholders. Collins, 532 F.2d at 592–93.
The Supreme Court reversed based on deference to agency discretion, id. at 56–57, with
only Justice Brennan dissenting. Id. at 57 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The discussion at confer-
ence, however, went to the substance of “fairness” in the context of a merger. Handwritten
notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Collins 1 (Mar. 4, 1977). No member of the Court expressed the view that “fairness” requires
sharing of benefits or the duplication of the result of an arms-length transaction, standards fa-
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A. The SEC in the Supreme Court
The most extreme example of the SEC’s aggressive litigation
strategy appears to have been International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. Daniel.491 The SEC apparently was playing fast and loose regarding
its change in position. As recently as 1971, the SEC had taken the po-
sition that involuntary pension plans did not involve the sale of secu-
rity; by 1979, when the case arose, it was taking the opposite posi-
tion.492Judge Tone, concurring in the court of appeals decision, noted
that:
Apparently for the first time ever, [the SEC] takes the position in its
brief before us that the employee’s interest or expectancy in a plan
such as this is subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the securities
laws. The Commission has been not as candid as we might have
hoped in acknowledging and explaining its change in position.493
Powell observed that the SEC’s lack of candor about its switch was
“not unusual.”494 The SEC’s brief in the Supreme Court further un-
dermined its credibility. Powell’s clerk advised him that “[t]he SEC
has made representations to this Court in its brief [regarding its change
in position] which, put in the most charitable light, are less than can-
did.”495 The SEC’s failure to hold to a consistent position was under-
mining its hopes for deference by the Supreme Court.496
vored by some state courts in evaluating mergers. E.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d
929, 937 (Del. 1985). Instead, the Justices viewed the tax benefits to the Christiana shareholders
as irrelevant. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, supra, at 1. As Powell put it: “What consideration of fairness
would entitle DuPont to claim a share in tax benefits derived by C[hristiana]’s shareholders?”
Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., for Conference on E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Collins 2 (n.d.). Powell appears to have been swayed by the fact that the “SEC consis-
tently has used net asset value.” Id. Powell’s refusal to defer to the SEC in so many cases was
based in large part on the SEC’s shifts in position.
491. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
492. Daniel v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1251 (7th Cir. 1977).
493. Preliminary Memorandum, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, to Justice Lewis F. Pow-
ell, Jr., supra note 112, at 9 (quoting Daniel, 561 F.2d at 1251 (Tome, C.J., concurring) (emphasis
added by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.)).
494. Id. (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
495. Bench Memorandum, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, from Paul [B. Stephan] to Jus-
tice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note 219, at 23 (handwritten notes of Paul B. Stephan) (emphasis
added by Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
496. The Solicitor General also rejected the SEC’s newfound position, siding with the De-
partment of Labor in favoring reversal. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8–10,
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (No. 77-753).
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Powell was frustrated with the SEC, but his own norms of profes-
sionalism prevented public criticism. His clerk drafted a sharp rebuke
of the SEC,497 but whatever the Court’s actual practice, Powell was
not prepared to announce a position of no deference to the agency.
The final opinion contains much milder language.498 Powell would not
indulge the SEC’s enthusiasm for expanding the federal securities
laws, which he saw as a profound shift for an agency that historically
held a modest view of its power, but he would not characterize the
SEC as a rogue agency.
Problems with the SEC were not limited to recent switches in po-
sition. Some of the agency’s abuses were longstanding practices. SEC
v. Sloan499 involved the agency’s authority under section 12(k) of the
Exchange Act to “summarily . . . suspend trading in any security . . .
for a period not exceeding 10 business days” if “in its opinion the
public interest and the protection of investors so require.”500 In Sloan,
the SEC had relied on this authority to issue a series of orders sum-
marily suspending trading in the common stock of Canadian Jave-
lin.501
The SEC had been issuing successive orders under this authority
since 1944.502 The agency’s interpretation, however, was difficult to
square with the statutory scheme. Section 12(j) of the Exchange Act
authorizes the SEC to suspend securities from registration (which
497. The initial draft explained the Court’s refusal to defer to the SEC this way:
[W]hen it becomes apparent that an agency has shaped its interpretation of a statute
solely to determine the outcome of a particular case, without regard to the ongoing
problems of policy and purpose that underlie that agency’s regulatory function, this
deference is forfeited. Ad hoc, unprincipled decisionmaking does not draw on devel-
oped expertise and constitutes an abuse of accorded flexibility.
On a number of occasions in recent years this Court has found it necessary to re-
ject the SEC’s interpretation of various positions of the Securities Acts. In those cases
the SEC either had shifted its position, had not previously developed a position, or
had developed its position without consideration of the statutory authorization under
which it acts. This case falls into the same category. Our review of the SEC’s past ac-
tions convinces us that until the instant litigation arose that agency never had con-
sider the Securities Acts applicable to non-contributory, involuntary pension plans
and that its argument to the contrary here demonstrates an alarming and dishearten-
ing lack of candor.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., First Draft Opinion, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, supra note
225, at 16–17 (citations omitted).
498. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 565–66 & n.20 (1979).
499. 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
500. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(k)(1)(A) (2000).
501. Preliminary Memorandum, SEC v. Sloan, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 2 (Oct. 14,
1977).
502. Id.
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would have the effect of suspending trading) for up to twelve months,
but only after giving the affected company notice and a hearing.503 By
using its summary power, the SEC could avoid the notice and hearing
requirements (which would afford the opportunity for judicial re-
view). Powell found it “[d]ifficult to believe Congress intended to al-
low the notice + hearing requirements of 12(j) to be by-passed by re-
petitive resort to 12(k).”504 The situation was exacerbated by the
SEC’s attempts to evade review by allowing orders to expire after
Sloan sued (only to renew them subsequently).505 This was an easy
application of the exception to mootness for cases “capable of repeti-
tion yet evading review.”506 The brazenness of the SEC did not sit well
with the Justices; even Justice Brennan, usually a dependable ally for
the SEC, thought that an “[a]dmin. agency that acts as SEC did is not
entitled to usual deference.”507
The SEC’s tendency to overreach hurt its position when the
Court was called upon to address procedures applicable to the
agency’s enforcement actions. The SEC had supported the plaintiff in
Ernst & Ernst seeking a negligence standard under section 10(b). The
SEC’s only consolation in Ernst & Ernst was that Powell was forced,
in order to hold his majority, to reserve the question of whether the
scienter standard would apply to an action for injunctive relief
brought by the SEC.508 Aaron v. SEC509 squarely raised that question.
Powell’s conference notes from Ernst & Ernst record Justice Stewart’s
view that an injunctive suit by the SEC might present a different
case,510 but Powell’s heavy reliance on the language of section 10(b) in
Ernst & Ernst greatly weakened that position. Section 10(b) makes no
distinction between government and private litigants, hardly a sur-
prise given that Congress did not anticipate private litigation under
section 10(b) when it adopted the Exchange Act in 1934. Nonetheless,
503. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(j) (2000).
504. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., for the Argument in SEC v. Sloan 1
(Mar. 27, 1978).
505. Preliminary Memorandum, SEC v. Sloan, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note
501, at 2.
506. S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514–15 (1911).
507. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on SEC v.
Sloan 1 (Mar. 3, 1978).
508. Telephone Interview with Greg Palm, supra note 162; see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
509. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
510. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra note 165, at 1.
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“policy concerns” raised by private litigation played an important role
in Ernst & Ernst. In Aaron, the Second Circuit (in an opinion written
by Judge Timbers, former general counsel of the SEC) read Ernst &
Ernst narrowly in order to hold that the SEC only needed to show
negligence when seeking an injunction.511
Powell, however, worried about the SEC as well as private liti-
gants: “[A] suit [by the SEC] [and] an injunction are punitive [and]
can impose severe stigma [and] other penalties.”512 In Powell’s world,
the harm to reputation from an injunction was at least as important as
a monetary sanction.513 The SEC could overreach; the scienter stan-
dard protected defendants against unwarranted damage to their
standing in the business community.514
Aaron, however, raised another issue that was not present in
Ernst & Ernst: the state of mind required for liability under section
17(a) of the Securities Act, which prohibited “any transaction, prac-
tice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon the purchaser.”515 The Court previously had found that
similar language in the Investment Advisers Act did not require the
SEC to establish an intent to deceive.516 Powell agreed with his clerk
511. Preliminary Memorandum, Aaron v. SEC, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Oct. 12,
1979).
512. Bench Memorandum, Aaron v. SEC, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Feb. 15, 1980)
(emphasis added by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
513. Id. at 3 (“Injunctions are punitive.”) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.)
(emphasis added by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
514. Another example of Powell’s efforts to guard against expansions of the SEC’s authority
is Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985). Bateman Eichler raised
the issue of whether the in pari delicto defense could be raised by corporate insiders and broker-
dealers who induce an investor to trade by falsely representing that they are conveying inside
information. Id. at 301. The Bateman Eichler opinion, written by Justice Brennan, is unexcep-
tional, emphasizing that the in pari delicto defense can only be invoked when the fault of the
parties is substantially equal, and where recognition of the defense would not “significantly in-
terfere with the effective enforcement of the securities laws.” Id. at 310–11. Powell’s only nota-
ble contribution was to persuade Justice Brennan to delete a footnote discussing the SEC’s
“shingle theory.” See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 436–37 (2d Cir. 1943) (hold-
ing that broker-dealers make an implied representation of fair dealing by the act of putting out
their “shingle” as broker-dealers). Powell feared “the SEC might view [the note] as at least an
implicit approval of its theory.” Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. 1 (May 24, 1985).
515. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 687 (1980) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3)).
516. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (construing sec-
tion 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789, 852 (1940), which
makes it illegal for any investment adviser “(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud any client or prospective client; (2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of
business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client”).
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that a looser interpretation of section 17 would lead the SEC to “pitch
much of its enforcement effort toward that statute, but the provision
is limited to those selling securities . . . As a result, a certain asymme-
try of enforcement policy would develop, where negligent fraud by
sellers of securities would be punishable while negligent fraud by
buyers would not.”517
Powell uncharacteristically had little to say at the conference in
Aaron. He discussed the case with Justice Stewart before the confer-
ence and they agreed upon a resolution. His discussion with Justice
Stewart was not unusual; Justice Stewart was “by a long reach his
closest colleague on the Court,” and Powell regularly spoke to him
about pending cases, which was not Powell’s practice with his other
colleagues.518 Powell apparently came round to Justice Stewart’s view
that section 17(a) could not be interpreted in the same fashion as sec-
tion 10(b).519 This time, text prevailed over policy.
At the conference, the Chief Justice led off by voting to affirm
the Second Circuit.520 Justice Stewart came next; he made it easier for
Powell to agree when he argued that “injunctions are fatal” and pro-
posed that the opinion should say that the “SEC should be cautious
about issuing an injunction.”521 Despite the consequences that an in-
junction had for defendants, Justice Stewart found the language of
section 17(a) could not be read to require a finding of scienter, al-
though section 10(b) required a “knowing” violation.522 Justice White
agreed that 10(b) required a “knowing” violation, but section 17(a)
did not. Powell and Justice Rehnquist simply expressed their agree-
ment with Justices Stewart and White, while Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun made no effort to persuade their colleagues,
simply voting to affirm.523 Finally, Justice Stevens gave Justice Stewart
and Powell a majority, stating that he “would not have joined
517. Bench Memorandum, Aaron v. SEC, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note 512, at
6.
518. Telephone Interview with David Stewart (former Powell clerk) (Apr. 17, 2002).
519. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Aaron v.
SEC, supra note 166, at 1. Powell notes on his copy of Justice Stewart’s eventual draft that Jus-
tice Stewart “reads § 17(a)(3) differently from my tentative view—but P.S. persuades me.” Jus-
tice Potter Stewart, First Draft Opinion, Aaron v. SEC 1 (circulated Apr. 16, 1980) (handwritten
notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
520. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Aaron v.
SEC, supra note 519, at 1.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Id. at 1–3.
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Hochfelder, but will accept it.”524 With a majority for vacatur, the
Chief Justice switched to the majority525 and assigned the opinion to
Justice Stewart.
Justice Stewart wrote the opinion, leaning “heavily + properly on
Ernst & Ernst.”526 Justice Stewart again reserved the question of
whether the definition of scienter included reckless behavior.527 For
the SEC, Aaron has to be considered a victory, despite the Court’s
rejection of its argument for a negligence standard under section
10(b). Statutory language and precedent preserved the enforcement
tool of section 17(a), despite the misgivings of at least Powell and Jus-
tice Stewart about the SEC’s use of injunctions. The threat perceived
by Powell was confined; Justice Stewart took care to note that the
Court did not address whether a private cause of action exists under
section 17(a).528
Powell’s suspicion of the SEC carried over to Steadman v. SEC,529
a remarkable case for one reason: it is the only securities case in
which Powell dissented.530 The question raised was the standard of
proof to be applied by the SEC in administrative proceedings to bar
an investment advise.531 The SEC had applied a preponderance stan-
dard.532 Powell worried that “[t]o bar a middle aged professional in-
vestment adviser from pursuing his vocation for life, and at the same
time stigmatize him with a judgment of fraud, is more serious than
most criminal penalties.”533 For this reason, Powell favored the “clear
524. Id. at 1, 3.
525. Id. at 1. Chief Justice Burger eventually ended up concurring. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680, 702 (1980) (Burger, C. J., concurring).
526. Justice Potter Stewart, First Draft Opinion, Aaron v. SEC, supra note 519, at 1 (hand-
written notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
527. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 686 n.5.
528. Id. at 689. The combination of a negligence standard for section 17(a), which has sub-
sequently been read not to give rise to a private cause of action, Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1998), and a scienter standard for section 10(b), strikes a workable balance.
The SEC faces a manageable burden of proof in the case that is the principal concern of the se-
curities law—selling securities through misstatements—while private litigants are not free to
impose enormous damages on defendants in open-market fraud cases without a showing that
the defendants intended to distort securities prices. The Court got to this result primarily as a
matter of precedent and statutory language, but it can be defended on policy grounds as well.
529. 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
530. Id. at 104 (Powell, J., dissenting).
531. Id. at 92.
532. Id.
533. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice Potter Stewart 1 (Feb. 12, 1981).
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and convincing” evidence standard for common law fraud.534 Despite
his dissent, Powell conceded at conference that his vote to reverse
was “very tentative.”535 Without a more vigorous stand from Powell,
his colleagues were not inclined to agree with his view on the relative
severity of criminal and SEC sanctions. Consequently, the Court
adopted the more typical preponderance of the evidence standard.536
Steadman was Powell’s only dissent in forty-one securities law cases
over a fifteen year period.537
B. Insider Trading
Powell wrote two foundational opinions on insider trading: Chi-
arella v. United States538 and Dirks v. SEC.539 These opinions reflect
Powell’s unease with the SEC’s efforts to expand Rule 10b-5 through
aggressive interpretation. Powell thought “that the SEC should have
gone to Congress long ago. Rather, it has elected to write expansive
Rules (e.g., Rule 10b-5, drafted by Louis Loss one morning), and then
undertake to extend the vague language of the Rule to the edge of ra-
tionality.”540 Powell saw Rule 10b-5’s jurisprudence as a species of
“federal common law.” The courts needed to develop workable
rules.541 This common law perspective gave wide latitude for policy
534. Steadman, 450 U.S. at 105.
535. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Steadman v.
SEC 1 (Dec. 5, 1980).
536. Steadman, 450 U.S. at 101.
537. One final case implicated the SEC’s authority. In O’Brien v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065 (1983),
the Ninth Circuit required the SEC to provide notice to the targets of its nonpublic investiga-
tions that it was serving subpoenas on third parties. Id. at 1069. The decision lacked any consti-
tutional or statutory basis, and the Solicitor General argued persuasively that the Ninth Circuit’s
holding threatened to undermine investigations relating to over one hundred programs that
used subpoenas of the type issued by the SEC. Preliminary Memorandum, SEC v. O’Brien, to
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 5 (Jan. 6, 1984 Conference). While Powell worried about conferring
too much discretion on the SEC in its enforcement efforts, he did not want to see the agency
hobbled. The Court voted unanimously to reverse; Powell’s notes suggest that there was virtu-
ally no discussion. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on
SEC v. O’Brien 1 (Apr. 20, 1984).
538. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
539. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
540. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Michael P. Dooley, supra note 489, at 1.
Powell’s assertion that Loss drafted Rule 10b-5 is incorrect. See Conference on Codification of
the Federal Securities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 922 (1967) (comment by Milton Freeman, At-
torney and Assistant Solicitor, SEC, 1934–46) (claiming authorship of Rule 10b-5).
541. Telephone Interview with James Browning (former Powell clerk) (Apr. 3, 2002). On
the insider trading prohibition as a species of federal common law, see generally Stephen M.
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concerns. Powell worried that prohibitions against insider trading
could chill incentives for analysts and other market professionals to
uncover information about publicly traded companies.
Chiarella was an unlikely beneficiary of these concerns. He was a
“markup man” at Pandick Printers, a printer of financial documents,
giving him access to documents relating to confidential takeover
plan.542 He deduced the identity of takeover targets, despite the best
efforts of Pandick’s clients (the potential tender offerors) to conceal
them, from the price histories, par values and the number of letters in
the fake names in those documents.543 Chiarella conceded at trial that
he knew he was going “against the SEC.”544 Powell agreed that Chi-
arella’s conduct was “egregiously dishonest,” but warned that “we
should resist temptation to make bad law.”545 He was more concerned
by the Second Circuit’s “major extension of 10b” to find silence to be
fraud even with “no fiduciary duty.”546
Powell also worried that regulation could impair market effi-
ciency. He saw the SEC’s efforts to impose a “parity of information”
rule as undermining “incentives to perform market research in order
to discover undervalued stocks and thereby bring about a more effi-
cient allocation of resources.”547 Powell agreed with a student author
in the Harvard Law Review: “[t]he courts must also recognize . . . the
importance of preserving incentives for legitimate economic effort,
such as gathering new information or perceptively analyzing generally
available facts.”548 Powell’s understanding of the market mechanisms
was an informed one, distinguishing demand theories of price change
in the securities markets from informational ones. In response to the
government’s claim that Chiarella’s trading could have harmed the
Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibi-
tion, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189 (1995).
542. Bench Memorandum, Chiarella v. United States, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 2 (Sept.
28, 1979).
543. Id. Powell was familiar with Pandick’s operation, having used their services for the
Ethyl deal. Lawrence E. Blanchard, Jr., The Albemarle-Ethyl Deal in 1962, supra note 53, at 21.
544. Bench Memorandum, Chiarella v. United States, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra
note 542, at 17.
545. Id. at 27 (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
546. Preliminary Memorandum, Chiarella v. United States, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1
(Apr. 13, 1979 Conference) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
547. Bench Memorandum, Chiarella v. United States, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra
note 542, at 7 (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
548. Case Comment, The Application of Rule 10b-5 to “Market Insiders”: United States v.
Chiarella, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1538, 1543 (1979) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., on the margins of a photocopy).
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offerors that hired Pandick by driving up the target’s stock price,
Powell noted that this was unlikely given the small number of shares
that Chiarella had purchased.549 Powell agreed, however, with the
proposition that Chiarella’s unusual trading patterns might have been
decoded by other market participants given that he was “a single in-
vestor known to his broker to work in a printing firm [who] shows a
pattern of predicting tender offers.”550 Powell’s concern with market
efficiency would play a larger role in Dirks, but he clearly had it in his
mind in Chiarella.
The Court found itself divided, with five votes to reverse the
conviction and three to affirm.551 The majority was tenuous, however,
with Justice Stevens advancing a different rationale. Although Jus-
tices Stewart, White, and Rehnquist agreed with Powell that Chi-
arella’s conduct did not violate section 10(b) under any theory, Jus-
tice Stevens thought there was a violation, but the government had
“tried [the] case on basis of fraud to [the] wrong party.”552 On this
theory—the “misappropriation” theory—Chiarella had defrauded
Pandick’s clients, thought Justice Stevens, not the investors from
whom he purchased.
The distance between Justice Stevens and the other members of
the majority was eliminated, however, by additional research. Pow-
ell’s clerk pored over the record and confirmed “the conclusion of
Mr. Justice Stevens that the jury was never presented with the theory
that now forms the basis of the SG’s argument—that petitioner
breached a duty to the acquiring corporation that is actionable under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”553 The jury was instead instructed that
it could find deceit if Chiarella had failed to disclose material infor-
mation to the sellers.554 Accordingly, Powell (after consulting with Jus-
tice Stevens)555 wrote to Justices Stewart, White, and Rehnquist pro-
posing an opinion reversing the Second Circuit on the ground that
549. Bench Memorandum, Chiarella v. United States, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra
note 542, at 12 (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.) (“not in amounts purchased”).
550. Id.
551. Justice Marshall missed the conference, but later communicated his vote to affirm.
Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Chiarella v. United
States 1 (Nov. 7, 1979).
552. Id.
553. Memorandum from Jon Sallet to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Nov. 25, 1979).
554. Id. at 3.
555. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice John Paul Stevens (Nov. 28, 1979).
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Chiarella owed no duty to the sellers of the securities.556 Powell pro-
posed that they leave for another day the question of whether Chi-
arella’s breach of duty to Pandick’s clients violated section 10(b).557
The published opinion reflects Justice Stevens’s position. Powell
rejects a duty to the sellers because Chiarella owed them no fiduciary
duty.558 The common law of fraud required a duty to the person on the
other side of the transaction.559 Powell used the common law as a
guide to congressional intent. In doing so, he was creating a federal
fiduciary principle, not incorporating state common law doctrines into
the federal law of fraud.560 Consequently, Chiarella sits in considerable
tension with Justice White’s rejection of a federal fiduciary standard
in Santa Fe.561
The SEC and the Justice Department were attempting to extend
section 10(b) beyond Powell’s understanding of Congress’s intention
in 1934, and the Second Circuit was acquiescing in those efforts. As
Powell saw it, courts had a responsibility to check such overreaching
by the executive branch.562 Chiarella was a conscious attempt to bring
precision and rigor to an area of the law in which the lower courts had
strayed from Congress’s purposes.563 Hence Powell’s reminder that
“Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it
catches must be fraud.”564
While the opinion attempts to ground Rule 10b-5 in the common
law of fraud, it does not reject the broader “misappropriation” the-
ory.565 This concession got Powell a majority, but left the misappro-
priation theory alive. To make matters worse, Justice Stevens high-
556. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justices Potter Stewart et al. 1 (Nov. 29,
1979).
557. Id.
558. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1980):
No duty could arise from [Chiarella]’s relationship with the sellers of the target com-
pany’s securities, for petitioner had no prior dealings with them. He was not their
agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed
their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the
sellers only through impersonal market transactions.
559. Id. at 228.
560. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Sallet, supra note 483.
561. See supra notes 168–77. On the tension between Santa Fe and Chiarella, see Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Property Rights
and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589 (1999).
562. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Sallet, supra note 483.
563. Id.
564. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234–35.
565. Id. at 236.
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lighted the theory’s potential in his concurrence.566 Powell responded
that he would prefer
not emphasizing that the result may have been different if liability
had been premised on a duty to the acquiring company, as I am by
no means sure that 10(b) should be extended this far beyond its
clear purposes at the time of its enactment in 1934. As we are talking
about criminal liability, I am inclined to think we should leave it to
Congress to draft a more refined and specific criminal statute. To be
sure, you leave the question for another day. But with a five to four
vote by the Court, I would prefer—I think—not to invite a judicial
rather than a legislative consideration of the question.567
This was about as strong an objection as Powell could muster, but
Justice Stevens nonetheless published the concurrence. In Powell’s
estimation, Congress was better placed to specify the conduct to be
prohibited.568 Powell’s preference for congressional action went un-
heeded, as Congress was unable to agree on a definition of insider
trading.569 Powell’s successors filled the gap by interpreting section
10(b) flexibly to facilitate the SEC’s efforts to crack down on insider
trading.570 That interpretive flexibility carries with it a breadth of ap-
plication that would have astounded the 1934 Congress that drafted
section 10(b).571
Powell’s opinion in Dirks v. SEC572 addressed more squarely the
relation between restrictions on the use of inside information and
market efficiency. The SEC censured Dirks, a securities analyst, for
566. Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring).
567. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice John Paul Stevens 1 (Feb. 4, 1980).
568. Powell wrote to Chief Justice Burger:
If I were in Congress, I probably would support a carefully drawn criminal statute
that would make it a crime for one to do what Chiarella did. But it is clear (at least to
me) that Congress never had the slightest intention—back in 1933 and 1934—to ex-
tend the Securities Acts to this type of situation.
. . . Before criminal liability is imposed by the courts, I think the Congress should
face up to this question, and draft a proper criminal statute that puts people on no-
tice.
I add that I do not admire Mr. Chiarella any more than you do.
Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 1 (Feb. 4, 1980).
569. Steve Thel, Section 20(d) of the Securities Exchange Act: Congress, the Supreme Court,
the SEC, and the Process of Defining Insider Trading, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1261, 1262 (1991).
570. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665 (1997) (upholding the “misappropria-
tion” theory of insider trading based on fraud on the source of the inside information).
571. On Congress’s intent in 1934, see generally Steve Thel, The Original Conception of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990).
572. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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passing to his customers information about a massive fraud at Equity
Funding that he had learned from current and former Equity Funding
employees.573 Dirks’s customers relied on that information to sell
large quantities of Equity Funding shares before the company’s col-
lapse.574
On petition for certiorari, the Solicitor General authorized the
SEC to file an opposition to the petition, but refused to join the
SEC’s position. The Solicitor General took the position that informa-
tion obtained by Dirks could not be considered confidential,575 high-
lighting the enormous obstacle that Dirks’s role in uncovering the
Equity Funding fraud posed for the SEC’s argument.576 The SEC was
therefore left to its own devices to defend its censure of Dirks. The
agency got no help from the D.C. Circuit, which affirmed the censure
on the ground that Dirks “breached his duty to the Commission and
to the public not to misuse insider information.”577 This “absurd”
holding squarely conflicted with Powell’s reasoning in Chiarella.578 Al-
though the lower court issued a more limited opinion on petition for
rehearing,579 the SEC faced an uphill battle to defend the judgment.580
The case was of obvious importance to the securities industry:
Powell’s law clerk, Jim Browning, recalls that there was “a blanket of
blue and gray suits in the courtroom” with SEC staff and the local
corporate bar taking up all the places in the audience for the argu-
ment.581 Powell had no doubt that the D.C. Circuit’s judgment should
be reversed, but he wanted to do so in way that would uphold a ban
573. In re Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, 21 SEC Docket 1401,
1421–13 (Jan. 22, 1981).
574. Id. at 1405.
575. Preliminary Memorandum, Dirks v. SEC, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note
112, at 8.
576. Powell noted this point made by the United States in its brief on the merits: “The
Commission’s erroneous imposition of liability in this case has serious consequences for federal
law enforcement, which frequently depends upon private initiative to uncover criminal con-
duct . . . Petitioner accomplished what regulatory authorities were unable to do.” Memorandum
from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to File, Dirks v. SEC 4 (Mar. 21, 1983).
577. “Bobtail” Bench Memorandum to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 3 (Mar. 21, 1983) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
578. Id. (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
579. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
580. Courts addressing the issue of tippee liability had taken a narrower approach. Donald
C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70
CAL. L. REV. 1, 29–32 (1982).
581. Telephone Interview with James Browning, supra note 541.
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on insider trading and tippee liability. He charged Browning with de-
veloping a theory that would achieve this result.
Browning was in some ways an odd choice for this task because
he had “considerable doubts that federal securities law should ban
any insider trading.”582 Moreover, he felt either the SEC’s position
prohibiting any use of inside information in trading, or the laissez
faire position permitting unconstrained insider trading, were more in-
tellectually defensible than the middle ground sought by Powell.583
But Powell saw the SEC’s approach as unpredictable and unfair;
moreover, he thought that analysts were important to the operation
of the securities markets. The SEC’s prosecution of Dirks was an as-
sault on the analyst industry.584 On the other hand, Powell’s sense of
propriety abhorred the abuse of trust that insider trading repre-
sented.585 A prohibition was appropriate, if that prohibition could be
applied fairly and predictably.586
Despite his skepticism, Browning succeeded in the task set for
him by his boss. He found the middle ground in a commentary on the
582. Memorandum from Jim [Browning] to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Mar. 22, 1983).
583. Telephone Interview with James Browning, supra note 541.
584. Id.
585. A later case confirms that Powell’s position on insider trading was based on ethics, not
finance theory. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985), raised the
issue of whether corporate insiders and broker-dealers who induce an investor to trade by
falsely representing that they are conveying inside information could raise an in pari delicto de-
fense. The plaintiffs made the somewhat unusual admission that they had purchased stock on
the basis of what they believed was nonpublic information. Id. at 302. The information proved
to be false, however, and the plaintiffs lost money. Id. at 302–03. They sought to recover their
losses from the broker-dealer who had communicated the false inside information, as well as an
officer of the issuer that was the subject of the rumor, who had tacitly confirmed the informa-
tion. Id. at 301–02.
Powell summarized his view of the case in his notes for the postargument conference:
I conclude Tippees did know that [the corporate officer] had breached his duty by
confirming that info. was not public + that broker was trustworthy. Thus tippees were
culpable.
But tippees conduct was not as culpable as tippers. Duty of tippers was clear.
Disallowing defense of in pari delicto furthers policy of Securities Acts. Persons
who become tippers present basic problem of insiders giving out tips. They should not
go free because tippees also act unlawfully.
Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Bateman Eichler,
Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner 1 (Apr. 4, 1985). This excerpt confirms that Powell viewed the
principal problem with insider trading as the abuse of trust by the corporate insider. The harm
to the securities markets stemming from information asymmetry was, at most, a secondary con-
cern. Powell’s greater concern with insider trading law was the risk posed by overaggressive en-
forcement of the prohibition by the SEC.
586. Telephone Interview with James Browning, supra note 541.
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case in a legal newspaper.587 Powell showed little interest in Brown-
ing’s extended analysis of the welfare effects of insider trading prohi-
bitions, but Browning hit the mark with his legal analysis. Browning
argued that
there was no “exploitation” by the insiders. Dirks’ informants re-
ceived no monetary benefit for revealing Equity Funding’s secrets,
nor did they have any apparent desire to make a gift of valuable in-
formation to Dirks. The informants may have had a duty not to
trade on inside information without disclosure, but they did not.
Therefore, even if Dirks’ informants did violate a duty to the com-
pany by disclosing, their conduct did not have one of the essential
elements of breach of the agency relationship: the exploitation of
corporate information by an insider.
We both know Dirks is a freak case. The situations we are con-
cerned with are where securities analysts interview employees
seeking information: is there liability? If the breach of an em-
ployee’s duty alone is enough to establish tippee liability, securities
analyst [sic] will be chilled from using any of the information he gets.
If, on the other hand, exploitation of confidential information by in-
siders is a prerequisite to tippee liability, securities analysts will be
encouraged to seek information from corporate employees. I will
not emphasize the obvious benefits of protecting the information-
gathering duties of a securities analyst.588
Powell agreed that “Dirks is easy, but is there a general principle?”589
Powell found his general principle in Browning’s “exploitation”
formulation, although he recast it. Powell, in an unusual step, pre-
pared a memorandum for the conference at which the Justices would
decide the case,590 perhaps as a bid for the opinion assignment.591 Pow-
ell wrote:
587. Leonard Chazen, “Dirks” Presents Unique Corporate, Social Issues, LEGAL TIMES,
Mar. 14, 1983, at 14. The author would not receive attribution in the opinion, however, because
of Powell’s unease with citing a piece that was not in “a scholarly journal.” Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Second Draft Opinion, Dirks v. SEC 24 (circulated May 10, 1983) (handwritten
notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
588. Memorandum from Jim [Browning] to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note 582, at
6–7.
589. Id. (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
590. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Memorandum for Conference, Dirks v. SEC 1 (Mar. 23,
1983).
591. Telephone Interview with James Browning, supra note 541.
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We made an important point in Chiarella. It did not involve a
tippee, but it did establish that liability cannot be imposed in the ab-
sence of a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading. The only refer-
ence in Chiarella to tippees is in fn. 12. The critical sentence in this
note says:
“The tippee’s obligation has been viewed as arising from his role
as a participant after the fact in the insider’s breach of a fiduci-
ary duty.”
Thus, where the tippee becomes a “participant after the fact,” he
shares whatever duty the insider breached by conveying the infor-
mation. This analysis makes Dirks’ case easy to decide. His liability
depends on a finding that the former Equity Funding employees—of
which Secrist [Dirks’s principal source] was only one—who disclosed
the fraud, breached their fiduciary duty to Equity Funding.
But even the SEC concedes there was no such breach of duty.
None of these employees profited by disclosing fraud they acted
strictly in the public interest. Therefore, Dirks was not a participant
after the fact in anyone’s breach of duty.592
In sum, Chiarella required a breach of duty and Dirks’s sources had
violated no duty. Dirks therefore could not be liable for violating
Rule 10b-5. Powell was not satisfied, however, with merely reversing
the judgment of the D.C. Circuit. He continued:
Deciding this case without identifying a general principle would
accomplish very little.
Let me make clear the type of situation to which the principle
would be applied. This case does not involve a Texas Gulf Sulfur
situation where an officer or director of a corporation himself trades
on inside information for personal gain. Nor do we have an insider—
who to benefit a friend—discloses inside information on which the
friend profits. The law is fairly well settled with respect to these
straightforward cases.
The much broader, underlying problem in this case concerns the
necessity of information being made available for the health of the
securities markets. In this case, the SEC’s opinion stated:
592. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Memorandum for Conference, Dirks v. SEC, supra note
590, at 1.
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In the course of their work, analysts actively seek out bits and
pieces of corporate information not generally known to the
market for the express purpose of analyzing that information
and informing their clients who, in turn, can be expected trade
on the basis of the information. The value to the entire market
of these efforts cannot be gainsaid: market efficiency in practice
is significantly enhanced by such initiatives to ferret out an[d]
analyze information, and thus the analysts’ works redowns [sic]
to the benefit of the investors.
If we sustain its opinion in this case securities analysts will be far
less liable to “ferret out” information. They will be concerned con-
stantly with the uncertainty of lawsuits, with juries determining
whether the information circulated was confidential and should not
have been disclosed.593
Powell’s proposed principle: “A tippee’s liability should depend on
the purpose or intent of the insider’s disclosure.” Powell conceded
that this was “a subjective rule,” but he defended it as “principled and
practical.”594 Powell recognized that the “question of ‘purpose’ (in-
tent) will be determined—as it is so often in the law—by the facts.”
The relevant facts would include
(i) The relationship between the insider and the recipient (e.g.,
the analyst); what were their respective purposes? Particularly, did
the insider expect to profit himself or to benefit a friend rather than
to inform the market generally?
(ii) Who initiated the disclosure? Typically, the analyst seeks out
the corporate executive—this is commonplace. Equally common-
place, executives brief large meeting of analysts. The circumstances
of the disclosure are relevant—as in this case.595
This fact-intensive inquiry went against Powell’s usual preference for
predictability and fairness, which had prevailed in Chiarella. But the
alternatives—the SEC’s blanket ban on the use of inside information,
on the one hand, and turning a blind eye to abuses of office by corpo-
rate insiders, on the other—were worse.
Powell’s diligent preparation was rewarded by the opinion as-
signment. Holding a court, however, would not be simple. The outra-
593. Id. at 2–3.
594. Id. at 4.
595. Id.
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geousness of the SEC’s sanctioning Dirks made it easy to find a ma-
jority for reversal,596 but no consensus emerged from the conference
on the rationale. Justice White’s vote, for example, was “tentative,”
and seemed to be based on the fact that Dirks “didn’t unload,” al-
though Justice White thought that “[h]is tippees may be guilty of
violating rules.”597 Justice Stevens, by contrast, thought that “Dirks
breached no duty. Even if he had owned stock + sold it, but [sic] he
had no duty. A person who is an outsider has no duty.”598 Justice
O’Connor thought that “the ultimate solution is to require fraud to be
disclosed first to SEC—+ would like to say this.”599 The risk that the
Dirks majority would fragment was real.
Powell and Browning struggled through seven drafts of the
opinion before it was ready to circulate. After reviewing Browning’s
first draft, Powell again emphasized the importance of protecting the
role of market analysts:
As you know, it is customary for management of listed companies to
convey supplemental information (some people call in [sic] “chum-
ming” the market) to analysts. This is done in primarily in two ways:
talks to, and questions and answer sessions with, large groups of
analysts—in effect, open meetings. Similarly, information not avail-
able through required filings with the SEC often is given at stock-
holders meetings where most of the stock is represented by proxies,
and news coverage may be scant and uninforming. The more diffi-
cult type of information gathering—difficult in terms of line drawing
for our purposes—is where the analysts will visit corporate head-
quarters and confer with senior officers. The analyst is likely to be a
specialist in the particular business. When he returns to his firm, of-
ten he will circulate “buy” or “sell” recommendations to clients and
person whom the firm would like to have as clients. These recom-
mendations are backed up by a report on the interview. The line
drawing problem is one that impacts directly on both the corporate
officers and the analysts. Neither can be quite sure when the “line”
is crossed.600
596. Even Justice Brennan, while voting for affirmance, described it as a “very close case.”
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Memorandum for Conference, SEC v. Dirks 1 (Mar. 23, 1983).
597. Handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., from the Conference on Dirks v.
SEC 1 (Mar. 23, 1983).
598. Id. at 3.
599. Id.
600. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Jim [Browning] 3 (May 2, 1983).
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Powell’s years in corporate boardrooms gave him a clear under-
standing of how corporate disclosure worked on the ground.601
The emphasis on “purpose” in determining whether there was a
fiduciary breach proved to be a stumbling block in gaining a majority.
Powell quickly got three votes for his initial circulation (Justices
White, Rehnquist, and Stevens),602 but Justice O’Connor had reserva-
tions. The first was rather idiosyncratic: she wanted to reserve the
question of whether information about criminal conduct could be
considered material information.603 While the answer to this question
would almost certainly be “Yes,” deferring the answer cost Powell
nothing.
Justice O’Connor’s second concern was more substantial. She
worried that focusing on the insider’s purpose in disclosing the infor-
mation would require “the fact-finder . . . to determine the subjective
state of mind of the insider,” “an inherently difficult determina-
tion.”604 She suggested omitting the discussion of purpose, a change
that Powell was not willing to make.605 More promising was her pro-
posed alternative, which looked to
whether the insider derives a direct or indirect benefit from his dis-
closure, and that benefit is primarily of a pecuniary nature. An em-
phasis on benefit differs from your approach only insofar as it estab-
lishes a more objective indicia of liability. If, as a factual matter, the
insider did not benefit from his disclosure, then I am not inclined to
be concerned with a further inquiry into his motivation. I am not
sure about what will be gained from an inquiry into intent, but from
601. Powell previously appears to have taken a narrower view of the legality of selective dis-
closure. In a memorandum to his law clerk in a section 16(b) case, Powell wrote: “absent a pres-
ence on the board there would be a clear violation of 10b-5 for a corporation (or its officers or
directors) to disclose to any stockholder information not available to all holders.” Memorandum
from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Carl Schenker 5 (Nov. 19, 1975). Powell apparently believed
that Rule 10b-5 would cover any selective disclosure to stockholders that led to trading. Powell’s
considerably narrower position in Dirks now has been overturned by the SEC through its
Regulation FD. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881,
[2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,676, 83,691 (Aug. 15, 2000).
602. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice Byron R. White et al. 1 (June 9,
1983).
603. Letter from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1–2 (June 7,
1983).
604. Id. at 2.
605. Id.
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my past experience on the bench, I know that a great deal of time
will be lost!606
Justice O’Connor shrewdly couched her suggested change as “more
objective” and based on her “past experience on the bench.” These
factors were well calculated to persuade Powell, who favored predict-
ability and respected the practical wisdom of experience. The opinion
accordingly was revised to reflect Justice O’Connor’s “quite construc-
tive” suggestions.607 These changes narrowed the scope of improper
purposes that the SEC could argue constituted breaches of fiduciary
duty under Rule 10b-5. Garden variety breaches of the duty of care
were clearly out; tipping required a breach of the duty of loyalty. As a
result, the federal common law of insider trading was brought into
line with the traditional distinction in state corporate law between
breaches of care and loyalty. Powell achieved his goal of protecting
the analyst community from being swamped by the prohibition
against insider trading; Justice O’Connor helped him achieve this goal
within a predictable framework.
606. Id.
607. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 1 (June 9,
1983). The changes:
Before: both the insider and the analyst will act in good faith
After: the insider will act consistently with his fiduciary duty
Before: Whether disclosure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on the
purpose or good faith of the insider who made the disclosure.
After: Whether disclosure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on the
purpose of the disclosure, i.e., whether the insider personally expects to
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.
Added: The SEC argues that, if inside-trading liability does not exist when the in-
formation is transmitted for a proper purpose but is used for trading, it
would be a rare situation when the parties could not fabricate some ostensi-
bly legitimate business justification for transmitting the information. We
think the SEC is unduly concerned. In determining whether the insider’s
purpose in making a particular disclosure is fraudulent, the SEC and the
courts are not required to read the parties minds. Scienter may be relevant in
some case in determining whether the tipper has violated his Cady, Roberts
duty, but to determine whether the disclosure itself “deceive[s], manipu-
late[s], or defraud[s]” shareholders, Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980),
courts should focus on whether the insider expects to receive a direct or indi-
rect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as—for example—a pecuniary
gain or a reputational benefit that may translate into future earnings.
Before: Determining the purpose of any one disclosure, a question of fact, will not
always be easy for the courts.
After: Determining whether an insider personally benefits from a particular disclo-
sure, a question of fact, will not always be easy for courts.
Compare Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., First Draft Opinion, Dirks v. SEC 14–15 (May 28, 1983)
with Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Second Draft Opinion, Dirks v. SEC 14–15 (June 9, 1983).
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Powell wrote a third insider trading opinion, but it never made it
to the United States Reports.608 Carpenter v. United States609 came on
certiorari to the Court during Powell’s last term. The case raised the
issue that Chiarella had left unresolved: Was a breach of duty to the
owner of inside information, rather than the counterparty to the
trade, sufficient for Rule 10b-5 liability?610 Powell saw the Second Cir-
cuit’s affirmative response to this question as a direct challenge to the
doctrine that he had developed in Chiarella and Dirks.
Carpenter involved unusual facts. Defendant R. Foster Winans
was a reporter for the Wall Street Journal and one of the writers of
the “Heard on the Street” column; defendant David Carpenter was a
news clerk at the Journal.611 Defendant Kenneth Felis was a stockbro-
ker.612 Winans would pass securities-related information scheduled to
appear in the next day’s column through Carpenter to Felis, who
would then, depending upon the tenor of the article, buy or sell the
subject securities.613 Wall Street Journal policy deemed all news in-
formation to be company property and required nonpublic informa-
tion to be treated as confidential.614 Ignoring this policy, the conspira-
tors netted nearly $690,000 from the scheme.615 The stress of an SEC
inquiry caused the conspirators to turn on each other,616 and an in-
dictment followed. The Second Circuit affirmed the conspirators’
convictions for mail, wire, and securities fraud.617 With respect to the
securities fraud counts, the Second Circuit upheld the convictions un-
der the misappropriation theory based on its earlier cases.618
The conspirators petitioned for certiorari, which the Court ini-
tially voted to deny. Powell’s draft dissent from the denial made it
clear that he would have rejected the misappropriation theory alto-
608. The discussion here draws from my earlier article, A.C. Pritchard, United States v.
O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 13 (1998).
609. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
610. Id. at 24.
611. 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986).
612. Id.
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. Id. at 1027.
616. Id.
617. Id. at 1036.
618. Id. at 1034–35. The Second Circuit also rejected the argument that the misappropria-
tion theory did not apply because the victim of the misappropriation was the Wall Street Jour-
nal and not the companies whose shares were traded. Id. at 1032–34.
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gether.619 He argued that “the Second Circuit has resolved an impor-
tant question of securities law in a way that appears to conflict with
recent opinions of this Court.”620 The first of these opinions was Chi-
arella, which began with the premise that
parties to a business transaction generally do not have an affirmative
duty to disclose information about the transaction. The court noted,
however, that a failure to disclose material information could be
fraudulent in certain circumstances. “But such liability is premised
upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and con-
fidence between parties to a transaction.”621
Powell tied his reading of Chiarella closely to the common law of de-
ceit, which requires that “[o]ne party to a business transaction is un-
der a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other before
the transaction is consummated . . . matters known to him that the
other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar rela-
tion of trust and confidence between them.”622 Thus, deceit requires
that one party to a transaction owe a duty of disclosure to the other.
Powell argued that Chiarella had incorporated this common law re-
quirement into section 10(b),623 notwithstanding the concessions he
had made to Justice Stevens in that case to secure a majority.
Powell then turned to Dirks, which “established that when out-
siders have a fiduciary duty to the shareholders, they cannot purchase
securities from those shareholders without first informing them of
material information that might influence the decision to purchase or
sell the securities.”624 Again, the relevant disclosure duty was between
the parties to the securities transaction. By contrast, in Carpenter,
there was no fiduciary relationship between the defendants and those
who had sold them securities.625 The only fiduciary relationship at is-
619. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari, Carpenter v.
United States, supra note 113, at 1. Powell had noted his plan to write in the event of a denial
even before conference. Preliminary Memorandum, Carpenter v. United States, from Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Dec. 5, 1986 Conference) (handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr.).
620. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari, Carpenter v.
United States, supra note 113, at 1.
621. Id. at 3 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980)).
622. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2) (1977).
623. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari, Carpenter v.
United States, supra note 113, at 4.
624. Id.
625. See id. (“The Court of Appeals found no fiduciary relationship between any of the peti-
tioners and the parties from whom they purchased securities.”).
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sue was Winans’s duty to the Journal.626 Powell noted, however, that
previous cases did not support the proposition that the fiduciary duty
an individual owes to his employee was sufficient to support an action
under Rule 10b-5.627 Rather, the inquiry under Rule 10b-5 “must focus
on the petitioner’s relationship with the sellers of . . . securities.”628
Because there was no such relationship, Powell concluded that the
petitioners’ conduct did not violate Rule 10b-5.629
Justices O’Connor and Rehnquist, both of whom had initially
voted to grant certiorari, joined Powell’s draft dissent.630 The dissent
was never published, however, because Justices Brennan and Scalia
switched their votes.631 Before Carpenter was argued, Powell retired.632
His successor, Anthony Kennedy, was not confirmed until after the
argument.633 The Court split 4-4 on the misappropriation theory and
consequently upheld the conviction without opinion.634 Given Powell’s
rejection of the misappropriation theory in his draft dissent, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that if Powell had not retired when he did, the
Supreme Court would have rejected the misappropriation theory in
1987. As it turned out, the Court did not decide the issue for another
decade, upholding the theory by a 6-3 vote in United States v.
O’Hagan.635 In this case Powell’s influence did not survive his retire-
ment, with even Justice O’Connor voting to uphold the theory.636
626. Id. at 4–5.
627. Id. at 5.
628. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
629. Id.
630. Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Dec.
11, 1986); Letter from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Dec. 11,
1986).
631. See Bench Memorandum, Carpenter v. United States (No. 86-422) (Oct. 7, 1987) (copy
on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 427 of Thurgood Marshall Papers).
Certiorari was granted on December 15, 1986. United States v. Carpenter, 479 U. S. 1016, 1016
(1986). Justice Brennan had been willing to endorse a much broader theory in Chiarella, so it
seems unlikely that Powell had persuaded him on the merits; more likely he saw the issue as one
that required resolution. Justice Scalia ultimately voted against the theory. See United States v.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 679 (1997).
632. See Al Kamen, Justice Powell Resigns, Was Supreme Court’s Pivotal Vote, WASH. POST,
June 27, 1987, at A1. Powell retired on June 26, 1987. Id.
633. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Kennedy Sworn in as 104th Justice on High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 1988, at A10. Kennedy was sworn in on February 18, 1988. Id.
634. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987).
635. 521 U.S. 642, 675–76 (1997).
636. Id. at 646.
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CONCLUSION
Powell worried that his experience as a corporate lawyer would
generate controversy when he was nominated to the Supreme Court.
Powell wrote to Attorney General John Mitchell in 1969, when his
name was first mentioned as a possible nominee:
My own practice, both in litigation and office work over the years,
has been largely for corporate and business clients. I also serve on
the boards of directors of several corporations of fairly substantial
size. In view of the opposition of organized labor to Judge [Clement]
Haynsworth because of his alleged “antilabor bias,” it must be as-
sumed that there would be similar opposition to any lawyer whose
professional career has been devoted primarily to business represen-
tations.637
As it happened, Powell faced no significant opposition from labor
groups,638 and his views on business received little attention during his
confirmation hearings.639 Only after Powell’s confirmation did his
somewhat strident views on defending free enterprise come under
media scrutiny, but by then it was too late.640
Powell’s judicial career shows the important role those views
played in the development of the securities law. Most of the issues
presented to the Court in the cases discussed here were nominally
questions of statutory interpretation. The Court’s opinions emphasize
statutory language, with Powell’s opinions in particular grounded in
careful statutory readings. Nonetheless, Powell’s reading of those
texts and their legislative purposes was colored by his experience in
corporate boardrooms, consistently leading him favor to narrower
readings.
637. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to John N. Mitchell, Attorney General, U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice 1 (Dec. 12, 1969).
638. Powell may have benefitted from having his nomination coupled with Justice
Rehnquist’s. JEFFRIES, supra note 17, at 10 (“Labor, liberals, and civil rights leaders who tried
to defeat Rehnquist were willing to accept Powell, if only to emphasize the contrast between the
two.”).
Powell did have an “antilabor bias” as conventionally understood, having lobbied to
strengthen Virginia’s “Right to Work” law. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Edward Emer-
son Lane 1 (Mar. 4, 1954). He also favored extending the antitrust laws to unions. See Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Trends in Antitrust, Address at the Conference of Financial Executives, supra note
299, at 17 (“When the antitrust laws were enacted there was perhaps good reason for exclusion
of fledgling unions from their anti-monopoly provisions. Today, under vastly different social,
economic and political conditions, the great monopolists in this country are the major unions.”).
639. Fred P. Graham, Powell Proposed Business Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1972, at 31.
640. Jack Anderson, Powell’s Lesson to Business Aired, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1972, at F7.
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Powell’s conservative stance in securities cases was not the prod-
uct of grand theory; he and his colleagues decided securities cases one
at a time, not as part of an overarching agenda. Powell did not sub-
scribe to the normative libertarianism or economic analysis that en-
chants some corporate and securities law academics. Rather, Powell’s
nearly forty years of experience in corporate boardrooms led him to
trust the character of the average American businessman. That trust
was reinforced by working alongside those clients in civic affairs. In
Powell’s world, free enterprise and the businessmen who made it
work were the foundation of strong communities. Free enterprise was
a resource to be preserved, not a menace to be tamed. Character, not
the threat of lawsuits, was the safeguard of the integrity of American
capitalism. That trust in American business led Powell to read the se-
curities laws—in all good faith—as setting down predictable rules that
would allow business to proceed without undue interference or liabil-
ity risk. These narrow readings reversed the trend in the Second Cir-
cuit and other lower courts to expand the securities laws. The securi-
ties laws experienced a counterrevolution, not as the result of a coup,
but because of the commitments and intuitions derived from one per-
son’s experience before becoming a Justice.
Powell’s experience as a corporate lawyer gave him credibility
when he urged his colleagues to disagree with the position taken by
the SEC, as he so often did. Having worked with the SEC from its
earliest days, Powell recognized the departure in the agency’s aggres-
sively expansionist tack. Agency expertise carried no weight when the
SEC came into court with newly developed positions that conflicted
with Powell’s understanding of well-established practice. The defer-
ence that the SEC had enjoyed in the Supreme Court before Powell’s
confirmation evaporated. If the Court deferred to anyone in securities
cases, it was to Powell and his experience, not the SEC and its efforts
to reshape the securities markets. As a result, the SEC’s winning per-
centage plummeted, particularly in the highest profile cases.
Powell’s experience did not always push him to oppose regula-
tion. Powell was not naïve; he recognized that there were abuses in
American business. His distaste for the abuse of trust of insider trad-
ing led him to read the common law of fraud broadly in Chiarella to
make room for a prohibition under section 10(b). The SEC’s “parity
of information” position would have cracked down on this abuse
more completely, but it went “too far” beyond any possible intention
of Congress. While regulation of insider trading was warranted, it
could not come at the expense of the law’s predictability.
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A more significant departure from free market dogma was Pow-
ell’s profound suspicion of takeovers. Federal preemption, pushed by
the SEC, was the most promising avenue for preserving a free market
in corporate control. Powell’s distrust of that market led him to toler-
ate state regulation of takeovers, which invariably protected man-
agement. Here, too, his instincts were grounded in experience. Powell
wanted to preserve space for local businesses and businessmen to
contribute to the community in the way that he and his clients, people
like Harvie Wilkinson, had done. Powell’s support for state efforts to
discourage takeovers was consistent with his federalist principles,
making Powell’s position that much easier to defend. Powell shut the
door to a free market in corporate control in CTS and corporate
managers sleep better as a result.
Was Lewis Powell’s influence on securities law a good thing?
One can disagree with the normative perspective that Powell brought
to the interpretation of the federal securities law. Powell’s experience
gave him expertise, but that expertise was infused with attitudes
gained through nearly forty years of practice as a corporate lawyer. It
seems unlikely that many Justices consider the corporate bar the rele-
vant audience for his or her work, as Powell did.641 The close connec-
tion between Powell’s attitudes and his readings of statutory text will
trouble those who subscribe to formalist theories of statutory inter-
pretation which require judges to be neutral readers. Realism seems
to capture better the interpretive practice of the Supreme Court in
the field of securities law. Powell’s emphasis on statutory text and
structure in his opinions may have been a strategic device, intended to
cabin the interpretive latitude of the lower courts rather than the Su-
preme Court. Perhaps another Justice with a greater faith in formal-
ism would better separate his own views from his statutory readings.
The deference that Powell got from his colleagues due to his ex-
perience (and perhaps, their lesser interest) will trouble those who
are sanguine about the role of private litigation in protecting investors
and who are less troubled by the risk of SEC overreaching. Perhaps
he trusted the character of the American businessman too much and
the plaintiffs’ bar and the staff of the SEC too little. As Powell recog-
nized, the reputation of business and businessmen has waxed and
waned throughout American history. The public’s regard for the
641. The SEC was also apparently part of the relevant audience. See Memorandum from
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Paul Cane 1 (Mar. 17, 1981) (“The SEC’s staff—and perhaps
members of the Commission—will be interested in our opinion [in Nuveen].”).
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business community is at a low ebb today due to events that would
have appalled Powell. Enron and the accounting scandals that have
followed it might well have shaken his confidence in the character of
American businessmen, a central premise underlying his efforts to
cabin the securities law.
Powell’s securities law legacy, however, does not rest solely on
the attitudes that he brought to that work. Powell’s presence ensured
that the Court would avoid the temptation to neglect the highly tech-
nical field of securities law, as it has done since his retirement. More
importantly, his influence ensured that the Court’s work in the area
would at least be sensible, if not invulnerable to criticism. Since Pow-
ell’s retirement, the Court’s forays into this area have been occasion-
ally impenetrable642 and sometimes bizarre.643 On other occasions the
Court simply regurgitates the party line offered by the SEC.644 Over-
all, “scholars and learned practitioners are giving the Court’s securi-
ties law opinions low grades for logic, clarity, and usefulness in future
cases.”645
Criticisms of this sort cannot be leveled at Powell’s work in secu-
rities law. Although practitioners and scholars can quarrel with par-
ticular outcomes, the cases decided under Powell’s guidance cannot
be described as incompatible with the basic structure of the securities
laws and corporate practice. Powell ensured that the revolution in the
securities laws that the Second Circuit had launched in the 1960s
(with the Supreme Court’s encouragement) would not stifle the free
enterprise in which Powell so fervently believed. Powell would take
pride in his success as a counterrevolutionary in the field of securities
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